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Abstract 
This publication explores the impact of procedural provisions inserted in EU fundamental rights 
legislation (in particular non-discrimination law) that are aimed at facilitating access to court in support 
or on behalf of victims. The papers investigate the interplay between: 1. ‘collective actors’ understood 
in the broad sense to cover civil society organisations and independent organisations such as equality 
bodies intended to represent individuals; 2. the actual litigation on EU fundamental rights law before 
domestic courts as it unfolds before the CJEU by way of preliminary references; and 3. the rules on 
access to domestic courts (shaped, to some extent, by EU legislation) as providing legal opportunity 
structures for preliminary references to the CJEU. 
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Introducing the role of collective actors and preliminary references  
in the enforcement of EU fundamental rights law 
 
Claire Kilpatrick & Bruno De Witte* 
 
This collection of papers is situated at the confluence of two burgeoning fields of European Union law: 
the field of European equality law, where it seeks to contribute to the scholarship that explores the 
conditions for equality law to have a transformative effect in European societies; and the field of the 
enforcement of EU law, where it enters the debate on the limits of individual litigation and the promise 
of alternative enforcement mechanisms and of public interest litigation. 
The contributions to this collective working paper were originally presented at a workshop that took 
place at the European University Institute on 24 February 2017. The aim of this publication is to explore 
the impact of procedural provisions inserted in EU fundamental rights legislation (in particular non-
discrimination law) that are aimed at facilitating access to court in support or on behalf of victims. The 
papers investigate the interplay between:  
1. ‘collective actors’ understood in the broad sense to cover civil society organisations and 
independent organisations such as equality bodies intended to represent individuals, 
2. the actual litigation on EU fundamental rights law before domestic courts as it unfolds before 
the CJEU by way of preliminary references,  
3. and the rules on access to domestic courts (shaped, to some extent, by EU legislation) as 
providing legal opportunity structures for preliminary references to the CJEU. 
The question of the enforcement of EU law before domestic courts has traditionally been examined from 
the vantage points of the principles developed by the Court of Justice in this regard: the principles of 
primacy and direct effect as the background conditions for such enforcement; and the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence shaping more specifically the conditions for access to court at the national 
level. These general principles are well established and well-studied. More recent research has also 
examined the way in which EU legislation may influence the conditions for access to courts to enforce 
EU law. Procedural provisions intended to facilitate the enforcement of a given policy are more and 
more often inserted in specific EU instruments. The increasing attention to this remedial dimension is 
well illustrated by a comparison of the Data Protection Directive of 1995 and its successor, the General 
Data Protection Regulation of 2016. As shown by Orla Lynskey in her contribution, the former 
contained only limited provisions on its domestic judicial enforcement, whereas the latter text contains 
important additional provisions on effective remedies and collective action. Occasionally, the EU 
legislator has enacted directives that are exclusively aimed at improving the effective enforcement of a 
branch of EU law, as with the Directive on consumer injunctions,1 the Directive on enforcement of 
intellectual property rights2, the Directive on damages for infringements of competition law3 and the 
Directive on enforcement of the posted workers rules.4 The increasing number of such piecemeal 
enforcement regimes has prompted comparative reflection on the differences and similarities between 
                                                     
*  Claire Kilpatrick is Professor of International and European Labour and Social Law at the European University Institute 
(EUI) in Florence. Bruno de Witte is Professor of European Union Law at Maastricht University, and a part-time professor 
at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. He is co-director of the Maastricht Centre for European Law. 
1  Directive 2009/22, OJ 2009, L 110/30. 
2  Directive 2004/48, OJ 2004, L 195/45. 
3  Directive 2014/104, OJ 2014, L 349/1. 
4  Directive 2014/67, OJ 2014, L 159/24. 
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them.5 Beyond those piecemeal and sector-specific attempts at harmonising the conditions for effective 
enforcement of EU law, the European Commission has promoted a discussion on the development of 
‘horizontal’ reforms of enforcement, as for example in its Recommendation of 2013 on collective 
redress.6 
EU anti-discrimination law is one of the prime areas in which harmonization of substantive law has been 
accompanied by harmonization of domestic procedures. There is abundant writing on the substantive 
side of EU equal treatment law, including also some research on the strategies developed by collective 
actors to make use of these EU-based rights to equal treatment. In contrast, the actual legal mechanisms 
through which domestic actors are empowered to access national courts for enforcing these rights have 
been more rarely examined. Aiming at filling this gap, the papers in this collection engage with the 
following set of common questions: What can we learn from the past ten to fifteen years of experience 
with those procedural rules introduced in domestic legal orders by EU equality legislation and by other 
fundamental rights legislation? What is the practical impact of the procedural provisions inserted side 
by side with substantive rights in EU fundamental rights legislation? Do they indeed have an impact on 
access to court and the litigation process? Does this influence the preliminary ruling procedure? And are 
we witnessing the development of a European brand of public interest litigation? It is worth exploring a 
little further some design features of the project. 
It is clear that collective actors (equality bodies, NGOs and trade unions) can and do take fundamental 
rights claims to court, leading to preliminary references, without any special EU legal support. The well-
known example of the litigation strategy of the UK gender equality agency, the Equal Opportunities 
Commission, in the 1990s did not derive from any particular EU equality law provisions supporting 
collective actors. EU gender equality law at that time provided only that: 
Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such measures as are necessary to 
enable all persons who consider themselves wronged by failure to apply to them the principle of equal 
treatment … to pursue their claims by judicial process after possible recourse to other competent 
authorities.7  
However, the new generation of EU discrimination law of the 2000s8 changed the procedural and 
institutional landscape in two specific ways this project aims to probe.9 Both seek to facilitate litigation 
by supporting or encouraging the involvement of a broad range of actors next to individual victims. Both 
are modelled on, and can be illustrated by, the relevant provisions in the Racial Equality Directive. The 
first might be called a collective actor defence of rights requirement: 
                                                     
5  See e.g. M. Eliantonio & E. Muir (eds.), Special issue on the incidental proceduralisation of EU Law, 8 Review of European 
Administrative Law (2015) nr 1; F.G. Wilman, Private Enforcement of EU Law before National Courts: The EU Legislative 
Framework (2015). 
6  Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the 
Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union law, COM(2013)3539. 
7  Equal Treatment Directive, Article 6 (Directive 76/207/EEC, OJ 1976 L 39/40); see also the Equal Pay Directive, Article 6 
(Directive 75/117/EEC, OJ 1975 L 45/19): ‘Member States shall, in accordance with their national circumstances and legal 
systems, take the measures necessary to ensure that the principle of equal pay is applied. They shall see that effective means 
are available to take care that this principle is observed.’ 
8  Race Equality Directive (Directive 2000/43/EC, OJ 2000 L 180/22); the Framework Equal Treatment Directive covering age, 
disability, religion/belief and sexual orientation (Directive 2000/78/EC, OJ 2000 L303/16); Gender Equality Employment 
Directive (Directive 2006/54, OJ 2006 L 204/30) which recast EU gender equality law and replaced the multiple earlier 
Directives covering gender equality in employment and occupation; Gender Equality Goods and Services Directive 
(Directive 2004/113/EC, OJ 2004 L 373/37); Gender Equality Self-Employment Directive (Directive 2010/41/EU, OJ 2010 
L 180/1) which replaced and repealed Directive 86/378/EEC. 
9  Other related innovations in the new generation of equality and discrimination directives are not specifically investigated 
such as the requirements to encourage dialogue with relevant stakeholders (see eg Articles 21 and 22 of the Gender Equality 
Employment Directive). 
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Member States shall ensure that associations, organisations or other legal entities, which have, in 
accordance with the criteria laid down by their national law, a legitimate interest in ensuring that the 
provisions of this Directive are complied with, may engage, either on behalf or in support of the 
complainant, with his or her approval, in any judicial and/or administrative procedure provided for 
the enforcement of obligations under this Directive. 
This provision is replicated in all the new generation of equality directives.10 It is worth noting that it 
does not extend to allowing collective actors to act on behalf of complainants without their approval.  
The second kind of provision requires the existence of an equality body which can provide independent 
assistance to victims in pursuing discrimination complaints.11 EU law accordingly requires the creation 
of a new collective actor where such a body does not already exist. However, this requirement applies 
only in relation to race and gender and not to the multiple grounds covered in the Framework Equal 
Treatment Directive: age, religion or belief, disability and sexual orientation. In addition, it does not lay 
down a requirement that such bodies are allowed to initiate legal proceedings. 
These new EU legislative collective actor requirements have a capacity to lead to change in two key 
ways. First, they have a capacity to act as a policy anchor or inspiration for similar requirements in areas 
of EU law seen by those involved in the policy process as related in some relevant way. At domestic 
level, to give just two examples that resonate with the findings of the project, this can occur by ‘over-
implementing’ the directives so as to provide for an equality body in areas other than race and gender 
or by allowing that equality body to participate in legal proceedings. At EU level, as noted above, there 
has been a recent spread of related procedural requirements. The hypothesis driving the selection in this 
project is that ‘fundamental rights’ may be a frame viewed as a relevant one to spur the diffusion of such 
requirements, a frame whose relevance is evidently enhanced by the contemporaneous creation of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. This can be because equality and non-discrimination may be seen 
as like other fundamental rights, such as the right to data protection or the right to asylum, both explored 
in this project. It can also be because procedural rights themselves are interpreted as fundamental rights: 
the requirements to ensure access to court and effective judicial protection, as fundamental rights 
informing such procedural requirements, may lead to their protection and further development. Links to 
human rights, especially the ECHR, can further strengthen this.12 That is to say, the fundamental rights 
frame can lead to spill-overs and the reinforcement of procedural protections in legislative and judicial 
processes. This feature is reflected on further by Elise Muir in her concluding contribution. 
Second, these new collective actor requirements in EU equality legislation have a capacity to change 
not just the law on the books, the transposition of the directives’ requirements, but also equality law 
                                                     
10  Article 7(2) Race Equality Directive; Article 9(2) Framework Equal Treatment Directive; Article 17(2) Gender Equality 
Employment Directive; Article 8(3) Gender Equality Goods and Services Directive; Article 9(2) Gender Equality Self-
Employment Directive. 
11  Article 13 Racial Equality Directive: “1. Member States shall designate a body or bodies for the promotion of equal treatment 
of all persons without discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. These bodies may form part of agencies 
charged at national level with the defence of human rights or the safeguard of individuals' rights. 2. Member States shall 
ensure that the competences of these bodies include: - without prejudice to the right of victims and of associations, 
organisations or other legal entities referred to in Article 7(2), providing independent assistance to victims of discrimination 
in pursuing their complaints about discrimination....”. For gender, this requirement was first introduced in Directive 
2002/73 which amended the 1976 Equal Treatment Directive and is now contained in Article 20 of the 2006 Gender 
Equality Employment Directive, Article 13 of the Gender Equality Goods and Services Directive and Article 11 of the 
Gender Equality Self-Employment Directive. 
12  Article 47 EUCFR (right to an effective remedy and a fair trial). For an early important use by the Court of Justice of the 
ECHR to underpin equality procedural protection, see Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the RUC [1986] ECR 
1651. For instance, the Court of Justice has made it clear that the limits on collective actors in EU equality legislation do 
not prevent Member States granting them more extensive rights, such as allowing equality bodies to initiate legal 
proceedings or allowing collective actors to act without the approval of the complainant (see C-54/07 Feryn, para 39 and 
C-81/12 Accept, para 37).  
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practices and litigation at domestic level. Yet a capacity to change is no more than that; the project is 
interested in exploring when and how these requirements actually played a role in new equality law 
practices by collective actors. The distinctive angle or ‘hook’ the project has chosen to ‘get at’ the 
transformative impact, or lack thereof, of these new EU collective actor requirements is the identification 
of preliminary references involving collective actors. Of course, new EU equality collective actor 
requirements may create extensive equality law innovations and litigation at domestic level which do 
not lead to preliminary references to the Court of Justice of the European Union. And the decision to 
make such references lies with the national court. Why then focus on preliminary references involving 
collective actors? There are two main reasons. First, the search for such preliminary references involving 
collective actors provides a shared point of departure for opening a wider range of questions. In relation 
to discrimination law these include the domestic transposition of EU collective actor legislative 
requirements. What changes were made at national level as a result of these EU requirements? Did those 
changes lead to more use of discrimination litigation, or a preliminary reference strategy, by collective 
actors? Are some kinds of collective actors, such as equality bodies, more active participants in litigation 
than others? What else led to preliminary references? What else are collective actors doing? This 
starting-point then leads to a richer understanding not just of which collective actors and national judicial 
procedures shape litigation and preliminary references but also which other actors or factors shape 
fundamental rights litigation, how collective actors interact, and what else they do alongside or instead 
of litigation. Hence the first reason for the choice of preliminary references is that they provide a useful 
jumping-off point for rich and careful domestic contextual inquiry into the impacts of EU collective 
actor legislative requirements. Providing accounts of EU discrimination practices from six EU Member 
States, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Denmark and Italy, invites comparative reflection and 
further refinement of the conditions under which specific collective actors engage in litigation leading 
to preliminary references. Academic and political resistances to EU discrimination law, vividly depicted 
by Latraverse for France and Möschel for Germany, as well as the fragility of collective actors in times 
of austerity and rule of law crises in a number of EU states, are important features to consider as limiting 
factors. 
The second reason is that preliminary references in and of themselves raise specific and interesting 
questions with regard to collective actors. First, where a collective actor is involved in a preliminary 
reference, there is often a set of specific strategic reasons for seeking a preliminary reference, as well 
illustrated in the examples of the Rosselle (C-65/14) reference on pregnancy discrimination from 
Belgium in the analysis by Kolf and Muir and the Danish disability reference in Ring and Werge (C-
335 and 337/11) in the analysis by Atanasova and Miller. Second, collective actors involved in 
preliminary references will have a right to intervene before the CJEU only if they are formally a party, 
including being a third party, in the domestic proceedings. A spectacular example of this, explored by 
Lilian Tsourdi in her contribution, is the interventions before the CJEU by Amnesty, AIRE, the UNHCR 
and the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission in the NS and M.E cases (C-411/10 and C-493/10) 
on the return of asylum seekers to Greece which could occur because they were formally third parties 
in the UK court proceedings leading to the reference. Where collective actors are not formally a party 
to the domestic proceedings detecting their presence is not straightforward and requires investigating 
behind the scenes. Hence reading the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice in Kamberaj (C-571/10), 
in a reference raising issues of nationality and race discrimination, one would have no idea that it was a 
pilot case emerging from strategic litigation involving four NGOs, trade unions and their lawyers who 
participated extensively in the Italian domestic proceedings as uncovered by Passalacqua in her 
contribution. Third, the mixed roles of equality bodies in some states, as quasi-judicial instances 
alongside other equality roles, can lead to peculiar interactions with the design of the preliminary 
reference procedure. In the Bulgarian race equality context, as explored by Farkas, it led to an equality 
body’s preliminary reference being rejected because it was not a court (Belov, C-394/11) but that 
equality body subsequently found itself as a defendant in a preliminary reference in connected legal 
proceedings after its quasi-judicial determination was challenged before a court (CHEZ, C-83/14). 
Fourth, although it is the national court which makes the decision to refer, in practice the contributions 
Introducing the role of collective actors and preliminary references 
European University Institute 5 
to this research project show that collective actors can play a substantial role in steering that decision 
and drafting the questions referred to the Court of Justice. Hence, this project casts interesting light on 
the ‘reality’ of collective actor involvement in preliminary references. It also raises questions about the 
exceptionally limited space the preliminary reference procedure affords collective actors which are not 
formally parties in the domestic proceedings at the Court of Justice stage of the proceedings.  
All the papers, except the last three, deal with EU anti-discrimination law. A review of the CJEU case 
law on anti-discrimination since 2000 (i.e. the year in which the relevant rules were first introduced in 
EU equality law) reveals that a number of countries stand out by the number of cases involving a 
collective actor and having led to a preliminary ruling by the CJEU, whereas in other countries nothing 
of the kind has happened. In the first contribution, Alvaro Oliveira sketches the collective enforcement 
of anti-discrimination law from a comparative perspective. The next two papers deal with relatively 
small Member States in which collective action has repeatedly been successful in bringing 
antidiscrimination cases to the CJEU by means of preliminary references, namely Belgium (paper by 
Elise Muir & Sarah Kolf) and Bulgaria (paper by Lilla Farkas); whereas in Belgium, the cases concern 
a variety of grounds of discrimination, in the case of Bulgaria the collective actors have focused on the 
protection of Roma against discrimination on the ground of their ethnicity. A second pair of papers 
examine the cases of France (by Sophie Latraverse) and Germany (by Mathias Möschel), two large 
countries from which hardly any preliminary references involving collective actors have emerged, 
despite the fact that litigation on non-discrimination is generally quite frequent there; the authors of 
these two papers examine the reasons why collective actors have not been able, or have not sought, to 
involve the CJEU by means of preliminary references. The following two papers deal with two countries 
that are situated in between the two other groups, Denmark and Italy. Whereas the Danish case (analysed 
by Atanasova and Miller) is characterized by the active role played by one type of collective actor, 
namely the trade unions, the Italian case (presented by Virginia Passalacqua) is characterized by the 
focus on non-discrimination on grounds of nationality as a tool to protect immigrant minorities. Two 
further papers of this collection are devoted to exploring the real or potential impact of procedural rules 
on access to court in other branches of EU law with strong fundamental rights dimensions, namely data 
protection (Orla Lynskey) and asylum law (Lilian Tsourdi). In the final contribution, Elise Muir draws 
the conclusions emerging from the individual papers as to the phenomenon of collective enforcement of 
EU law in the interplay between national and European courts. 
 
  
 
What difference does EU law make? The added value of EU Equality Directives  
on access to justice for collective actors 
 
Álvaro Oliveira* 
 
This paper examines the impact on national legislation of the provisions of EU Equality Directives on 
access to courts by collective actors, such as associations and trade unions.  
First, it recalls the historical origin of these provisions, which can be put in the framework of the 
virtuous dynamic of EU equality law, where protection from discrimination is progressively reinforced 
and extended step-by-step.  
Subsequently, the paper explains that most Member States had to change their legislation in order to 
comply with the new Equality Directives, notably regarding access of associations to courts. However, 
the changes were not of the same scale in all Member States. The impact of the Directives was generally 
stronger in Southern countries and those that acceded to the Union in 2004 or afterwards. Several 
among these countries lagged behind in granting collective actors, such as associations, the right to 
access courts. However, it was also the case that, when they transposed the Directives, often those 
Member States went beyond the strict minimum necessary to comply with them. 
In conclusion, the analysis made in this paper indicates that the provisions of the EU Equality Directives 
on access of collective actors to justice had a significant impact on national legislation in EU Member 
States. Together, these directives constitute one important factor, among many others, in facilitating the 
practical access to courts for victims of discrimination.  
Introduction  
What is the added value of EU equality directives1? This paper focuses specifically on the rules of the 
directives on access to justice by private collective actors, such as trade unions and associations 
concerned with equality.2 The role of governmental agencies, such as state equality bodies, will also be 
analysed here, but only to provide a more general context.3 
First, the paper starts with an historical note. It highlights the virtuous dynamic of EU equality law, 
where protection from discrimination is progressively reinforced and extended step-by-step. This is 
usually the result of a constructive dialogue between the EU legislator and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (the “EU Court of Justice” or “EU Court”).  
                                                     
*  ISCTE – University Institute of Lisbon, currently on long-term leave of absence. The author is currently working for an EU 
institution, but the content of this paper does not reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Responsibility for the 
information and views expressed therein lies entirely with the author. This text is based on a paper originally presented in 
February 2017 at the E.U.I. The author would like to thank Elise Muir for her guidance and suggestions, as well as to Gina 
Babinec and Fabian Luetz for useful comments. 
1  I refer to Directive 2000/43 on equal treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19/7/2000, p.22; Directive 
2000/78 on equal treatment in employment based on religion or belief, age, disability and sexual orientation, OJ L 303, 
2/12/2000, p. 16; Directive 2004/113 on equal treatment between men and women in access to goods and services, OJ L 
373, 21/12/2004, p. 37, and Directive 2006/54 on equal treatment between men and women in employment and occupation 
(recast), OJ L 204, 26/7/2006, p. 23.  
2  Article 7(2) of Directive 2000/43, article 9(2) of Directive 2000/78, article 8(2) of Directive 2004/113 and article 17(2) of 
Directive 2006/54.  
3  See section 3 below.  
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The origin of EU equality rules on the role of private collective actors is also part of this positive dynamic 
of increased protection against discrimination. However, since these rules resulted from lobbying by 
civil society, they constitute an exception to the usual bilateral dialogue between the EU legislator and 
the EU Court of Justice – a process during which EU institutions influence each other, and working 
towards a shared objective, provide the impetus for new developments in EU equality law.  
Secondly, the paper examines the impact that EU Directives had in this respect on national legislation.  
Most Member States had to change their legislation in order to comply with the new equality directives, 
notably regarding associations’ access to courts. However, the changes were not the same everywhere. 
This paper identifies three groups of Member States: a) those in which the Directives had a significant 
impact on national law, b) those in which they had a certain, but not considerable impact and c) those in 
which they did not have a significant impact.  
The impact of the Directives was generally stronger in Southern countries and in those that acceded to 
the Union in 2004 or afterwards. Several among these countries lagged behind in granting collective 
actors, such as interested associations, the right to access courts. However, it was also the case that, 
when they transposed the Directives, often those Member States went beyond the strict minimum 
necessary to comply with them. 
In this section, reference will be made to the other papers in this series examining in detail national 
legislation and case law regarding access to courts in individual Member States.  
Finally, this issue is put into a larger context, considering other rules of EU equality law, such as those 
on equality bodies and on the burden of proof, as well as other factors influencing the practical access 
of victims of discrimination to the courts. 
A historical note  
The virtuous dynamic 
In EU equality law there is usually a virtuous dynamic that develops the protection against 
discrimination step-by-step. The protection is not only progressively reinforced as time goes by; it is 
also extended from one area of social life to another and from one ground of discrimination to others.  
The plot usually goes like this. The legislator adopts general rules prohibiting discrimination, either in 
the Treaties or in directives. The EU Court of Justice is then obliged to interpret their precise meaning 
and effect. To respect the intention of the legislator and to make such rules meaningful, the Court usually 
strengthens their effect and adopts a broad interpretation. Later the legislator codifies the rules and 
principles developed by the Court in statutory law. Moreover, when some rules are adopted regarding 
one ground of discrimination, for example sex, it appears justified to apply them also to other grounds 
of discrimination, for example race, and eventually the legislator follows suit.   
Of course, this is a movie, not a photograph. The dynamic is not always perfect and, as for any human 
creation, the existing law can certainly be improved.4 But it is submitted that in EU equality law this 
positive trend is quite clear. 5 The following are a few examples.6 
                                                     
4  See, for example, Erica Howard, The EU Race Directive : Time for Change ?, International Journal of Discrimination and 
the Law, 2007, Vol. 8, p. 237.  
5  This seems to contrast with the USA, where the Supreme Court has occasionally adopted a restrictive interpretation of equality 
statutory law, and in certain cases the legislator (Congress), has subsequently adopted legislation to counter such judgments 
by reinforcing the reach and scope of previously adopted legislation. 
6  For a more detail account of these historical developments see Bruno de Witte, From a “Common Principle of Equality” to 
“European Antidiscrimination Law”, American Behaviorial Scientist 53(12) 2010, p. 1715 and Elise Muir, Procedural 
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In the original EEC Treaty, entered into force in 1957, Article 1197 established in general terms the 
principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work. In 1976, in the second Defrenne 
case, the Court ruled that that Treaty article had direct effect and could thus be invoked directly by 
workers in national courts – even if this conclusion was not technically obvious.8  
In 1981, the Court ruled that Article 157 prohibited not only direct sex discrimination, but could also 
forbid indirect sex discrimination. In the case, part-time work was paid at an hourly rate lower than full-
time work. The Court ruled that this was not per se discriminatory on the basis of sex. However, since 
most part-time workers were women, and since it was difficult for women to work full-time, that 
difference in salary could be indirectly discriminatory on the grounds of sex.9 
In 1989, in Danfoss,10 the Court went one step further and ruled that the burden of proof should be shared 
between the claimant and the defendant. When the claimant presents evidence that indicated the 
possibility of discrimination, the defendant should prove that the behaviour at stake was not 
discriminatory. In that case, a trade union complained that a company’s pay system resulted in women 
having an average pay lower than men. The point was that the company gave to workers individual 
salary supplements in a non-transparent way. The Court ruled that the employer had to make its pay 
system transparent and had to indicate the criteria it applied to give out supplements. Only in this manner 
could the courts check whether discrimination had occurred. Otherwise, women “would be deprived of 
any effective means of enforcing the principle of equal pay”.  
In December 1997, the EU legislator adopted the directive on the burden of proof,11 bringing into 
statutory law the rule that was originally created by the Court.  
The two Anti-discrimination Directives adopted in 200012 consolidate the rules of the previous directives 
and the previous case law and go beyond them.  
They were adopted within a specific political context. On the one hand, they were the result of an 
important phase in European political integration. The Treaty of Maastricht, which entered into force in 
1999, extended the competences of the EU regarding immigration, while giving it powers to adopt 
legislation against discrimination. Meanwhile, in 1999, a Convention had drafted the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.13 Prohibiting race discrimination in EU law can be seen as 
the counterweight to closing borders to immigration from third countries.  
On the other hand, with the federal elections in 1999, a new-right majority took power in Austria. It was 
made up of the ÖVP, the Christian-democrats, a party accustomed to being in power, but also the 
“Freedom Party” of Jörg Haider, a politician known for his philo-nazi and anti-semitic statements.  
In this context, when the Anti-discrimination Directives were adopted, they carried a specific function: 
they were supposed to make a strong statement against racism, xenophobia and right-wing extremism. 
                                                     
Rules in the Service of the “Transformative Function” of the EU Equality Law: Bringing the Prohibition of Nationality 
Discrimination Along, Review of European Administrative Law, 8 (1) 2015, p.153. 
7  Now Article 157 of the TFEU.  
8  Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena (1976) ECR, 455. See the analysis made by Evelyn Ellis and Philippa Watson in EU Anti-
Discrimination Law, OUP, Oxford, 2012, at p.246. 
9  Case 96/80, Jenkins v. Kinsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd (1981) ECR 911. 
10  Case 108/88 (1989) ECR 3199.  
11  Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex, OJ L 14, 
20.1.1998, p. 6. 
12  Directive 2000/43/EC on equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin and Directive 2000/78/EC 
on equal treatment in employment and occupation, quoted above. 
13  The Charter was solemnly proclaimed by the EU institutions originally in 7 December 2000 and was given full legal effect 
by the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009. 
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The protection that the Directives created should be meaningful, in order to show that EU governments 
were serious about their commitment to fight discrimination.  
For that purpose, while inspiration was drawn from many sources and the Directives included new ideas, 
they also consolidated concepts taken from previous EU directives and from the case law of the Court 
on equality. The 2000 Directives, for example, list the different types of prohibited discrimination, which 
include direct and indirect discrimination. They also include a rule on the sharing of the burden of proof, 
originally created by the Court in the cases on sex equality and later incorporated into the directive on 
the burden of proof.14 
When the anti-discrimination directives were adopted in 2000, they were the best car in town. Of all of 
the EU law instruments against discrimination, they contained the most detailed and most effective 
protections.  
It was only logical that in 2002 the legislator amended the directive on sex equality in employment15 
including therein several rules used in the 2000 Anti-discrimination Directives – including provisions 
on access to courts by associations and the establishment of equality bodies. Protection against sex 
discrimination should not be weaker than that of any other ground.16  
Along the same line, in 2014 some aspects of the protections provided by the 2000 Directives, such as 
the right of associations to participate in court procedures, as well as the existence of equality bodies, 
were extended to free movement of workers.17 
The origins of the rule on access to justice by collective actors  
The rule in the Anti-discrimination Directives on access to courts by collective actors was not the result 
of the case law of the Court, but of lobbying from civil society. In this sense, although the rule 
participates in the positive dynamic of increased protection against discrimination, it introduces an 
external element, and therefore constitutes an exception to the usual pattern of bilateral dialogue, in 
which the EU legislator and the EU Court of Justice influence each other, and ultimately determine the 
trajectory of EU law.  
The rule of the Directives stems from a proposal presented in 1993 by a network of NGOs and 
independent experts (the “Starting Line Group”) for a Council Directive concerning the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, developed later in 1998 in a proposal that also concerned religious 
discrimination.18 The proposal received the support of hundreds of NGOs and of the European 
Parliament.19  
Article 4 of the Starting Line proposal suggested that: 
                                                     
14  See above at footnote 12. 
15  Directive 2002/73 of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle 
of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions, L 269, of 5.10.2002, p. 15. Later, in July 2006, Directive 76/207 was repealed and replaced by Directive 
2006/54. 
16  Recital 6 of Directive 2002/73 refers to the fact that, while Directive 76/2027 did not define direct and indirect discrimination, 
Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78 did so and it was “appropriate to insert definitions consistent with these Directives in 
respect of sex”.  
17  Directive 2014/54/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on measures facilitating the exercise 
of rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of movement for workers, OJ L 128, 30.4.2014, p. 8. 
18  See Conor A Gearty, The Internal and External ‘Other’ in the Union Legal Order : Racism, Religious Intolerance and 
Xenophobia in Europe, in "The EU and Human Rights", Philip Aston (ed.) OUP, Oxford, 1999, at p. 350. 
19  In a 1993 resolution (OJ C 342, of 20.12.93, p.19) and again in a 1994 resolution (OJ C 323, of 20.11.94, p. 154, para. 9) the 
Parliament asked the Commission to use the proposal as a basis to prepare a draft directive to be presented to the Council. 
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organisations concerned with the defence of human rights and in particular with the combating of racism 
and xenophobia shall be able to institute or support legal actions in civil, administrative and criminal 
courts enforcing the rights granted under this Directive and provisions in national law granting protection 
against racial and religious discrimination in areas (covered by the Directive).20 
The final provision21 adopted by the Council was a bit less ambitious.22 It stated:  
Member States shall ensure that associations, organisations or other legal entities which have, in 
accordance with the criteria laid down by their national law, a legitimate interest in ensuring that the 
provisions of this Directive are complied with, may engage, either on behalf or in support of the 
complainants, with his or her approval, in any judicial and/or administrative procedure provided for the 
enforcement of obligations under this Directive. 23 
Different from what the Starting Line proposed, the Directives provide that it is for the Member States 
to decide whether associations have a legitimate interest in the enforcement of the Directive. Moreover, 
associations must obtain the approval of a victim of discrimination to act in court.  
Nevertheless, this provision was a novelty in EU law at the time of its adoption in 2000. It constituted 
undisputable progress in the protection against discrimination. But did it make a difference? Did it have 
any meaningful impact on national legislation?  
The impact on national legislation – the added value  
This section examines the impact on national legislation of the Equality Directives’ provisions on access 
to courts by private collective actors, such as associations or foundations concerned with equality. Did 
the Directives make any difference in this respect? Did national laws have to be changed to comply with 
the Directive? How much did they change?  
As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the European Commission scrutinized the legislation of 
all Member States to ensure that it complied with the directives in general, including the rights of 
associations to have access to courts. 
A specific situation relates to position of trade unions. Before 2000, when Member States already 
prohibited discrimination (most prohibited sex discrimination, for example), normally they allowed 
trade unions to go to court to defend the interests of their members. Therefore, when examining below 
the impact that the Directives had on national legislation, I will concentrate on the rights of associations 
other than trade unions, such as human rights associations, or associations of people united by their 
characteristics – such as ethnic origin, disability or sex.  
                                                     
20  Article 4(4) d) of the “Starting Line proposal”. For a comparison of the text of this proposal and the Commission’s proposal, 
see: 
http://www.migpolgroup.com/wpkln/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/98.CombatingRacismintheEuropeanUnionwithLegalMe
ans-AComparisonoftheStartingLineandtheEUCommissionsproposalforaRaceDirective_2000.pdf 
21  Article 7(2) of Directive 2000/43 and article 9(2) of Directive 2000/78. They are identical or very similar to those adopted 
later in article 8(2) of Directive 2004/113 on sex equality in access to goods and services, article 17(2) of Directive 2006/54 
on sex equality in employment and occupation, and later article 3(2) of Directive 2014/54 on exercise of rights in free 
movement of workers.  
22  The text of Article 7(2) of the Commission proposal, COM (1999) 565, was simpler: “Member States shall ensure that 
associations, organisations or other legal entities may pursue, on behalf of the complainant with his or her approval, any 
judicial and/or administrative procedure provided for the enforcement of obligations under this Directive.” 
23  See also recital 19 of the Directive 2000/43 : “To provide a more effective level of protection, associations or legal entities 
should also be empowered to engage, as the Member States so determine, either on behalf or in support of any victim in 
proceedings, without prejudice to national rules of procedure concerning representation and defence before the courts.” 
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The situation varied considerably across the European Union.24 For the sake of simplicity, in this paper 
Member States are divided into three groups. In the first group we can include those where the Directives 
had a considerable impact on national law. In the second group of Member States, the Directives had 
some impact on national law, but they did not make a radical change to it. In the third group of countries, 
the Directives did not make much of a difference in this specific aspect. 
Below, I examine the situation in fourteen Member States.25 Their selection was made taking into 
account those with the largest populations and that could best represent the variety of legal traditions 
and socio-economic realities within the European Union. When explaining their legislation, I will refer 
to the other papers in this series that examine in detail national legislation and case law regarding access 
to courts in individual Member States. 
The reader may think that, in some cases, the classification of some Member States in a specific group 
is not clear-cut. Indeed, this is not an exact science and this is only my personal opinion. In any event, 
the description below contains an explanation of the reasons for my classification.  
Considerable impact  
In some Member States there were no, or almost no, rules on access of associations to courts in 
discrimination cases. Therefore the transposition of the Directives had a very significant impact on 
national legislation. Some of these countries went also beyond the minimum necessary to transpose the 
Directives. 
In Belgium, as explained in the paper of Elise Muir & Sarah Kolf, the rights of associations to go to 
court in discrimination cases pre-dated the adoption of the 2000 Anti-discrimination Directives. The 
1981 law against racism26 and later the 1993 law creating the Belgian racial equality body27 (the “Centre 
for the equality of chances and combat against racism”) provided the right for interested associations 
and trade unions to go to courts in discrimination cases, but to criminal courts only. The Centre could 
also bring cases to criminal courts, going beyond what Directive 2000/43 would require much later in 
2000.  
In 2003 a new law28 transposing Directives 2000/43 and Directive 2000/78 made litigation before civil 
courts accessible both to the Centre and to associations. It also enlarged the competence of the Centre 
to include the grounds of discrimination covered by Directive 2000/78, which was not required by the 
latter.  
In Bulgaria, the Protection Against Discrimination Act provides for the rights of interested associations 
to act on behalf of victims of discrimination in court proceedings when the victims request them to do 
so. Associations can also act in support of victims by joining pending proceedings as an interested party. 
29 These rights did not exist before the adoption of the Act in 2003.  
                                                     
24  For a brief description of the current situation see A comparative analysis of non-discrimination law in Europe 2016, by 
Isabelle Chopin and Catherine Germaine, at p.87: http://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/3987-a-comparative-analyses-of-
non-discrimination-law-in-europe-2016-pdf-1-2-mb  
25  Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.   
26  Law of 30 July 1981 on the repression of acts inspired by racism or xenophobia.  
27  Law of 15 July 1993 creating the Centre for the equality of chances and combat against racism. Today the name of the Centre 
is Unia. 
28  Law of 30 July 1981 on the repression of acts inspired by racism or xenophobia.  
29  Article 11.  
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In the Czech Republic, associations can now act on behalf and in support of claimants of discrimination 
in court proceedings. This was possible after the adoption of the related provisions of the Anti-
Discrimination Act of 2009.30 
In Greece, before the 2000 Anti-discrimination Directives, the law did not ensure that associations or 
other interested organizations could engage in legal proceedings in individual cases of discrimination. 
This was provided by the Law 3304/2005, transposing the two Anti-discrimination Directives, which 
established the right of associations to support a complainant, on condition that, (a) they have a 
legitimate interest in ensuring the application of the principle of equality and (b) the victim gives her or 
his consent. This right was a novelty in Greek law, but resulted in a rather minimalistic transposition of 
the Directives.  
In Italy, thanks to the Directives, associations now have the right to access courts, both on behalf and 
in support of victims of discrimination. This is the most protective interpretation of the provisions of the 
Directives, because, strictly speaking, they only require that associations be able to “engage, either on 
behalf or in support of the complainants, with his or her approval” in enforcement procedures. Moreover, 
in Italy associations may also act in court regarding discrimination affecting an undetermined group of 
people. Such extensive rights were provided by the Italian legislation transposing the concerned 
directives.31 The transposition of Directive 2000/78 was initially incomplete and the Commission had to 
initiate infringement procedures against Italy on this point, which ended with an amendment to the initial 
legislation.  
On the other hand, Italy seems to be the only EU Member State where associations fighting race and 
ethnic discrimination face more barriers to access courts than associations working on other grounds. 
Special conditions apply to them: to have access to courts they have to be included on a special list 
approved by the government, which implies, among several other conditions, that they must have been 
established for one year, have a democratic structure, be non-profits and have the promotion of equality 
as their main aim. Similar restrictions apply to disability-concerned associations,32 but not to 
associations concerned with discrimination based on sex, age, or sexual orientation.  
As Virginia Passalacqua notes in her paper in this series, at this moment the main anti-discrimination 
provisions in Italian law are the result of the transposition of EU Equality Directives – with the exception 
of Immigration Law of 1998, which prohibits discrimination based on nationality, race, religion and 
ethnic origin, which is still in force. The problem is that the rules on access to courts are provided by 
each specific piece of anti-discrimination legislation. This fragmentation of rules of procedure creates 
uncertainty. For example: the locus standi of associations in cases of race discrimination does not apply 
to cases of nationality discrimination, which is sometimes very much related to race or ethnic 
discrimination. Therefore, in some cases, associations that brought to court cases of nationality 
discrimination have had their locus standi challenged. 
In Poland, associations now have the right to engage in court proceedings, both on behalf of and in 
support of victims of discrimination. This was provided by an amendment33 to the Code of Civil 
Procedure adopted in July 2004, soon after the EU accession. To benefit from these rights, associations 
must aim at the promotion of equality and protection from discrimination and have to obtain the written 
                                                     
30  Article 71(2) of the Protection Against Discrimination Act.  
31  See Article 5 of Decree 215/2003 transposing Directive 2000/43; Article 5 of Decree 216/2003 (as amended by Article 8-
septies of Law 101 of 6/6/2008) transposing Directive 2000/78 and Article 38 of Decree 198/2006 regarding sex 
discrimination.  
32  Article 4 of the Disability Act 67/2006.  
33  It entered into force in February 2005. See Articles 8, 61 and 462.  
Álvaro Oliveira 
14 Department of Law Working Papers 
consent of the claimant. The Code applies in cases regarding consumer protection, labour law and social 
security. Similar rights exist in administrative proceedings. 34  
In Portugal, Article 52(3) 35 of the Constitution and Law 83/95 created a right of actio popularis, but it 
applies only to specific areas, such as infringements against public health, the environment, cultural 
heritage or consumers’ rights. Law 134/1999, which predates the 2000 Directives, prohibited 
discrimination based on race, colour, nationality or ethnic origin. However, it did not provide for the 
right of associations to go to court. This was partially remedied by Law 18/2004, which transposed 
partially Directive 2000/43. Its Article 5 provided for the right of interested associations to access courts 
on behalf or support of a claimant, with his/her approval. However, this law did not solve completely 
the problem, since it did not apply to employment. Associations could not access courts in labour 
proceedings (either concerning private or public employment). In judicial proceedings related to private 
employment, only trade unions could intervene and only in relation to their members. 
Therefore, in 2007 the EU Commission initiated infringement proceedings on this point against 
Portugal, which eventually adopted a new law in 2011 which settled the issue. Article 8 of Law 3/2011 
now allows for interested associations to intervene on behalf of a victim of discrimination, with his/her 
approval in related proceedings (without limitation). This applies both to the grounds of the 2000 
Directives and to sex discrimination.  
Finally, in Romania, Article 28 of the Anti-discrimination Law36 of 2000 created legal standing for 
NGOs with an interest in combating discrimination. They can either appear in court as parties in cases 
involving discrimination within their field of activity and which prejudice a community or a group of 
persons, or, in the alternative, in cases involving discrimination of one person, on condition that the 
latter gives the NGO authorisation to do so. In practice they can either assist victims of discrimination, 
or act on their behalf in court.  
As Lilla Farkas points out in her paper on Bulgaria and Romania, during the transposition of the 
Directives, both countries levelled up procedural requirements. Domestic procedural rules go now 
beyond the requirements of the EU Equality Directives. EU law facilitated access to courts and to 
equality bodies on grounds beyond racial or ethnic origin. As she explains, these improvements explain 
in part the origin of several preliminary rulings before the EU Court of Justice originating from these 
two countries. They arose out of a mix of collective enforcement and enforcement involving the national 
equality body.  
A certain, but nor radical impact 
For an important group of Member States the Directives did not mean completely radical change. 
Typically, they already provided some rights for associations and did not strengthen these rights 
considerably. Nevertheless, in several of these Member States, the rights of associations were explicitly 
included in the equality legislation, thereby establishing this right in a clearer manner than before.   
In France, Article 31 of the Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile, a provision originally from 1975, 
already recognised the general standing of any legal person, such as an NGO, who had a legitimate 
interest in a civil procedure. However, the transposition of the Equality Directives regulated this right 
in a more detailed manner. For example, Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78 were initially transposed by 
the Law no. 1066-2001 of 16 November 2001, which provided that trade unions and NGOs existing for 
more than five years could intervene in court in any action where one worker or a candidate for a job 
                                                     
34  Provided the issue at stake is related to the objectives of the association and there is a public interest in its participation in 
the proceedings. This last condition is examined by the administrative body concerned, but the decision may be appealed, 
Polish Code of Administrative Procedure, Article 31(1).  
35  Article adopted by the 1989 Revision of the Constitution, although the Constitution itself is from 1976. 
36  Governmental Ordinance 137/2000.  
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alleged to be a victim of discrimination, with their consent (Article L122-45-1 of the Labour Code). This 
rule applied also to sex discrimination and its basic content is still in force today (Article 1134-7 of the 
current Labour Code).  
In Germany associations have a limited right to support victims in court and cannot bring proceedings 
on their behalf. Article 23 of the AGG, 37 the anti-discrimination law of 2006, establishes that interested 
associations can provide legal advice to a claimant in court hearings, unless procedural law requires that 
a lawyer represents him or her. In essence, associations can assist victims in first instance proceedings 
only. Moreover, this limited right is only available to non-profit and permanent associations with at least 
75 members, or an association comprised of seven associations. This rule applies to all grounds of the 
2000 Directives and to sex discrimination.  
Additional rights are provided in Germany for associations concerned with persons with disabilities. 
The Federal Act on Equal Opportunities for Disabled People of 2002 allows those associations to act on 
behalf of victims of disability discrimination and permits a sort of actio popularis. These associations 
can act in the public interest without identifying a specific victim. But this Act focuses on accessibility 
for persons with disabilities in relation to public bodies.  
In his paper on Germany, Mathias Möschel argues that the German legal and political communities had 
mostly hostile reactions to the introduction of the AGG. In his view, this approach influenced the 
transposition of the Directives, with a restrictive legal framework that limited the use of equality 
legislation by collective actors. He explains that, with the exception of one association with a strategic 
litigation approach (the Büro zur Umsetzung von Gleichbehandlung e.V.), in general anti-discrimination 
associations “have not really been active to use that little room granted to them.” 
In Hungary, it was only with the entry into force of the Equal Treatment Act adopted in 2003 that the 
rights of associations were fully guaranteed. The Act provides that interested associations may represent 
victims of discrimination in proceedings to enforce the equality law. In administrative procedures, they 
are entitled to the rights of the claimant, which means that they can support, but not initiate the 
proceedings. Associations may also bring claims to courts regarding the situation of a large undefined 
group of people.38 
In Spain the Organic Law on Judicial Authority, of 1985 already provided that courts “shall protect 
rights and legitimate interests, both individual and collective” and for that purpose “legitimacy will be 
conferred on corporations, associations and groups which are affected or are legally empowered to 
defend and assist them.” This general right was later explicitly inscribed in laws applicable to 
associations concerned with equality. Law 62/2003 of 30 December 2003, which transposed both Anti-
discrimination Directives, provided in its Article 31 for the right of associations to participate in judicial 
proceedings on behalf (not in support) of a claimant with his/her authorization. This article applies to 
race and ethnic origin discrimination only and only to fields other than employment. Along the same 
lines, Organic Law 3/2007 of 22 March 2007 for the effective equality between women and men, which 
transposed Directive 2006/54 on sex equality in employment, provides in its Article 12(2) that 
associations have the right to participate in related judicial and administrative procedures, but the details 
that govern an association’s rights vary according to the applicable procedural law.  
Not a significant impact  
In the Netherlands, the Civil Code has provided since 1994 that a foundation or association with full 
legal capacity can bring a claim to court to protect interests that are similar to its statutory objectives.39 
                                                     
37  Law of 25 February 2003 on the fight against discrimination.  
38  Articles 18 and 20 of the Equal Treatment Act of 2003. 
39  Article 3:305a on “Collective actions”. 
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They can therefore act of behalf of victims of discrimination, if, for example, they aim to combat 
discrimination or defend the rights of a group of people, such as persons with disabilities. With the 
authorization of the victim, they can also support in court victims of discrimination. Lastly, according 
to Article 12(2)(e) of the General Equal Treatment Act, which dates also from 1994, they can ask the 
equality body to start investigations to determine whether discrimination took place or is taking place.   
Finally, in the United Kingdom too the Directives do not seem to have made much of a difference in 
this regard. On the one hand, there are no restrictions under procedural law for associations to support 
victims of discrimination, for example, by providing legal advice and financial assistance. However, 
they cannot engage in proceedings on behalf of those victims. In any event, associations play an 
important role in access to courts by victims. It has been reported that complainants in the employment 
tribunal are regularly represented by the equality body, local equality councils, trade unions, 
complainant aid organisations, citizens advice bureaux and other similar organisations.40  
Conclusions of the analysis above 
Logically, the impact of the Directives on national legislation depended on two factors: what rules 
existed before and what rules were adopted during the transposition of the Directives.  
Some countries already provided for the right of associations to intervene in court and did not feel there 
was a need to change their legislation. Other countries did not provide for such rights, and had to 
introduce new provisions. However, some of these latter countries, when they adopted new legislation, 
decided to go beyond minimum compliance with the Directive. In many cases, they ended up providing 
more extensive rights for associations than countries that already had some rules in place when the 
Directives were adopted.  
For example, many of the countries that acceded in 2004 or afterwards to the EU now provide that 
associations have the right to intervene either on behalf or in support of claimants. This means that the 
associations have the two possibilities. They may choose one or the other. By contrast, for example in 
the United Kingdom, associations can only support victims of discrimination.  
An overall examination of the situation in the Member States analysed above indicates the following.  
The impact of EU Law on national legislation seems to have been generally stronger in Southern 
Member States and in Member States that acceded to the EU in 2004 or afterwards. Concerning the 
latter, the adoption of anti-discrimination legislation was one of the requirements to accede to the 
European Union and was subject to the accession negotiations within the “Social Chapter”. Improving 
the right of associations to access courts did not involve any expense (at least not immediately) or major 
economic impact, contrary to other requirements during the negotiations. Often, the new legislation was 
seen also as part of a more general progressive trend in the protection of human rights.41 Several among 
these “new” or Southern countries ended up having rules that provided associations with broader rights 
to access courts than several older or Northern Member States.  
My analysis above, somehow confirmed by the discussions in the workshop in the E.U.I. in February 
2017, indicates that the more remote the Member State was from Brussels, the more the chances were 
that the transposition of the Directives had a greater impact in their law.  
In this context, Belgium is a relative atypical case. Here the transposition of the Directives created a 
clearly positive dynamic and finished by having an important impact on national legislation. The new 
                                                     
40  Barbara Cohen, 2002 report on the Transposition of Directive 2000/43/EC, European Group of non-governmental experts in 
the field of combating racial and ethnic discrimination.  
41  Note the comments of Lilla Farkas, in her paper on Bulgaria and Romania, referring to the fact that the Romanian law 
transposing the Directives was drafted with the participation of civil society and having international law on human rights 
as a source of inspiration.  
What difference does EU law make? The added value of EU Equality Directives… 
European University Institute 17 
legislation went far beyond what was required by EU law, although the country had already a tradition 
as a pioneer in granting access to courts for associations.  
The map below illustrates the impact on national legislation of the provisions of the EU Equality 
Directives on access of associations to courts. 
Group 1: strong impact  
Group 2: a certain impact 
Group 3: no significant impact  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The bigger picture – burden of proof, equality bodies and beyond  
The present issue should be put into context. The impact of the specific EU equality rules on private 
collective actors cannot be understood in isolation. It must be examined taking into consideration, for 
example, the impact of other rules of EU Equality Directives, such as those on the sharing of the burden 
of proof and on the role of equality bodies.  
If we consider the changes brought by the EU Equality Directives on national legislation, the impact of 
the EU rules on the burden of proof was perhaps as important, if not more so, than that of the rules on 
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to transpose the rules on the sharing of the burden of proof.42 Some studies have been done on this 
subject,43 but it would certainly be important to deepen the research on this important topic. 
Moreover, the impact of the Directives was also very important regarding the obligation to establish an 
equality body, with competence to assist victims of discrimination.  
Article 4(4) e) of the Starting Line proposal44 suggested that: 
Member States shall ensure that: (…) In each Member State appropriate bodies shall be established to 
which complaints of any activities which are contrary to the principle of equal treatment (…) may be 
submitted; such bodies shall be required to investigate all complaints made to them and shall be granted 
all necessary powers to investigate any complaint. Such bodies shall reach conclusions on all complaints, 
which conclusions shall be public, save that where appropriate the body may exclude from any public 
document information enabling identification of a complainant. 
Article 13 of Directive 2000/43/EC established a slightly softer version of this provision, but one that is 
still quite meaningful:  
1. Member States shall designate a body or bodies for the promotion of equal treatment of all persons 
without discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. These bodies may form part of agencies 
charged at national level with the defence of human rights or the safeguard of individuals' rights. 
2. Member States shall ensure that the competences of these bodies include: 
- without prejudice to the right of victims and of associations, organisations or other legal entities referred 
to in Article 7(2), providing independent assistance to victims of discrimination in pursuing their 
complaints about discrimination, 
- conducting independent surveys concerning discrimination, 
- publishing independent reports and making recommendations on any issue relating to such 
discrimination. 
As mentioned above, in 2002 an amendment to Directive 2002/73 also provided for the creation of 
equality bodies in the field of gender equality.45 
The importance of equality bodies for the enforcement of equality rights cannot be underestimated. Their 
efficiency depends on several factors, including the resources available to them and therefore varies 
considerably among Member States. 
However, in several Member States equality bodies have played a crucial role in facilitating access to 
justice for victims of discrimination. In some cases, they are indeed the main entity in the country 
bringing cases to courts. Although, strictly speaking, this is not required by the Directives, several 
equality bodies in the EU have the right to participate themselves in court proceedings, bringing a case 
to court, or supporting a victim of discrimination.46  
                                                     
42  See A comparative analysis of non-discrimination law in Europe 2016, by Isabelle Chopin and Catherine Germaine, at p.96, 
mentioned above. For a more in-depth analysis, see also Reversing the burden of proof: Practical dilemmas at the European 
and national level, by Lilla Farkas and Orlagh O’Farrell, report of the European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-
discrimination field for the European Commission, Brussels, 2014: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ 
discrimination/files/burden_of_proof_en.pdf 
43  Idem.  
44  Quoted above.  
45  New article 8a of Directive 76/207/EEC, introduced by Directive 2002/73/EC, above quoted. 
46  According to the report Study on Equality Bodies set up under Directives 2000/43/EC, 2004/113/EC and 2006/54/EC, by 
Margit Ammer et al (eds.), 2010, at least 12 equality bodies in the European Union have the right to bring a case to court, 
while six (some among the former) have the right to represent victims in court, at p.83.  
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The importance of the role of equality bodies after the adoption of the Equality Directives is confirmed 
in several papers in this series.  
As explained by Elise Muir & Sarah Kolf, Belgian equality bodies have been at the vanguard of 
important litigation before the EU Court of Justice. This was clear in cases such as Feryn47 and Achbita48 
(respectively, brought to court and supported by the race equality body), Rosselle49 (brought to court by 
the gender equality body50). Meanwhile, the case Test-Achats51 was brought to court by a consumer 
protection association.  
A similar situation took place in Bulgaria and Romania, as explained by Lilla Farkas. Several 
preliminary ruling procedures before the EU Court of Justice originating from these two countries were 
the result of a mix of collective enforcement and enforcement involving the national equality body. The 
well-known case Chez (Nikolova),52 for example, involved sustained public interest litigation, with the 
use by NGOs of the procedural tools provided by the transposition of Directive 2000/43/EC for 
collective enforcement and with the participation of the Bulgarian equality body.  
Likewise, as described by Sophie Latraverse, the action of the French equality body53 has been 
absolutely crucial for overcoming resistance to EU anti-discrimination legislation in France and, 
together with very active NGOs, for promoting enforcement of discrimination laws. Since its creation 
in 2005, the body has had a stable and “comprehensive strategy to support plaintiffs, facilitate 
enforceability, multiply cases, and thereby contribute to the building of a corpus of jurisprudence” of 
civil and administrative courts, which is important for the enforcement of discrimination laws. 
This does not mean that it is enough that equality bodies or interested associations are active and have 
access to courts for equality laws to be enforced.  
Access to courts is of course also determined by other factors beyond the reach of current EU law that 
result in obstacles to access to justice. These obstacles may include, among others, national court fees, 
availability of legal aid, and the lack of a strong legal litigation culture in most countries in continental 
Europe.  
More generally, legal and court proceedings are of course only the tip of a big iceberg. There is still 
certainly a lot to do to change the current situation. Discrimination is a widespread phenomenon in 
Europe and many victims do not report the instances of discrimination they suffer.  
According to the Eurobarometer report on Discrimination in the EU in 2015, among the people 
interviewed, 21% people said that they personally felt discriminated against or harassed in the 12 months 
preceding the survey. Moreover, they believed that discrimination was widespread on the grounds of 
ethnic origin (64%), sexual orientation (58%), religion or belief, disability (both 50%), old age (42%), 
and gender (37%).  
                                                     
47  Case C-54/07, Feryn, ECLI:EU:C:2008:397. 
48  Case C-157/15, Achbita, ECLI:EU:C:2017:203. 
49  Case C-65/14, Charlotte Roselle v INAMI and UNM, ECLI:EU:C:2015:339. 
50  The Institut pour l’égalité des femmes et des hommes, established in 2002. 
51  Case C-236/09 Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2011:100. 
52  Judgment of 16 July 2015, in Case C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie (Nikolova), ECLI:EU:C:2013:48. See the note on the case 
“A good chess opening: Luxembourg's first Roma case consolidates its role as a fundamental rights court” by Álvaro 
Oliveira and Sarah-Jane King, European Law Review, 2016, vol. 41, Issue 6, p. 865.  
53  Initially the HALDE, Haute Autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l'égalité, later integrated into the Défendeur 
des Droits. 
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More interestingly, the same survey indicates that if they were the victim of discrimination or 
harassment, only 6% of the respondents would prefer to report their case to the courts, and only 5% to 
an NGO or association.54 
Conclusion  
This paper started with an historical note, explaining what I call the virtuous dynamic of EU equality 
law, through which protection from discrimination is progressively reinforced and extended, step-by-
step. The origin of the rules of the EU Equality Directives on the role of private collective actors and 
their access to courts can be explained in the framework of that virtuous dynamic. However, since those 
rules resulted from lobbying by civil society, they constitute an exception to the usual bilateral dialogue 
between the EU legislator and the EU Court of Justice, during which the institutions influence each 
other, and together influence the direction of EU equality law.  
Subsequently, the paper examined the impact of these directives on national legislation. Most Member 
States had to change their legislation in order to comply with the new Equality Directives. However, the 
impact was not the same in all Member States, which is confirmed by other papers in this series on 
individual Member States. This paper identified three groups of Member States: a) those in which the 
Directives had a significant impact on national law, b) those in which they had a certain but not 
considerable impact and, c) those in which they did not have a significant impact.  
The impact of the Equality Directives on national legislation was generally stronger in Southern Member 
States and Member States that acceded to the EU in 2004 or afterwards. This was not only due to the 
fact that before the Directives these countries lagged behind in granting collective actors the right to 
access to courts. It is also explained by the fact that, when they transposed the Directives, they took 
advantage of the opportunity to go clearly beyond the strict minimum necessary to comply with the 
Directives. Several among these “new” or Southern countries ended up having rules providing 
associations with broader rights to access to courts than several older or Northern Member States.  
In other words: my analysis above, confirmed by the discussions in the workshop in the E.U.I. in 
February 2017, indicates that the more remote the Member State was from Brussels, the greater the 
chances were that the transposition of the Directives had a greater impact on the national law.  
In any event, access to courts by associations must be put into a broader context. In order to examine 
the impact of the Directives generally on access to courts by victims of discrimination, it is important to 
consider other (new) rules of EU equality law, such as those on indirect discrimination, equality bodies 
and on the burden of proof. More generally, access to courts is also determined by factors beyond the 
reach of current EU law, such as rules on court fees, availability of legal aid at national level, and the 
(lack of) a legal litigation culture in most countries in continental Europe.  
In conclusion, the analysis made in this paper seems to indicate that the provisions of the EU Equality 
Directives on access of collective actors to justice in discrimination cases had a significant impact on 
national legislation. Together, these directives constitute one important factor, among many others, in 
facilitating the practical access to courts for victims of discrimination.  
                                                     
54  They would prefer to report their case to the police (35%), an equal opportunities organisation (17%), a lawyer (17%), or a 
trade union (9%), although, of course, in practice these groups do not work in isolation. For example: it is common for a 
victim of discrimination who is a trade union member to have recourse to an in-house or outside lawyer. See Special 
Eurobarometer 437: Discrimination in the EU in 2015 – which can be found here : https://data.europa.eu/ 
euodp/en/data/dataset/S2077_83_4_437_ENG 
  
 
Belgian equality bodies reaching out to the CJEU: EU procedural law as a catalyst 
 
Elise Muir & Sarah Kolf* 
 
Introduction 
Belgium stands out in terms of the number and high profile of cases brought by collective actors in the 
field of anti-discrimination law that have reached the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).1 
In Feryn,2 Rosselle,3 Test-Achats4 and more recently Achbita,5 Belgian collective actors - civil society 
organisations and independent organisations such as equality bodies - have sought to push equality law 
forward through litigation, reaching beyond domestic courts through the preliminary ruling procedure 
provided in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).These cases 
not only inform EU substantive law on equal treatment, but also provide food for thought regarding the 
mechanisms that enhance the effectiveness of a fundamental rights policy designed at a supranational 
level. What are the key features of the procedures and processes through which collective actors activate 
the various layers of norms and players involved in the governance of fundamental rights in the EU? Do 
procedural requirements regarding access to justice imposed by EU law actually facilitate public interest 
litigation? 
An examination of the set of events that led to the rulings identified above reveals that the provisions of 
EU law on access to courts for collective actors in anti-discrimination cases have had a significant impact 
on facilitating litigation. EU anti-discrimination legislation has indeed been characterised by the 
presence of procedural rules on access to courts for a long time.6 Since 2000, these rules seek to facilitate 
                                                     
*  Elise Muir is Associate Professor of Law and head of the Institute for European Law at KU Leuven. Sarah Kolf is Academic 
Assistant, European Legal Studies Department of the College of Europe. The authors are grateful to Stefan Sottiaux for 
useful comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer of course applies. 
1  Empirical research coordinated by Elise Muir and available on request to the author reviewed CJEU cases involving collective 
actors from 2000, when the relevant rules were first introduced in EU equality law, until 1 March 2016. This research 
revealed that a number of countries, such as Belgium, stand out regarding the number of cases involving a collective actor 
that have led to a preliminary ruling by the CJEU. 
2  CJEU Case C-54/07, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. Firma Feryn NV, 10 July 2008. 
3  CJEU Case C-65/14, Charlotte Rosselle v. Institut national d’assurance maladie-invalidité and Union nationale des mutualités 
libres, 25 May 2015. 
4  CJEU Case C-236/09, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v. Conseil des ministres, 1 March 
2011. 
5  CJEU Case C-157/15, Samira Achbita and Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. G4S Secure 
Solutions NV, 14 March 2017. 
6  Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
application of the principle of equal pay for men and women [1975] OJ L45/19, Art.2; see also Council Directive 
76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards 
access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions [1976] OJ L39/40, Art.6; Council 
Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men 
and women in matters of social security [1979] OJ L6/24, Art.6; Council Directive 86/378/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes [1986] OJ 
L225/40, Art.10; Council Directive 86/613/EEC of 11 December 1986 on the application of the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women engaged in an activity, including agriculture, in a self-employed capacity, and on the protection 
of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood [1986] OJ L359/56, Art.9; see also Council Directive 
92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work 
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litigation by supporting the involvement of a broad range of actors to assist individual victims.7 Two 
provisions common to the relevant EU equality directives play a central role to that effect; they are 
modelled on Articles 7(2) and 13 of Directive 2000/43 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin,8 known as the Race Equality Directive. 
According to Article 7(2), Member States shall ensure that legal entities which have a legitimate interest 
in ensuring that the provisions of the Directive are complied with may litigate. Importantly, ‘legitimate 
interest’ is to be defined in accordance with national law and access to justice is only required for legal 
entities acting on behalf or in support of victims and with their approval; there is no requirement to 
create a right to bring self-standing collective legal actions. Article 13 of the Race Equality Directive 
refers to the Member States’ duties to designate a body or bodies for the promotion of equal treatment. 
The competences of these bodies shall include the provision of independent assistance to victims of 
discrimination in pursuing their complaints; there is no requirement that the equality bodies be granted 
access to justice. It shall be noted that Article 13 is reproduced in similar terms (for our purposes) in all 
equality directives except for Directive 2000/78 (also known as the ‘Employment Equality Directive’), 
which covers discriminations on grounds of sexual orientation, disability, age and religion/belief in 
employment.9 As will be discussed below, these rules have been influential in involving collective actors 
in the litigation of discrimination cases in Belgium. 
Yet, these EU law requirements are not the only factors that explain this form of public interest litigation. 
Access to courts in the cases examined below did not solely derive from EU requirements. Instead, EU 
law acted as a catalyst in a legal landscape that was already broadly favourable to public interest 
litigation. The collective entities used existing expertise to make the most of the opportunities created 
by EU law. Before investigating the variety of elements that have made it possible for collective entities 
to benefit from EU equality law in Feryn, Achbita and Rosselle (sections 3 & 4), we point out some key 
features of the Belgian legal context from which the cases have emerged. These features are also well 
illustrated by the Test-Achats case (section 2). 
The emphasis placed on collective actors as a result of EU law requirements, transposed into a country 
with a legal culture already familiar with, and accepting of, the concept of collective redress, has been 
a catalyst for a particularly fruitful use of the preliminary ruling procedure (section 5). In the three cases 
brought by collective actors owing to procedures facilitated by EU law, institutionalised and specialised 
actors in the form of equality bodies have had a decisive influence on the use of the preliminary reference 
procedure and the nature of the legal questions that reached the CJEU. As emerges from this case study, 
the involvement of collective actors in litigation usefully complements classic forms of institutional 
enforcement10 and can be significantly influenced by EU legislation promoting the role of collective 
actors if implemented in a favourable legal culture.  
                                                     
of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the 
meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) [1992] OJ L348/1, Art.12.  
7  Such provisions were introduced in EU equality directives as from 2000 (the so-called Art.19 TFEU Directives with Directive 
2000/43 covering race, and Directive 2000/78 covering sexual orientation, disability, age and religion/belief) and then 
included in other Directives in 2002 (Directive 2002/73 amending the sex equality in employment Directive (76/207), 2004 
(Directive 2004/113 on sex equality in access to goods and services), 2006 (Directive 2006/54 Employment Equality 
Directive recasting EU sex equality law) and 2010 (Directive 2010/41 on the application of the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity). 
8  Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective 
of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22.  
9  Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16. 
10  See further: M. Dawson & E. Muir, ‘Individual, institutional and collective vigilance in protecting fundamental rights in the 
EU: Lessons from the Roma’, 48 (3) Common Market Law Review (2011), p. 751-775. 
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A Belgian legal culture favourable to granting collective entities access to courts 
Belgium has a tradition of fairly broad access to courts for collective entities. Two examples related to 
equality law make this clear. The first one relates to access to criminal courts; the other to the rules on 
standing before the Belgian constitutional court. 
Collective entities have had access to court in criminal cases involving discrimination well before the 
adoption and implementation of the EU equality directives. The first Belgian equality body, the “Centre 
pour l’égalité des chances et la lutte contre le racism” or “Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor 
racismebestrijding”11 (the ‘Centre’ or CGKR) existed before EU law required the creation of equality 
bodies.12It initially specialized in racism and xenophobia and had the power to bring cases before 
criminal courts on such matters in accordance with a law from 1981.13 Similarly, legal entities other than 
the Centre (associations having a special interest and trade unions) were entitled to appear in criminal 
courts.14 In many ways, the CGKR could in fact have served as a model for EU equality bodies. Along 
with the British Commission for Racial Equality, the CGKR was one of the first bodies created to combat 
racism in Europe.15 In 2003, a new law amended the 1993 law as part of an effort to implement the Race 
Equality Directive, which made litigation before civil courts in disputes relating to employment, as 
exemplified in Feryn and Achbita, possible.16 After another important reform in 2013, which will be 
addressed later, the Centre was renamed “Unia” in 201617. For the purpose of this paper, any reference 
to the “Centre” or “CGKR” should be understood to apply also to its successor Unia, unless otherwise 
stated. 
Another illustration is Article 142 of the Belgian Constitution, pursuant to which every person 
demonstrating a legitimate interest can refer a matter to the Constitutional Court. This provision has 
been complemented by a law from 1989 which specifies in its Article 2(2) that an action for annulment 
can be brought by every physical or legal person demonstrating an interest.18 Thus, legal persons have 
been granted access to the Constitutional Court for a long time, and it is not uncommon for collective 
entities such as NGOs and trade unions to take part in actions before the Court.19 The Constitutional 
Court has taken a relatively flexible approach to the requirement that entities must demonstrate an 
interest in the lawsuit to bring a case before it.20 
Among EU equality lawyers, a well-known example of reliance on Article 142 of the Belgian 
Constitution is the Test-Achats case.21 The “Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achat” (“Test-
Achats”), a Belgian consumers organisation, brought an action before the Constitutional Court to annul 
the Law of 21 of December 2007 modifying, with regard to the treatment of gender in insurance matters, 
                                                     
11  The Centre for equality of chances and combat against discrimination.  
12  Law of 1993 - Loi créant un Centre pour l’égalité des chances et la lutte contre le racisme (Moniteur Belge 19.02.1993). 
13  See art.3 (5) Law of 1993. 
14  Law of 1993, art.7. 
15  See overview on the Centre’s website, available at: http://www.myria.be/files/historique_centre_pour_roadshow_(1).pdf.  
16  See abstracts from this Directive in the Introduction. 
17  Unia, « Le Centre interfédéral pour l’égalité des chances devient Unia » (19 February 2016), available at : 
http://www.unia.be/fr/articles/le-centre-interfederal-pour-legalite-des-chances-devient-unia#Nouveau-nom-nouvelle-
visibilite. 
18  Loi spéciale du 6 janvier 1989 sur la Cour constitutionnelle.  
19  For instance, a case brought by 10 associations before the Belgian Constitutional Court led to a reference for a preliminary 
ruling to the CJEU: CJEU Case C-543/14, Ordre des barreauxfrancophones et germanophone and Others v. Conseil des 
ministres, 28 July 2016. These human rights associations (inter alia) expressly suggested to the Constitutional Court to ask 
questions regarding the conformity of some aspects of the VAT directive (regarding services provided by lawyers) with 
the right to an effective remedy and the principle of equality of arms. 
20  E.g. Constitutional Court, case n°133/2013, 10 October 2013. 
21  CJEU, Test-Achats. 
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the Law of 10 May 2007 against discrimination between women and men. The relevant provision of EU 
law was Directive 2004/113 on sex equality on access to goods and services.22 According to Test-Achats, 
the Belgian provision implementing the derogation provided for in Article 5 §2 of that directive was 
contrary to the principle of equal treatment between men and women. This derogation entitled Member 
States to authorize risk evaluations based partly on gender to have an impact on premiums and benefits. 
The CJEU invalidated Article 5 §2 of Directive 2004/113; the derogation was deemed to be incompatible 
with the principle of equal treatment. Indeed, women and men were considered to be in a comparable 
situation with respect to premiums and benefits, so that a difference in treatment was contrary to the aim 
of the directive and to Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.23 
Both the historical background of the CGKR and its right to litigate criminal cases and the domestic 
constitutional background of Test-Achats show that the Belgian legal order has for several decades 
allowed collective actors to litigate. This is not to say however that collective actors are always granted 
access to Belgian courts. The Constitutional Court itself explained that it opts for a relatively flexible 
approach to rules on standing; in contrast ordinary civil courts apply stricter standards.24 Yet, as we shall 
see below, EU equality law itself has contributed to opening access to justice in civil law cases. It may 
finally be recalled that Belgian courts are familiar users of the preliminary ruling procedure,25 as 
illustrated by the reference from the Constitutional Court itself in Test-Achats. This element contributes 
to explaining the high number and high profile nature of the cases involving Belgian equality bodies 
that have been brought before the CJEU. 
Equality bodies at the forefront of equality litigation reaching the CJEU 
An overview of the cases brought before the CJEU since the entry into force of the requirements for 
Member States to provide procedural avenues for collective entities to support litigation26 allows us to 
single out the following three Belgian cases. All three cases involved collective entities whose access to 
courts were influenced by EU equality law. The first two cases introduced, Feryn27 and Achbita28, related 
to the Race Equality Directive and the Employment Equality Directive, respectively, and involved the 
Centre for equality of chances and the combat against racism (CGKR). Although Belgian equality bodies 
do not provide for dispute resolution mechanisms, they may mediate and litigate, as occurred in both of 
the cases under examination. Yet, the facts of each of the cases differed and so did the type of 
involvement of the CGKR. 
Feryn was an undertaking specialiszed in the sale and installation of up-and-over and sectional doors. 
As an employer, Feryn applied a recruitment policy that the CGKR believed was discriminatory. The 
CGKR itself brought legal actions before a labour tribunal against the public statements of the director 
of Feryn to the effect that his undertaking was looking to recruit fitters, but that it could not employ 
‘immigrants’ because its customers were reluctant to give them access to their private residences to 
perform work. The case was referred to the CJEU by the appeal court. The CJEU ruled that such 
declarations constituted direct discrimination pursuant to the Race Equality Directive.  
                                                     
22  Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and 
women in the access to and supply of goods and services [2004] OJ L373/37. 
23  CJEU, Test-Achats, para. 39. 
24  Constitutional Court, case n°133/2013, 10 October 2013. 
25  Although the total number of preliminary references is lower than Germany, Italy, France and the Netherlands if we take the 
total number of references introduced since the beginning ;see: CJEU, Annual Report 2016 Judicial activity, p. 108. 
26  See supra footnote 3. 
27  CJEU, Feryn. 
28  CJEU, Achbita. 
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The background of the Achibta case - and the role of the CGKR - was slightly different. In 2003, Samira 
Achbita was a receptionist for G4S Secure Solutions NV, an undertaking providing security and 
guarding services as well as reception services. Employees were not allowed to wear religious, political 
or philosophical symbols while working. This rule was unwritten until 2006. It was then introduced in 
the code of conduct for employees after the applicant indicated she intended to wear an Islamic headscarf 
during working hours. G4S explained that this would breach the undertaking’s neutrality image. Because 
she refused to comply, Samira Achbita was dismissed. She introduced a claim in damages before the 
first instance labour court. The CGKR then joined the proceeding to support Samira Achbita after she 
had initiated the claim. The first instance court and the appeal courts rejected the claim. The applicant 
went to the Court of Cassation, who referred the case to the CJEU. This was the very first CJEU case 
involving a claim of religious discrimination.29 The Court stated that a prohibition on wearing an Islamic 
scarf which arises from an internal rule formulated in neutral terms did not constitute direct 
discrimination. It might however constitute indirect discrimination within the meaning of the 
Employment Equality Directive unless it is objectively justified by a legitimate aim, such as a policy of 
neutrality pursued by the employer in the exercise of its fundamental right to conduct a business. 
The third case involves another equal treatment body, the “Institut pour l’égalité des femmes et des 
hommes” or “Instituut voor de Gelijkheid van Vrouwen and Mannen” (the ‘Institute’ or IEFH)30. The 
Institute was established in 2002 to deal with equal treatment between women and men. The co-
existence of the Institute, working on gender, and the Centre, working on racism at that time31, was 
intended to enhance the visibility of their respective mandates.32Like the CGKR, the IEFH has the right 
to litigate in employment cases. Ms Rosselle began working as a teacher in Ternat, and was appointed 
as an established public servant by the Flemish Community in September 2008. Effective 1 September 
2009, she obtained non-active status for personal reasons in order to teach in language immersion classes 
in the French Community as a salaried employee. Ms Rosselle continued to work as a salaried employee 
until her maternity leave started on 11 January 2010. She gave birth on 2 February 2010. On 23 February 
2010, the mutual sickness fund to which Ms Rosselle was affiliated rejected her request for maternity 
allowance on the grounds that she had changed her status on 1 September 2009 by becoming a salaried 
employee after having been an established public servant. Under Belgian law, in order to be eligible to 
receive a maternity allowance, a minimum contribution period of six months had to be completed, a 
condition which Ms Rosselle had not fulfilled as a salaried employee. On the advice of the IEFH, Ms 
Rosselle brought an action against that decision before the Tribunal du Travail de Nivelles (Labour 
Court, Nivelles), invoking inter alia Directive 92/85 on pregnancy and maternity. The IEFH intervened 
to support the applicant from the very beginning (as explained further below).  
In Rosselle, the Belgian tribunal asked the CJEU whether the relevant domestic provisions infringed 
Directive 92/85 on pregnancy and maternity and Directive 2006/54 on equal treatment between men and 
women in employment33 because they failed to provide an exemption from the minimum contribution 
period for a public servant assigned non-active status for personal reasons who was on maternity leave, 
whereas such an exemption was provided for a public servant who had resigned or been dismissed. The 
Court answered affirmatively with respect to Directive 92/85, but considered that it was not necessary 
to rule on Directive 2006/54.34 The applicant (and thus the Institute) won the case and the case stopped 
                                                     
29  Ibid. 
30  The Institute for the equality of women and men. 
31  This was before the competences of the CGKR were broadened (see section 4). As a result of the political comprise from 
2002 to maintain two separate entities, the IEFH remains self-standing today. 
32  N. Ouali & I. Carles, ‘L’usage des lois visant à lutter contre les discriminations raciales en Belgique : une perspective de 
genre’, available at: http://www.ulb.ac.be/is/gem/RapportR&G.pdf, p. 20. 
33  Directive 2006/54/EC of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of 
men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L204/23.   
34  CJEU, Rosselle, para. 50. 
Elise Muir & Sarah Kolf 
26 Department of Law Working Papers 
immediately after the CJEU ruling. The defendant complied as soon as the Court ruled, so there was no 
need to continue the litigation at the domestic level.  
It is remarkable that in all three settings identified above, litigation was made possible almost exclusively 
owing to the involvement of the relevant equality bodies. In Feryn, the CGKR acted as a self-standing 
entity in a situation characterised by the absence of identified victims. The Feryn case was therefore 
entirely driven by the equality body, which was the only complainant. It has been pointed out that such 
a case could not have been brought by an average citizen; it was genuinely complex and required 
substantial financial resources.35 
In Rosselle, the IEFH took over the defence of the claimant from the very beginning; and in Achbita, 
the CGKR joined the proceedings before domestic courts after they had started in order to support the 
claimant. In both cases, the intervention of the CGKR and the IEFH were crucial. Neither victim would 
have had sufficient financial means to afford a lawyer. Ms Rosselle was represented by IEFH’s lawyer 
during the entire proceedings. Moreover, the IEFH took the initiative to introduce the judicial action at 
the very beginning. Mrs Achbita was in a similar situation. She did not have the necessary financial 
resources to take part in the proceeding before the CJEU and did not submit observations herself, but 
she allowed the Centre to intervene in the proceedings and to do so.36 The rules of procedure before the 
Court allow collective actors to take part in proceedings as any other party; ‘parties’ to the dispute are 
determined with reference to domestic law, as well as the rules of representation and attendance.37 Not 
only did collective actors thereby play a crucial role in these legal disputes, but their involvement was 
actually facilitated by EU law, as we shall now see. 
EU law on access to courts for collective actors: a catalyst in the Belgian context 
The procedural requirement enshrined in EU anti-discrimination directives played an undeniable role in 
allowing the public interest litigation under examination to unfold before the CJEU. Nevertheless, the 
interplay between Belgian and EU procedural law in this context has been both complex and nuanced. 
The collective entity involved in the Feryn and Achbita cases, the CGKR, existed prior to the adoption 
and implementation of EU rules, but could only go to criminal courts. The equality body was reformed 
in 2003 as part of an effort to integrate the Race Equality Directive into national law.38 EU equality law, 
in so far as it tackles discrimination through civil law channels, fed into to a process of change that had 
two related effects. Firstly, it led to broadening the competences of the CGKR to cover grounds other 
than racism and xenophobia, such as discrimination on grounds of race - which is legally distinct from 
racism39- religion, belief, age or disability. This broadening of the competences of the Centre was 
implemented without affecting those of the IEFH.40 Secondly, the reform gave the Centre access to 
                                                     
35  Interview with I. Aendenboom, lawyer at Unia. 
36  Supra. 
37  Art.23 of the Statue of the Court of Justice; Art.104 II of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities of 19 June 1991, in force until 2012; Art.96 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 25 September 
2012. 
38  See section 2 above. 
39  See also other grounds covered in the Employment Equality Directive and beyond. Art.23 Law of 2003 - Loi du 25 février 
2003 tendant à lutter contre la discrimination et modifiant la loi du 15 février 1993 créant un Centre pour l'égalité des 
chances et la lutte contre le racisme (Moniteur Belge, 17.03.2003, Err. Moniteur Belge, 13.05.2003). 
40  In practice, this has led to a need for cooperation between these bodies, especially when it comes to cross-grounds 
discriminations: in its annual activity report for 2006, the Institute pointed out the need to formalize this collaboration; 
however, no formalization took place and cooperation regarding complaints addressed by victims still occurs on an informal 
basis. 
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forms of litigation and related procedures41beyond the narrow realm of criminal law. The Centre was 
empowered to litigate in employment cases, and exercised this right in Feryn and Achbita. 
The involvement of the IEFH in the Rosselle case resulted from a similar set of reforms. The case 
involved old areas of EU substantive law - sex equality in employment has been regulated by EU law 
since the Treaty of Rome and maternity leave since the early 1990s – but the rules on access to justice42 
were introduced in 2002 by Directive 2002/73, which modernized Directive 76/207 on equal treatment 
in employment between men and women and introduced the specific procedural rules quoted above in 
this field.43 The Belgian Institute specialised in equal treatment between women and men was 
established by a law from 2002,postdating by a few months the adoption of Directive 2002/73. The 2002 
Belgian law gave the Institute access to justice.44 This 2002 law was further modified in 200745 with 
procedural elements including Article 34 on the ability for the specialized body to take legal action. This 
is the article that was used in Rosselle.46 The very existence of the IEFH, and its ability to litigate, are 
therefore simultaneous to reforms triggered by EU law. 
The involvement of the CGKR and the IEFH in these cases is thus closely intertwined with processes 
driven by EU equality law. However, in both instances the domestic rules on access to courts go beyond 
the requirements of EU law.47 The IEFH and the CGKR have standing to bring claims in court although 
such standing is not required as such by EU law. Instead, EU law acted here as a catalyst: EU 
requirements enhanced the involvement of collective actors in litigation in a legal culture already 
favourable to involving collective actors in litigation. The EU’s procedural requirements provided an 
impetus to boost the potential of new rules beyond EU law minimum standards.  
Such a catalysing function has been endorsed by the Belgian Constitutional Court. It has relied on the 
rules of procedure contained in the EU equality directives to give legitimacy to Belgian rules on standing 
for collective actors, some of which pre-dated or went beyond the EU law requirements. In 2004, the 
2003 law on discrimination and racism was partly annulled by the Constitutional Court.48In the context 
                                                     
41  Art.25 et seq. as well as art.31 of the Law of 2003. 
42  See section 1. 
43  By way of reminder: Directive 2002/73/EC of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training 
and promotion, and working conditions (Text with EEA relevance) [2000] OJ L269/15 reformed EU sex equality law and 
in particular the employment equality Directive (76/207) to align it with the Art.19 TFEU Directives. Art.1 (6) and (7) 
introduce in sex equality law support for litigation by collective actors and the creation of a specialized body. 
44  Loi du 16 décembre 2002 portant création de l'Institut pour l'égalité des femmes et des hommes (Moniteur Belge,31.12.2002) 
- Modifiée par l'article 2 de la loi du 27 février 2003, (Moniteur Belge, 24.03.2003), par la loi du 10 mai 2007 (Moniteur 
Belge, 30.05.2007), art.4 (6) and/or 4 (5). (Note that other entities with a special interest such as trade unions (no general 
NGOs or fundamental right NGOs, only organisations representing employees) also had standing from at least 1999 in 
matters of equal treatment between women and men; this was then broadened. See Art. 20 of the Law of 7 May 1999 - Loi 
sur l'égalité de traitement entre hommes et femmes en ce qui concerne les conditions de travail, l'accès à l'emploi et aux 
possibilités de promotion, l'accès à une profession indépendante et les régimes complémentaires de sécurité sociale 
(Moniteur Belge 19.06.1999). 
45  Law of 10 May 2007 (“gender” law) on sex equality. This law transposed the Employment Equality Directive 2006/54 
(although with reference to all its predecessors such as the 2002 Directive instead). 
46  Note that Art.35 further gives access to justice to associations for the purposes of the Directive. Also note the Decree of the 
Walloon Government of 6 November 2008 transposing Directive 2006/54/EC into French Community law. This Decree 
gives both the Institute (IEFH) and the Centre (see Feryn) access to justice for the purposes of the 2006 Directive (arts. 31-
32):  
47  See supra section 1, the equality directives do not require legal standing of specialised bodies. 
48  Constitutional Court, case n°157/2004, 6 October 2004. The law has been partly annulled because of its restrictive scope of 
application. Initially, the list of prohibited grounds of discriminations did not include the grounds of language and of 
political belief. 
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of these proceedings, the validity of Article 31 of the 2003 Law49that related to access to justice for the 
CKGR and other entities was called into question. The claimant argued that giving access to justice to 
specialised organisations was detrimental to the public prosecution of crimes and created a difference 
of treatment among violations of the law.50 Dismissing the argument, the Constitutional Court relied 
inter alia on EU law to back up the Belgian rules pre-dating and/or going beyond EU rules, such as 
those relating to access to justice for collective entities.51 The Constitutional Court ruled that the 
challenged provision was based on an objective criterion, which was the specific nature of the disputes 
these associations are allowed to bring to courts as evidenced by EU law, and was thus justified even 
with regards to civil action in criminal proceedings.52 
Despite these findings on the influence of EU law on access to courts in Belgium, there is no reference 
to EU law either in the Law of 2003, which broadens the competences of the CGKR, or in the 2002 law 
establishing the IEFH.53 It is clear however that these laws respectively transpose parts of the Race 
Equality Directive and Directive 2002/73 on equal treatment between men and women in employment. 
The actual added value of EU law in these matters (which is not only substantive but also procedural) 
has therefore long been hidden.54 It has been observed that the influence of EU law on domestic equality 
law may be blurred by national judges’ tendencies to refer only to domestic equal treatment legislation 
without taking into account or mentioning the directives on which it is based.55 This contrasts with the 
idea mentioned earlier of Belgian judges being familiar with the procedure of preliminary ruling. Such 
side-lining of EU law may however explain the decision of the CGKR in Feryn to specifically rely on 
newly adopted rules giving effect to EU equality law instead of well-established domestic rules, as will 
now be illustrated. 
Belgian equality bodies as strategic users of the preliminary ruling procedure 
The equality bodies that benefited from novel avenues for litigation have made very strategic use of the 
preliminary ruling procedure and arguments based on EU law. The processes that led to the CJEU 
rulings in all three cases powerfully illustrate this point. 
In the Feryn case, the Centre had two sets of legal arguments available to it; one relying on domestic 
law and the other on EU law.56 The first option related to domestic criminal law.57 Here, an employer 
had stated publicly his intention to discriminate, which could be covered by the Law of 1993 (Article 5) 
read in conjunction with the Law of 1981(Article 1(3)) on making public an intention to discriminate. 
Yet, this line of arguments was not an obvious choice because the Belgian Constitutional Court had just 
declared invalid a provision restricting the possibility to make discriminatory public statements for 
                                                     
49  See points A11.1-A11.2, A12.1 of the ruling. 
50  Point B.85. 
51  Art.7 (2) of the Race Equality Directive and Art. 9 (2) of the Employment Equality Directive. 
52  Point B.86. 
53  This is arguably a breach of the relevant directives. 
54  However, note that the most recent piece of legislation refers to the relevant EU law directives. See for instance Decree of 3 
April 2014 approving the cooperation agreement between the Federal Government, the Regions and the Communities of 
the 12 of June 2013, the Federal Government, the Regions and the Communities signed a cooperation agreement creating 
the new Centre for equality and to combat discrimination (now called Unia). 
55  Interview with E. Abella-Martin, lawyer at the IEFH. 
56  This information was obtained from: I. Aendenboom, Centre for equal opportunities and opposition to racism, Equinet 
Seminar (Brussels, 30 June 2009), available at: http://www.equineteurope.org/IMG/pdf/the_feryn_case__2_.pdf. 
57  Law of 30 July 1981. 
Belgian equality bodies reaching out to the CJEU: EU procedural law as a catalyst 
European University Institute 29 
breach of the freedom of expression.58The second option would allow the Centre to use Belgian civil 
law before labour courts. This possibility had just been introduced by the Law of February 25th, 2003, 
adopted in order to transpose the Race Equality Directive. It may be recalled that this was a new 
procedure in Belgium since criminal law had been the only avenue open to collective actors until 2003. 
The Centre chose the second option.59 The civil route and reliance on the new directive rather than on 
the old 1981 Law allowed it to boost the potential of the newly adopted rules implementing EU law. 
The CGKR chose this new path intentionally and for two reasons. Firstly, the Centre did so ‘essentially 
to prove the efficiency of the directives as transposed in Belgium law’.60 Secondly, this route created 
the opportunity to encourage the Belgian civil court to refer the case to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling.61 The Centre then suggested a set of preliminary questions to the domestic court, which appears 
to have drafted its own version of the questions that were ultimately referred to the CJEU.62 The 
involvement of the Belgian equality body did not only facilitate the enforcement of an equal treatment 
rule; it also had a clear impact on the substance of the case. Maître Bayart, who represented the CGKR 
in the Feryn case, specialized in employment discriminations, and such expertise was likely relevant in 
the decision to choose the civil route over the criminal one.  
The IEFH also shaped the legal argument in Rosselle, intentionally referring to various provisions of 
EU law and requesting a preliminary reference to the CJEU. In the Rosselle case, the applicant had two 
sets of legal arguments available: Ms Rosselle could have tried to rely on the consistent interpretation 
of domestic law (horizontal indirect effect) in light of Directive 92/85 on pregnancy and maternity or, 
following the idea of the lawyer acting for both the IEFH and the applicant, request that the Belgian 
court pose a preliminary question asking if the domestic rules were in breach of EU law. This second 
option was chosen, and the question finally asked by the Belgian court to the Court of Justice was the 
one suggested by the IEFH.63By its preliminary question, the national court (and the IEFH) requested a 
dual check on the compliance of the domestic rule with Directive 92/85 on pregnancy and maternity and 
Directive 2006/54 on equal treatment between men and women in employment. The first argument 
proved to be the strongest in both the views of the Advocate General and the CJEU. The IEFH hoped 
that by raising the second argument on the lack of compliance with Directive 2006/54 the courts would 
recognise that the domestic legislation was discriminatory. The silence of the CJEU on this point was 
thus a source of disappointment for IEFH’s lawyers.64 
Although it is difficult to comment on the Achbita case as it is still pending before the domestic court, 
the dynamics behind that case are quite comparable to those in Feryn and Rosselle. From the point that 
the CGKR intervened in the proceedings, the case has almost been entirely driven by the equality body. 
It is the Centre that submitted to the Court of Cassation a very precise list of questions to refer to the 
CJEU. These questions were rephrased by the Court of Cassation into a single question.65 It should be 
stressed that the outcome of the dispute does not matter anymore for the applicant in practice as she no 
                                                     
58  See J. Tojerow, ‘Etat de la question: La nouvelle Législation Fédérale de Lutte contre les Discriminations du 10 mai 2007’, 
available at: http://www.iev.be/getattachment/b3b613b4-12d6-461a-93ac-48fadc64d788/La-nouvelle-legislation-federale-
de-lutte-contre-l.aspx, p. 4. 
59  There had been prior mediation efforts: I. Aendenboom, Centre for equal opportunities and opposition to racism, Equinet 
Seminar (Brussels, 30 June 2009). Also, ‘Le Centre […] privilégie les solutions non-contentieuses, les poursuites judiciaires 
ne représentant environ que 5% des cas’, N. Ouali & I. Carles, ‘L’usage des lois visant à lutter contre les discriminations 
raciales en Belgique : une perspective de genre’, p. 83. 
60  I. Aendenboom, Centre for equal opportunities and opposition to racism, Equinet Seminar (Brussels, 30 June 2009), p. 3. 
61  Interview with I. Aendenboom, lawyer at Unia. 
62  It seems from the ruling of the domestic court that it asked a slightly different set of questions than those proposed by the 
Centre: see Arbeidshofte Brussel, 24th January 2007, A.R.Nr. Kortgeding 292, p.24-25. 
63  Interview with E. Abella-Martin, lawyer at the IEFH. 
64  supra. 
65  Interview with I. Aendenboom, lawyer at Unia.  
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longer lives in Belgium. However, it matters quite a lot for Unia, which expects clarification of the legal 
situation in Belgium. Indeed, similar cases have been raised at domestic level and legal uncertainties 
remain.66 
There is thus little doubt that the collective actors involved in all three cases have played a crucial role 
in framing each of the disputes in EU law terms and in pushing for the use of the preliminary reference 
procedure. It is perhaps useful to recall here that all three cases involved equality bodies rather than 
associations or legal entities with a special interest. Procedures initiated or supported by NGOs or trade 
unions - in contrast to cases brought by equality bodies - before ordinary (criminal or civil) courts are 
not very common in Belgium.67 It appears from the 2015 annual report of one of the prominent 
association in the fields covered by the activities of Unia, the Mouvement contre le racisme, 
l'antisémitisme et la xénophobie or MRAX, that litigating in court is a marginal activity of the 
organization. MRAX receives a constant, if not increasing number of complaints, but considerably less 
than today’s equivalent of Unia does.68 This can be explained by the limited legal resources of MRAX 
(with only two lawyers in 2015) as well as the possibility that it refers cases to Unia instead of addressing 
the cases itself.69 In the Belgian context, the role of equality bodies is therefore complementary to that 
of civil society organizations when it comes to litigation.70 Similar observations have indeed been made 
in the French context where a new procedure, the ‘action de substitution’, has been introduced inter alia 
in order to comply with the procedural requirements of EU equal treatment law.71 It entitles NGOs and 
labour unions to take actions on behalf of victims of discriminations. The mechanism is however barely 
used in practice72 and claims are often instead referred to the French equality body (“le Défenseur des 
droits”).73 Unlike Belgian equality bodies however, the Défenseur des droits itself offers dispute 
resolution mechanisms, but is not entitled to go to court. 
It is also remarkable that the CGKR as well the IEFH are somewhat specialized institutions. The IEFH 
deals, as its name indicates, with equal treatment between women and men. The CGKR has a broader 
mandate as it covers several grounds of discrimination but it was initially created back in 1993 to deal 
with racism and xenophobia, both themes are closely linked to the claims of discrimination on ground 
of race or ethnic origin and religious or belief in Feryn and Achbita. It may indeed be easier for 
institutionalized and experienced or specialized structures to venture along new procedural routes than 
for NGOs or trade unions with less resources to do so.  
                                                     
66  supra. 
67  One example is that of an association combatting racism, antisemitism and xenophobia (Mouvement contre le racisme, 
l'antisémitisme et la xénophobie, MRAX) which intervened as partie civile in criminal proceedings (on the basis of the law 
of 1981) against politicians for racist speeches; see ‘Le MRAX se porte partie civile contre De Wever, qu’il accuse de 
propos raciste’, (14 January 2016), available at: http://www.lalibre.be/culture/medias-tele/plainte-du-mrax-contre-luc-
trullemans-51b8fc59e4b0de6db9ca6cd1, http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/le-mrax-se-porte-partie-civile-contre-de-
wever-qu-il-accuse-de-propos-racistes-5697ad523570b38a58243737.  
68  N. Ouali& I. Carles, ‘L’usage des lois visant à lutter contre les discriminations raciales en Belgique : une perspective de 
genre’, p. 23, note de bas de page 51. 
69  MRAX, Annual report 2015. 
70  Compare with the Danish situation where some unions are very active in litigation, see the contribution by A.Atanasova and 
J. Miller in this edited collection of essays: ‘Collective Actors and EU Anti-Discrimination Law in Demark’. 
71  See section 1. 
72  See for instance L. Pécaut-Rivolier& D. Pons, Les discriminations collectives en entreprise – Lutter contre les 
discriminations au travail : un défi collectif, Rapport du Ministère du travail, de l’emploi, de la formation professionnelle 
et du dialogue social, Ministère de la justice, Ministère du droit des femmes, December 2013, p. 82.  
73  See the contribution by S. Latraverse in this edited collection of essays. 
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Conclusions and reflections on the collective enforcement of EU equality law 
As evidenced in Feryn, Achbita and Rosselle, EU law requirements intended to facilitate access to courts 
for victims with the support of collective entities have served as catalysts to ultimately make it possible 
for the CGKR and the IEFH to litigate cases. As pointed out in Section 3, it is likely that the violations 
of EU law in Feryn and Rosselle, and, the uncertainties about the interpretation of the directive, in 
Achbita would not have been brought to justice without the involvement of such entities. Procedural 
requirements enshrined in EU law have indeed contributed to compensating for the vulnerability of 
victims of discrimination and the difficulties in identifying them, which are key objectives of the rules 
on access to justice and equality bodies enshrined in the EU equality directives. As evidenced in this 
contribution, the involvement of these collective actors has not only allowed the claims to proceed in 
court but has also permitted a particularly strategic use of EU law arguments and the preliminary ruling 
procedure. The Employment Equality Directive regrettably still does not require the creation of equality 
bodies to cover discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, age, sexual orientation and disability so 
that protection gaps in certain member states still exist74.  
It is perhaps unsurprising that the CJEU itself has welcomed domestic legislation relying on collective 
enforcement of equality law beyond the requirements of EU law. The Feryn ruling was itself partly 
about the very specificity of litigation by collective entities. The Court of Justice made it clear that the 
Race Equality Directive does not preclude Member States from granting access to courts for associations 
with a legitimate interest or equality bodies in conditions more favourable to the efficiency of EU 
equality law than the provisions of the directive itself (i.e. to litigate without acting in the name of a 
specific complainant or in the absence of an identifiable complainant).75 The Court went as far as to 
provide concrete examples of sanctions that could be created at domestic level in the context of a 
procedure (litigation brought by a collective actor alone) that is in fact not required by EU law.76 This 
approach has actually been taken one step further in the Accept ruling. The Court of Justice stated that 
the requirement for collective actors to obtain the approval of the complainant in order to litigate within 
the meaning of Article 9(2) of Directive 2000/78 does not prevent Member States from providing rights 
for certain organizations to bring proceedings without acting in the name of a specific complainant or 
in the absence of an identifiable complainant.77 Such a right may be combined with a partial reversal of 
the burden of proof78 and sanctions still have to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.79 
These findings on the catalysing role of procedural rules enshrined in EU anti-discrimination directives 
to facilitate public interest litigation should nevertheless come with several words of caution. To start 
with, the success of the CGKR and the IEFH in activating the various layers of EU equality norms and 
players may be closely related to the experience that the relevant lawyers had developed in a legal culture 
that is broadly favourable to the involvement of (institutionalized)collective actors as evidenced in 
Section 2. The CGKR in particular has a long-standing tradition of litigating cases in the fields of racism 
and xenophobia, which are closely connected to the disputes in Feryn and Achbita. The IEFH, which 
was involved in Rosselle, specializes in sex equality. Belgian courts also are remarkably frequent users 
of the preliminary ruling procedure, thus facilitating the whole process in the cases we have examined 
in this paper. It may therefore not be easy to extrapolate the conclusions we have reached about Belgium 
to other legal cultures, and in any case, the provision of solid financial resources for entities entrusted 
with collective enforcement tasks is a sine qua non condition for their efficiency.  
                                                     
74  See European Network of legal experts in gender equality and non-discrimination, “A comparative analysis of non-
discrimination law in Europe”, 2016, p. 108 et seq. 
75  CJEU, Feryn. 
76  Ibid para. 39. 
77  CJEU Case C-81/12, AsociatiaAccept v. ConsiliulNationalpentruCombatereaDiscriminarii, 25 April 2013, para. 37. 
78  Provided for in Art.10 (1) of the Employment Equality Directive: CJEU, Accept, para. 38. 
79  So as to ensure compliance with Art.17: CJEU, Accept, para. 62. 
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There might in that sense be a tension between the diversification of the activities of institutions in 
charge of the promotion and enforcement of EU law and their efficiency. The main Belgian equality 
body is still oscillating between two trends. On the one hand, the CGKR has progressively lost its image 
of “défenseur des marocains”80 and developed an expertise in fields other than racism, notably with 
respect to discrimination on the grounds of age and disability.81 On the other hand, in 2013, a new inter-
federal institution has been created to deal with discrimination and equal treatment82 (that has then been 
renamed Unia in 2016, as mentioned above), while a distinct federal structure devotes its activities to 
migration, fundamental rights of foreigners and human trafficking (called Myria since 3 September 
2015).83 The functions of the former CGKR in matters of discrimination have now been taken over by 
Unia, while some of its tasks regarding migration and the protection of foreigners’ fundamental rights 
have been handed over to Myria.84 Interestingly, this splitting of the Centre’s competences took place 
against recent trends in Europe to merge specialized bodies into broader human rights or general equality 
bodies.85 
The independence of institutionalized collective actors such as equality bodies may be an additional 
condition for the effectiveness of collective enforcement. The equal treatment directives and the Law of 
1993 creating the CGKR provide that equality bodies shall be independent. This is important because 
there could be diverging interests between the State and the applicants. It is worth noting that in these 
three cases the Belgian Government submitted observations distinct from the ones submitted by the 
applicant or the equality bodies before the Court of Justice. It appears (from what is mentioned in the 
opinions of advocates general and in the judgements of the Court of Justice) that the observations 
submitted by Belgium were in line with the ones submitted by the Centre in Feryn and Achbita.86 
However, the Belgian observations in the Rosselle case differed from the ones submitted by the applicant 
with the support of the IEFH.87 This illustrates that the interests of the State may differ from the ones 
                                                     
80  As it was colloquially referred to. 
81  Interview with I. Aendenboom, lawyer at Unia. It appears that cases such as HK Danmarkhave had a certain influence in 
that regard (as well as, to go beyond EU Law, the United Nations convention on the rights of persons with disabilities). 
The number of cases on age and disabilities dealt with by Unia considerably increased in recent years; CJEU Joined Cases 
C-335/11 and C-337/11, HK Danmark, acting on behalf of Jette Ring v. Dansk almennyttigtBoligselskab and HK Danmark, 
acting on behalf of Lone SkouboeWerge v. Dansk Arbeidsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Pro Display A/S, 11 April 
2013. 
82  On 12 June 2013, the Federal Government, the Regions and the Communities signed a cooperation agreement (« accord de 
coopération »). 
83  Law of 17 August 2013 (Moniteur Belge, 5.03.2014). 
84  Unia, ‘1993-2013: Le Centre a 20 ans!’ (14 February 2013), available at: http://unia.be/fr/articles/1993-2013-le-centre-a-20-
ans. 
85  See Bruno de Witte, ‘National Equality Institutions and the Domestication of EU Non-Discrimination Law’, 1 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law (2011), p. 157-178. 
86  See Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Feryn, 12 March 2008, para. 11: “The CGKR takes the opposite view and 
argues that the prohibition on direct discrimination concerns the recruitment process as well as the eventual recruitment 
decision. According to the CGKR, the substantive scope of the Directive has to be determined independently from the 
question of who is entitled to bring legal action. In other words, the issue of the locus standi of the CGKR has no bearing 
on the question whether direct discrimination has occurred. The Commission and the Belgian Government share the view 
of the CGKR”. See also the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Achbita, 31 May 2016, para. 41: “While G4S proceeds 
on the premise that there is no discrimination at all, and France and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, assume the 
commission of indirect discrimination, Belgium and the Centrum consider that there is direct discrimination”, para. 63: 
“The parties to the proceedings strongly disagree on the question of whether a ban such as that at issue here pursues a 
legitimate aim, let alone a legitimate aim within the meaning of either of the aforementioned provisions of the Directive, 
and the question whether it passes the proportionality test. While G4S answers those questions in the affirmative, the 
Centrum, Belgium and France answer them in the negative.” 
87  See Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, 18 December 2014, para. 41: “For these reasons, I do not accept the Belgian 
government’s argument that MrsRosselle did not contribute specifically the social security scheme for salaried employees 
for at least six months”, para. 49: “Unlike the Belgian government, I therefore regard it as immaterial, when considering 
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defended by the equality bodies, in particular in cases where the compatibility of domestic law with EU 
law is called into question, as was the case in Rosselle.88 
Finally, the possibility that EU law requirements may be used to move backwards in terms of protection 
cannot be excluded. For instance, EU law may have been relied upon to support a step back from the 
‘actio popularis’ by equality bodies in the Belgian context. Indeed, the rules on access to courts for the 
CGKR and the IEFH became stricter after 2007. With regard to the CGKR, the 2007 law is narrower 
than earlier versions, as the approval of the (physical/moral) victims is necessary for the Centre to be 
allowed to take legal action.89In 2003, these conditions applied only to organisations having a special 
interest.90 The same reform was adopted for the IEFH in 2007: Art. 36 of the Gender Law of 2007 
reduces the powers of the Institute by requiring the consent of victims, when they exist, which was not 
a pre-requisite in Art. 4(6) of the 2002 Law. The new requirements to obtain the approval of victims 
may signal a move away from Belgium’s tradition of actio pupolaris91 the purpose of which is to allow 
legal action by associations and legal entities having a sufficient interest in the outcome of the case.92 
 
                                                     
the possibility of direct discrimination, that in Belgium access to maternity allowance and access to a sickness allowance 
(including by a male worker) are both contingent to the same minimum contribution period, applied in a similar way”. See 
also the judgement of CJEU, Rosselle, para. 47: “Lastly, the Belgian government claims that the national legislation at 
issue in the main proceedings does not require that the worker concerned occupy the same post during the six months prior 
to confinement, but rather requires that she occupy, for at least six months, one or several posts entitling her to allowances 
in the context of the social security scheme for salaried employees”.  
88  In contrast, Feryn and Achbita were concerned with the practices of private employers. 
89  Art.33 of the Law of 10 May 2007 — Loi modifiant la loi du 30 juillet 1981 tendant à réprimer certains actes inspirés par le 
racisme et la xénophobie (Moniteur Belge, 30.05.2007).  
90  Art.31 last recital of the Law of 2003. 
91  Note that the Law of 1981 (criminal procedures in cases of racism and xenophobia) was also restrictive as the Law of 2007. 
92  No clarifications on this emerge from an investigation of the ‘travaux preparatoires’. Discussion papers commenting on the 
2007 reform do not seem to pay much attention to these procedural aspects. (See for instance J. Tojerow, ‘Etat de la 
question: La nouvelle Législation Fédérale de Lutte contre les Discriminations du 10 mai 2007’; N. Ouali& I. Carles, 
‘L’usage des lois visant à lutter contre les discriminations raciales en Belgique : une perspective de genre’; M. Gianni, ‘La 
lutte contre la discrimination et la promotion de l’égalité : comment mesurer les avancées réalisées ?’, available at: 
file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/meaprobe08_fr.pdf.) Perhaps the text of 2003 was a mistake itself as, if compared to the 
law of 1981, the text (Art.5 last recital) was actually more flexible. So that the 2007 amendment would be coming back to 
a past situation. 
  
 
NGO and equality body enforcement of EU anti-discrimination law:  
Bulgarian Roma and the electricity sector 
 
Lilla Farkas* 
 
This paper analyses a litigation campaign contesting racial discrimination in access to electricity that 
led to the Belov and CHEZ judgments before the Court of Justice of the European Union under the 
Racial Equality Directive. When transposing the directive, Bulgaria went beyond the minimum 
requirements concerning enforcement. The Bulgarian equality body has quasi-judicial powers and 
representative standing. The latter is also available to non-governmental organisations. This facilitated 
access to justice and triggered strategic litigation both before the equality body and civil courts.  
Introduction 
Legal mobilisation contesting racial discrimination in access to electricity led to the Belov and CHEZ 
judgments before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) under the Racial Equality Directive 
(RED).1 The cases concerned the following practice. In 1998 and 1999, across Roma districts in 
Bulgaria, the state-owned electricity company erected electricity poles at a height of 7 m, ostensibly to 
prevent fraud. Installing metres on these poles rendered it practically impossible to check electricity 
consumption. Outside Roma districts, electricity metres are placed at a height of up to 1.70 m, usually 
in the consumer’s home. Private electricity providers sanction defaulting customers in Roma districts 
by collectively cutting energy supply. Roma districts are predominantly, but not exclusively, inhabited 
by persons perceived as Roma, while many non-Roma districts have Roma residents. 
Universal access to electricity was the Bulgarian communist regime’s major achievement. Prior to 
privatization prompted by the EU, non-paying customers were bailed out. Two major groups defaulted 
as electricity prices rose: factories and the impoverished residents of Roma districts.2 Delays in 
modernizing the grid in Roma districts increased energy loss that was billed to customers.3 The private 
service providers’ responses were heavily influenced by local Turkish minority politics in districts 
inhabited by Turkish speaking Muslim Roma.4 In regions where CHEZ is the main provider, the Roma 
do not benefit from political representation. At the national level, the fraudulent consumption of 
electricity is the core anti-Gypsy argument, portraying the Roma as en bloc genetically criminal.5 
                                                     
*  PhD Researcher, Department of Law, European University Institute. 
1  Case C-394/11 Valeri Hariev Belov v CHEZ Elektro Balgaria AD and others, ECLI:EU:C:2013:48 and Case C-83/14 CHEZ 
Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia (Nikolova), ECLI:EU:C:2015:480. Council Directive 
2000/43/ECof 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin. 
2  Stanford PACS, Center on Philanthropy and Civil Society: EVN in Bulgaria (B)* – Engaging the Roma Community, prepared 
by Barbara Coudenhove-Kalergi and Christian Seelos, 20 August 2012. 
3  The regulatory riddle is analysed in detail in Zahariev, B. and Jordanov I., Geography of exclusion, space for inclusion: Non-
payment of electricity bills in Roma neighborhoods in Bulgaria in Pallai K. (ed.), Who decides? Development, planning, 
services and vulnerable groups, OSI-LGI, 2009, Budapest, pp. 55-123. 
4  In Plovdiv, having lost a case in court, the Austrian owned EVN engaged Daniela Mihaylova in its pilot project aimed at 
modernizing the electric grids, installing individual metres, linking illegal dwellings to electricity, reforming payment 
structures and managing outstanding debts. See, “Stolipinovo”, Bulgaria European case study, Renate Lackner-Gass, power 
point presentation. 
5  Genetically coded criminal behaviour is a common anti-Gypsy stereotype in the CEE region, anchored in the Roma’s 
overrepresentation in the prison population, as well as among the perpetrators of theft and robbery. 
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Resolving the debt crisis requires government intervention and a change in consumption habits.6 In the 
former Soviet bloc, Bulgaria experiences the highest level of electricity waste and reliance on this source 
of energy.7  
CJEU judgments show that in comparison to other protected grounds, equality bodies play a central role 
in enforcing racial equality - broadly construed. 8 This Bulgarian analysis adds flesh to this more general 
observation. My analysis also seeks to show that the preliminary referral in CHEZ, which began as an 
individual complainant’s private action, was but one element in a test case strategy anchored in 
collective actions by Roma communities, political leaders and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
before the equality body and civil courts. Administrative courts reviewing the equality body’s decisions 
blocked protection from discrimination. The referrals in both Belov and CHEZ sought to override the 
decisions of these administrative courts by bringing the CJEU into play. 
Procedural and institutional changes triggered by the RED: ‘over-implementation’ 
Despite its numerous procedural innovations, the RED’s minimum requirements ask little from Member 
States and promise little to individuals seeking redress. The RED requires that NGOs and trade unions 
have a role in legal proceedings, either by acting on behalf or in support of actual victims of 
discrimination.9 This can be ensured by giving them the right to represent individuals in administrative 
or judicial proceedings, to intervene and/or to act as friends of the court (amicus curiae). However, it 
does not require Member States to grant them the right to represent individual applicants or groups in 
legal proceedings, or to have representative standing. Article 8 mandates the reversal of the burden of 
proof in judicial proceedings only. Article 13 RED makes it the duty of Member States to establish a 
body for the promotion of racial equality by providing independent assistance to victims, issuing 
independent reports and undertaking independent surveys. Equality bodies do not therefore have to be 
established as quasi-judicial institutions. Ombuds institutions can generally fulfill the Article 13 criteria. 
The RED does not foresee a role for equality bodies in legal proceedings.  
Although Central and Eastern European (CEE) Member States did not partake in the drafting process, 
many were among the first to transpose the RED into national law. They transposed the directive prior 
to accession, in a manner that went beyond the minimum requirements. NGO lawyers engaged with the 
Council of Europe and EU processes played a central role in drafting domestic anti-discrimination 
                                                     
6  Zahariev and Jordanov, 2009, p. 75. 
7  Lampietti, Julian. 2004. Power's Promise: Electricity Reforms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. World Bank working 
paper series; no. 40. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
8  So far, eight cases have been referred to the CJEU under the RED. Islamophobia which, according to regional monitoring 
bodies amounts to racial discrimination, has been the subject of two references on religious discrimination. The Belgian 
equality body, UNIA initiated a collective lawsuit in Feryn and intervened on the plaintiff’s behalf in Achbita (a religious 
discrimination Islamophobia reference). In CHEZ, the Bulgarian equality body, KZD was the defendant before the CJEU. 
In Belov, it made a preliminary reference itself. In the pending case, Jyske Finans, the Danish equality body acted on behalf 
of Mr Huskic before the Equality Board. Case C-54/07 Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v 
Firma Feryn NV, ECLI:EU:C:2008:397. Case C-157/15 Samira Achbita and Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor 
racismebestrijding v G4S Secure Solutions NV, and Opinion of Advocate General Wahl delivered on 1 December 2016 in 
case C-668/15, Jyske Finans AS v Ligebehandlingsnaevnet, acting on behalf of Ismar Huskic. For further analysis see, 
Farkas, L, The meaning of racial or ethnic origin under EU law: between identities and stereotypes, 2017, European 
Commission, Brussels. 
9  Article 7(2) RED. 
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legislation.10 Some had been members of the expert network that initially assessed compliance.11 In 
Bulgaria, as in many other CEE Member States, over-implementation was spurred by the Euro-Atlantic 
integration process that required compliance with international human rights standards. It coincided with 
standard setting both within the EU and the Council of Europe.12 For domestic law-makers, over-
implementation offered the technical advantage of reconciling discrepancies among protected grounds 
and fields in the various international treaties.13 It was also perceived as a low-cost investment with a 
high political pay-off.14 For instance, even though not required under EU anti-discrimination law, 
representative action was introduced in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Croatia.15 The former 
three also went beyond the minimum requirements concerning equality bodies, as well as the fields and 
grounds they cover - the latter being limited to racial or ethnic origin and sex under EU law.16 
Fitting into this overall pattern of ‘over-implementation’, Bulgarian discrimination legislation provides 
one of the highest levels of protection in the EU. When Bulgaria acceded to the EU in 2007, it had 
already transposed the RED by 2002 with its Protection Against Discrimination Act (PADA), which 
entered into force in 2004. The legislation gave both the equality body and NGOs much more extensive 
powers than the minimum provided by the RED. 
The equality body, the Protection Against Discrimination Commission - Komisija za zashtita ot 
diskriminacija (KZD) - established in 2005, has hybrid enforcement powers as both an investigatory and 
promotional body and as a quasi-judicial body. On the investigatory and promotional side, it is an 
independent public body that reports to Parliament17 and it can make (legislative) recommendations.18 It 
acts on the basis of complaints, communications, or ex officio. As a quasi-judicial body, it adopts legally 
binding decisions, following a public hearing of both parties.19 It can impose the following sanctions: a 
fine and/or mandatory remedial or preventive injunctions, an order to apologise and publish its 
                                                     
10  For instance, the Romanian Open Society Foundation organised an expert group to draft an emergency ordinance on anti-
discrimination. Renate Weber, Gabriel Andreescu and Romanita Iordache - all affiliated with the Romanian Helsinki 
Committee were involved in the process. Skype interview with Romanita Iordache, 19 January 2017. In Hungary, András 
Kádár, József Kárpáti and the author, based with the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, commented on various drafts of the 
law.  
11  For instance, András Kádár in Hungary, Romanita Iordache in Romania and Margarita Ilieva in Bulgaria. 
12  The adoption of the RED in 2000 was preceded by the adoption of the Framework Convention for the Rights of National 
Minorities in 1995, Protocol 12 ECHR and the establishment of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
in 1994. 
13  UN ground-specific treaties, such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
must be reconciled with the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, as well as on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which in Article 26 and 2.2. respectively ensure equality on the basis of an open list of grounds. Similarly, 
under Article 14 the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) prohibits discrimination on the basis of an open list 
of grounds, whereas Protocol 12 - not widely ratified - extends to all fields. Conversely, EU anti-discrimination law 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of a closed list of ground, mainly in the field of employment. 
14  Skype interview with Romanita Iordache, 19 January 2017. 
15  Chopin I. and Germaine-Sahl, C., A Comparative Analysis of Non-Discrimination Law in Europe, The 28 EU Member 
States, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Turkey compared, European 
Commission, October 2016, pp. 88-94 and 114-119. See, also Ilieva M., Legal Standing For Civil Society Legal Entities 
To Litigate Against Discrimination In The Member States Of The European Union And Candidate Countries, 2014, 
unpublished, pp. 33-42. 
16  Chopin and Germain-Sahl, 2016. 
17  PADA Article 40. 
18  PADA Article 47. As the 2016 Legalnet report on Bulgaria notes, there “is no public or institutional perception of a clash 
between the body’s adjudicator functions and its victim’s assistance mandate, and no debate. In practice, the assistance 
mandate is depressed: the body gives victims no assistance other than to explain how the procedure before it works and 
what they are expected to do in order to participate. It has initiated no court action” Margarita Ilieva, Country Report, non-
discrimination, Bulgaria, 1 January-31 December 2015, European Commission, Brussels, p. 70.. 
19  PADA Article 65 and 61. 
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decisions20 as well as sanctioning parties who fail to implement its decisions.21 KZD decisions are 
subject to judicial review in administrative courts.22 In practice, the quasi-judicial function may impede 
the equality body's function as an institutional enforcer. The KZD rarely engages in institutional 
enforcement, which means that its financial resources are spent on case work reactive to complaints. It 
has not yet initiated lawsuits and has rarely used the power to intervene. It does not have a litigation 
strategy. The KZD deals with all the protected grounds enumerated in Bulgarian law and ratified 
international treaties, which hinders its ability to prioritize certain groups, such as the Roma, one of the 
most discriminated groups in Bulgarian society.23  
Strategic action is left mainly to NGOs. Their legal action is funded from private charities, membership 
fees, foreign development organisations or the EU, due to the lack of predictable public financing, 
adequate legal aid, or pro bono services.24 The Bulgarian discrimination law ensures legal standing to 
NGOs and trade unions to represent victims before the equality body and civil courts, as well as to 
intervene in judicial proceedings.25 However, going beyond the RED, legal standing is also provided to 
NGOs and trade unions in representative actions. In addition, any entity can initiate proceedings before 
the equality body, even without a specified victim.26 The sanctions available in representative actions 
are limited to declaratory finding and injunctive relief. The burden of proof is reversed both in civil 
proceedings and before the equality body. 
The Belov and CHEZ litigations  
The applicants in both cases complained to the KZD contemporaneously and the litigation trajectories 
were intertwined. On 3 October 2008, Ms Nikolova requested CHEZ to relocate her metre. While this 
may suggest a test case strategy, it arose from her lawyer’s initial strategy to challenge over-billing. 
Along with other regularly paying consumers in the Roma district, CHEZ charged Nikolova for the 
illegal electricity consumption of her neighbours. Having lost under civil law, the lawyer switched to a 
legal strategy championed by Daniela Mihaylova, a discrimination and human rights activist, which had 
been widely reported in the Bulgarian press.27 On 5 December 2008, Nikolova complained to the KZD 
of CHEZ’s failure to relocate her metre. She contended that the reason for the practice was that most of 
the inhabitants of Dupnitsa’s ‘Gizdova mahala’ district were of Roma origin, and that she, accordingly, 
suffered direct discrimination on the grounds of nationality (narodnost). The fact that Nikolova herself 
was not of Roma origin complicated the identification of the protected ground. In April 2010, the KZD 
found indirect discrimination based on nationality. The case then proceeded from the KZD to judicial 
review before the Sofia Administrative Court, followed by another review in the Supreme 
Administrative Court - Verhoven Administrative Sad (VAS). In May 2011, the VAS directed the 
equality body to reconsider the case, particularly because it had failed to indicate the nationality in 
comparison to which Nikolova suffered discrimination. In May 2012, the KZD upheld Nikolova’s 
                                                     
20  PADA Article 47 and 65. 
21  PADA Article 82. 
22  PADA Article 68(1). 
23  PADA Article 4(1). 
24  The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, the Romani Baht Foundation and the Equal Opportunities Project Initiative have been 
financed by, among others, the Open Society Foundations and the Sigried Rausing Trust. Information can be gleaned from 
the respective NGOs and donors’ reports available on their websites. For instance, BHC lists its donors at the bottom of its 
website: the United States Agency for International Development, Democracy Commission, European Commission, 
European Refugee Fund and Open Society Institute - Budapest, New York, Sofia. See http://www.bghelsinki.org/en/about-
us/ 
25  Bulgarian Administrative Procedure Code, Article 18 (2) and PADA Article 71(2). 
26  Although this was subsequently restricted by judicial interpretation in a 2014 Supreme Court decision. PADA Article 50(3). 
Supreme Administrative Court, Decision No. 5645 in case No. 15991/2013; Decision No. 15637 in case No. 1925/2014 
27  Skype interview with Yonko Grozev, 26 January 2017. 
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complaint again, this time on the basis of her personal situation, namely the location of her business. 
CHEZ challenged the decision before the Sofia Administrative Court, which in its reference queried 
whether the ground was common Roma ethnic origin in the district where Nikolova’s shop was based. 
A short time after Nikolova had lodged her complaint with the KZD, in 2009 Mr Belov also complained 
to the KZD. He claimed that the ethnic Roma inhabiting the town’s Roma districts were subject to 
discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity. Joined to his complaint was a petition signed by other 
inhabitants of the Roma district, asking the KZD to order CHEZ to abolish the impugned practice and 
to impose sanctions.28 In July 2011, the KZD referred Belov to the Court of Justice, seeking to 
counterbalance the VAS’s restrictive interpretation in the electricity cases. According to the VAS, the 
lack of access to electricity metres did not adversely affect a right or legitimate interest, an essential 
element of establishing discrimination under the PADA. The KZD asked whether such an interpretation 
complied with the RED’s definitions of direct and indirect discrimination. Furthermore, in light of the 
shortcomings of the Bulgarian-language version of Article 8(1) RED29 and the VAS’s view that the 
Roma districts were not inhabited solely by Roma, nor were the measures at issue based on ethnicity, 
the KZD sought guidance on the reversal of the burden of proof. Finally, it pondered whether the 
measures could be justified, in line with the VAS’s general practice. In January 2013, the Belov 
reference was dismissed. In Belov, the Luxembourg Court established its lack of competence due to the 
administrative character of the referring entity, the Bulgarian equality body.30 Tamás Kádár, legal officer 
of EQUINET, the European Network of Equality Bodies criticises this decision, because in his view - 
which is consistent with that of Bulgaria, the European Commission and Advocate General Kokott - in 
this concrete case, not only does the KZD fulfill the criteria under Article 267 TFEU, but the judgment 
has a chilling effect on future references in the race field. He underlines that at the domestic level the 
main fora adjudicating racial discrimination are equality bodies.31 
In February 2014, the Sofia Administrative Court referred Nikolova-CHEZ on the judge’s motion.32 The 
reference springs from the failure to engage with Belov and revisits the questions the KZD had raised 
before. Even though it was inclined to agree with the KZD’s view of the practice as direct discrimination, 
the referring court was swayed by Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion in Belov, according to which it 
amounted to prima facie indirect discrimination.33 It also observed that in similar cases the VAS did not 
find either direct or indirect discrimination. Following the decision to refer, Open Society Justice 
Initiative (OSJI) Advisory Board member Yonko Grozev – the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee’s 
previous legal director and presently judge of the ECtHR - took on Nikolova’s legal representation as a 
                                                     
28  Belov is represented by Ms Chernicherska, who practices law in the law office Ekimdjiev, Boncheva and Chernicherska. 
The Plovdiv based law firm is famous across Bulgaria for victories before the ECtHR - including cases brought on behalf 
of the Roma.  
29  It differs from other language versions, requiring that the victim must establish facts from which it may be ‘concluded’ that 
there has been discrimination. 
30  As AG Kokott noted, the contested issues concerned the KZD’s independence, compulsory jurisdiction and the judicial 
character of its proceedings. Prior to establishing that the KZD’s proceedings are of an administrative nature, the CJEU 
analysed the latter two issues, focusing on judicial character in general, rather than in the concrete case. It interpreted 
compulsory jurisdiction in a strict sense, i.e. as requiring the KZD’s exclusive jurisdiction over disputes, rather than a 
binding nature of its decisions. It further held that the KZD’s decision are of an administrative character, given its power 
to proceed on its own motion with extensive investigative powers; its power to join persons to the proceedings on its own 
initiative; its defendant status in judicial review; and its power to revoke a decision if both parties consent. Opinion of AG 
Kokott, 20 September 2012, Case C‑394/11, Valeri Hariev Belov 
31  Kádár, T., The Standing of National Equality Bodies before the European Union Court of Justice: the Implications of the 
Belov Judgment, Equal Rights Review No 11 of 2013, pp. 13-25. 
32  Skype interview with Yonko Grozev, 26 January 2017. 
33  See, fn. 30, para. 99. 
Lilla Farkas 
40 Department of Law Working Papers 
third party supporting the KZD.34 In CHEZ, the CJEU held that the placement of the electric metres on 
7 meter high poles can be interpreted as giving rise to direct discrimination based on racial or ethnic 
origin, whereby Ms Nikolova is less favourably treated ‘together with the Roma’.35 It held, however, 
that the facts could also be interpreted as giving rise to indirect racial discrimination. The judgment has 
been widely commented upon, eliciting radically opposing views about its impact on the race ground, 
but also beyond. 
The potential to develop EU discrimination law and policy impact justified OSJI’s shouldering of the 
costs of legal action instituted by a non-Roma shop owner, who ran a profitable business in the poorest 
Roma district in the region of Dupnitsa. Nikolova's individual complaint was transformed into a case 
about collective harm and racial stigma. This links the preliminary reference with anti-Romani 
discrimination in other fields, such as education, that form the focus of infringement proceedings 
advocated by OSJI.36 However, when it came to sanctioning CHEZ, Nikolova remained the sole 
beneficiary. Accordingly Belov and CHEZ suggest that legal expertise in EU law concentrated in 
legally-focused NGOs have an impact mainly on the legal-conceptual rather than the practical outcome. 
However, CHEZ may also have a beneficial impact beyond the ground of racial or ethnic origin in 
Bulgaria because in its wake the government introduced a bill to amend the PADA definitions of indirect 
discrimination and unfavourable treatment.37 
The domestic litigation campaign 
Rather than being isolated cases, Belov and CHEZ were nestled in a large-scale litigation campaign. 
Several KZD investigations were triggered by signals from political actors at the municipal level, where 
access to electricity is an important currency one can offer in exchange for votes. Nikolova’s case is 
exceptional, not only because she is the single ethnic majority person to challenge the practice, but also 
the only one who pursued an individual action. It is curious that a preliminary reference was made in 
her case, but not others. 
The immediate threat of losing electricity mobilised the Roma across the country. NGOs reacted with 
collective legal challenges before domestic civil courts and the equality body. The first proper legal 
challenge under PADA was brought by the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee and the Romani Baht 
Foundation, concerning power failures in Fakulteta, Sofia.38 The Romani Baht Foundation was 
established in this 40-70,000 strong Roma district to oversee the implementation of foreign development 
projects and provide legal aid services with a view to collecting test cases under PADA. The core grant 
was provided by the European Roma Rights Center, which funded test case litigation.39 The Romani 
                                                     
34  Grozev, Maxim Frechtsman - legal officer in charge of identifying test cases amenable for regional level litigation in Europe 
based with OSJI until his recent appointment to a judicial post in his native Netherlands - and Simon Cox are named as her 
legal representatives. Delivery is requested to the hands of Grozev and Rupert Skilbeck, OSJI legal director. 
35  CHEZ judgment, paras. 50. and 60. 
36  Based on D.H. and Others v The Czech Republic, Application No. 57325/00, Grand Chamber judgment of 13 November 
2007 
37  Legalnet report ‘ADL draft amendments of definitions of ‘indirect discrimination’ and ‘unfavourable treatment’, 15 July 
2016, Margarita Ilieva: “The amendments were introduced as a follow-up to the ruling of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in case C-83/14 (the “Chez” case). … The amendments seek to clarify that indirect discrimination by 
association is banned, and that less favourable treatment is not restricted to rights provided for under laws.” 
38  Civil case No 1262/2004, panel 39, Sofia District Court. Several Roma individuals from Filipovtsi - another Roma district 
in Sofia - took joint legal action prior to PADA entering into force for power failure and lack of visual control. The Sofia 
District Court applied PADA and ruled in their favor, Case No 21674/2003, panel 24. 
39  See, Mihaylova, D., Legal Practice under the Bulgarian Protection against Discrimination Act, Roma Rights, 11 March 2005, 
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, Obektiv, Special Edition, March 2008, p. 9. and Human Rights in Bulgaria in 2007, Annual 
Report of the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, pp. 20-21. Interview with Ivan Ivanov, former ERRC staff lawyer, director 
of the European Roma Information office, 29 November 2016, Brussels. 
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Baht Foundation and the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee took a representative action concerning at least 
31 paying households.40 The Sofia District Court found indirect ethnic discrimination. Starting in 2006, 
with a complaint from Stolipinovo41, a Roma district in Plovdiv, the equality body received various 
complaints and signals against service providers. The KZD’s practice has been to establish indirect 
ethnic discrimination. In Nikolova, its approach was different for potentially two reasons. First, the 
complaint invoked nationality as a ground and initially, the KZD proceeded along this line. Second, 
when it re-examined the case, it clearly could not identify suitable comparators based on nationality, 
and it grappled with the fact that Nikolova herself was not of Roma origin. Moreover, she suffered 
discrimination not as a typical natural person, but as the owner of a business based in a Roma district. 
On the other hand, the Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court developed a restrictive interpretation, 
rendering legal protection illusory. According to this court, no adverse effect resulted from the lack of 
access to electricity metres. The Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court found that, due to the lack of 
ethnic homogeneity in the Roma districts and of the explicit racial motive of the measures, 
discrimination could not be established. It regularly upheld justification defences. The KZD referred 
Belov to counterbalance this interpretation by the Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court and the 
Sofia Administrative Court’s preliminary reference in CHEZ revisited the same questions. 
Conclusions  
The paper investigated the rich domestic context of the Belov and CHEZ judgments. Bulgarian lawyers 
based in non-governmental organisations played a crucial role in the transposition of the Racial Equality 
Directive before the country’s accession to the European Union. Having created an advanced legal 
opportunity structure, they continued to play a significant role in its strategic enforcement.  
The equality body’s roles were also central although its hybrid nature led in Belov to its judicial nature 
being denied and thus deprived it of the capacity to make preliminary references. Nevertheless, the 
equality body’s initial activism, its powers, permanency and funding were important factors in the 
success of NGO activity. This case study corroborates the view that not only representative standing, 
but also proceedings before the specialised agency facilitate enforcement, by diminishing the length, as 
well as the disproportionately high risks associated with individual action. The public financing of 
equality bodies substantially decreases the costs - which in civil court would be borne by the aggrieved 
individual or the representative entity.42 NGO enforcement before quasi-judicial agencies can benefit 
from EU law expertise found in both the legally focused NGOs and equality bodies. The KZD’s impact 
has been contained in several ways. First, by the interpretation of the Supreme Administrative Court, 
which deviated from the civil courts’ jurisprudence. Preliminary referrals to the CJEU were key to 
overcoming this. Second, the KZD has been subject to political intervention, directly, as well as 
indirectly.43 It is important to note that such interventions occur across the EU.44 Thirdly, the equality 
body also contains its own impact, by not fully using its investigatory and promotional powers. 
                                                     
40  For a detailed description see, Mihaylova D. and Iordanov, M., Access to electricity in Roma settlements in Bulgaria, Sofia 
2015, pp. 30-33. 
41  Decision No. 58 of 29 November 2006, Case No 107/2006 of First Specialized Permanent Panel, Ibid, pp. 20-22. 
42  In reality, perpetrators are hardly ever compelled to pay the full costs of quasi-judicial proceedings, but as a rule, it is equally 
difficult to recover from them the full costs of legal representation and investigation in judicial proceedings, at least in the 
CEE region. 
43  According to a Legalnet flash report of 5 September 2012, former members of the xenophobic ‘Ataka’ party - in opposition 
- moved to repeal PADA and abolish the KZD According to another flash report of 17 April 2012, a year elapsed before a 
new president for the KZD was finally appointed on 11 April 2012. On 17 July 2012 the Bulgarian expert reported that 
although two former members were re-elected, the others “demonstrate no expertise at all in anti-discrimination law. One 
is a member of the openly racist Ataka party”. 
44  See, for instance, European Anti-discrimination Law Review No. 8/2009, Ireland Political development, Future inability of 
the Equality Authority to carry out its core functions under anti-discrimination directives budget cut and restructuring. The 
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The transposition of the RED was an essential pre-condition of legal mobilization. Legal challenges had 
simply not been brought before 2004, even though the challenged practice of inaccessible electricity 
metres had been in place since 1998. The new legal opportunity structure reflected the RED’s broad 
material scope, while over-implementation provided tools for collective enforcement. The KZD 
strategically engaged with Roma communities and NGOs, becoming a key interlocutor both at the 
domestic, as well as the EU level, but the CJEU’s Belov ruling had a chilling effect on its own initiative 
activities. The issue was originally framed by domestic NGOs as discrimination in access to electricity 
and reframed by OSJI as racial stigma. The litigation campaign has not ensured access to electricity for 
the most vulnerable Roma because it failed to adequately address the regulatory shortcomings of pricing 
for the economically destitute. However, in certain Roma districts, it enhanced direct political action 
which then led to changes on the ground. 
                                                     
Hungarian Legalnet expert reported on 22 February 2012 that on 1 February 2012, the Equal Treatment Advisory Board 
consisting of six members with extensive experience in enforcing the principle of equal treatment was abolished. 
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Angelina Atanasova & Jeffrey Miller* 
 
A large body of research confirms that the preliminary reference procedure (Article 267 TFEU), 
whereby national courts pose questions to the European Court of Justice (CJEU) regarding EU law, has 
not only been critical to the development of the CJEU’s case-law, but also an important driver of 
European integration in general.1 Researchers have also uncovered that Member State courts have been 
willing participants in the preliminary reference process.2 But in a more recent series of articles 
published over the past decade, scholars have noted that the aggregate upward trend in preliminary 
references masks substantial variations in the rate of references from individual Member States.3 
Denmark—indeed all Nordic members of the EU—appear to invoke Article 267 rather infrequently. 
This finding holds up in studies that control for population size and length of time that a country has 
been a member of the European Union.4  
Among others, Marlene Wind attributes Denmark’s hesitance to refer cases to the CJEU to its tradition 
of majoritarian democracy—a feature that, in broad strokes, is evident in all Nordic countries. In 
contrast to constitutional democracies, which embrace judicial review of legislation as an essential 
component of what it means to be a “true” democracy, majoritarian democracy is based on the principle 
of parliamentary supremacy or sovereignty. Hence, the role of the courts in a majoritarian system is 
comparatively limited. Judicial review of legislative acts to ensure their conformity with the Danish 
Constitution, while formally permitted by law, has happened only once in the past 150 years.5 The 
prevailing view in Denmark is that unelected judges should strike down acts of Parliament only under 
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Department of Law, European University Institute. 
1  See Karen Alter, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW ((2001); Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe 
Before the Court, 47 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 41–76 (1993); Mark Pollack, THE ENGINES OF INTEGRATION (2003); 
Alex Stone Sweet, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE (2004); J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 
YALE L. REV. 2403–83 (1991). 
2  See Court of Justice of the European Union, Annual Report 2016, Judicial Activity (providing information on the number of 
preliminary references over time). The 2016 Report and for previous years are available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7000/en/. 
3  See Jens Elo Rytter & Marlene Wind, In Need of Juristocracy? The Silence of Denmark in the Development of European 
Legal Norms, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 470-504 (2011); Marlene Wind, The Nordics, the EU and the Reluctance towards 
Supranational Judicial Review, 48 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 1039-1063 (2010); Marlene Wind et al., The 
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TIDSSKRIFT FOR MENNESKERETTIGHETER 131 (2009); Marlene Wind, When Parliament Comes First-The Danish Concept 
of Democracy Meets the European Union, 27 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR MENNESKERETTIGHETER 272 (2009); Sten 
Schaumburg-Muller, Parliamentary Precedence in Denmark-A Jurisprudential Assessment, 27 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR 
MENNESKERETTIGHETER 170 (2009); Uffe Jakobsen, The Conception of Nordic Democracy and European Judicial 
Integration, 27 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR MENNESKERETTIGHETEr 221 (2009); Palle Svensson, Conceptions of Democracy 
and Judicial Review, 27 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR MENNESKERETTIGHETER 208 (2009); Martin Scheinin, Constitutionalism 
and Approaches to Rights in the Nordic Countries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: NEW CHALLENGES, EUROPEAN LAW FROM A 
NORDIC PERSPECTIVE 135 (Joakim Nergelius ed., 2008). 
4  See publications cited, supra, fn. 3. 
5  See Jens Peter Christensen, “The Supreme Court in Today’s Society,” in Jens Peter Christensen et al. (eds.) The Supreme 
Court of Denmark (2015) at 29 (noting that this is commonly referred to in Denmark as the “Twind” case). 
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extraordinary circumstances. Parliament, above all others, is the institution that embodies the legitimate 
representation of the popular will. Wind et al. claim that because Denmark has no tradition of judicial 
review of legislation, Danish courts (and other Nordic courts) treat the preliminary reference procedure 
with suspicion.6 
Wind et al. provide a plausible account for the behavior of Danish courts towards the preliminary 
reference procedure as a whole, but when we scratch beneath the surface, the dichotomous majoritarian 
democracy/constitutional democracy distinction loses some explanatory power. In the field of primary 
concern in this paper, EU anti-discrimination law, Danish courts do not appear to demonstrate the 
reticence typically associated with majoritarian democracies. 
The first preliminary reference under Directive 2000/78 was Mangold, an age-discrimination case 
submitted by the Arbeitsgericht München, Germany on 26 February 2004.7 Since then, Danish courts 
have referred 87 cases to the CJEU under the preliminary reference procedure. In 9 of those cases, 
Danish courts requested guidance in interpreting EU anti-discrimination Directive 2000/78, which 
accounts for 10,3% of all preliminary references from Denmark since Mangold.8 This behavior differs 
substantially from the other Nordic/majoritarian members of the EU (per Wind et al.’s typology). During 
the same time period, in Sweden, out of 81 preliminary references, only one involved Directive 2000/78. 
Similarly, in Finland, out of 71 preliminary references, only one involved the directive. 
As Wind et al.’s thesis would predict, the largest number of preliminary references involving Directive 
2000/78 have come from Germany and Austria—EU members with strong traditions of judicial review.9 
But in Germany and Austria, Directive 2000/78 references constitute, respectively, a relatively meagre 
3,4% and 4% of these countries’ total preliminary references.  
The total number of preliminary references submitted by all EU Member States involving Directive 
2000/43 is significantly lower – 11, one of which comes from Denmark. We have decided to exclude 
preliminary references based on Directive 2000/43 from the remainder of our analysis because the 
number of cases is too small to test reliably. Nevertheless, to provide a more complete picture of activity 
in the EU anti-discrimination field, we include it in the table below, which summarizes our findings. 
  
                                                     
6  See publications cited, supra, fn. 3.  
7  See Case C-109/00, Mangold v Helm [2004]. 
8  All statistics in this section are based on searches conducted using the CURIA database – search by date of the lodging of the 
application initiating proceedings of the CJEU judgements under Directive 2000/78/EC. As a starting date for the search 
is taken the date when the first decision referred under this Directive was submitted to the CJEU, namely the Mangold case, 
26/02/2004. Last search in CURIA was conducted on 09/05/2017. As a result, we disregard the inactive years—the period 
between the implementation of the directives in the Member States and the first preliminary reference regarding the 
interpretation of the directives. Joined cases are represented as separate cases, for example, Joined case 335/11 and 337/11 
is counted as 2 cases, and not as a single case. Based on this search criteria, in total there were 90 preliminary requests sent 
by national courts referring to Directive 2000/78. 
9  Germany, Austria and Denmark have referred respectively, 37,8%, 11% and 10% of the total number of preliminary 
references under Directive 2000/78. See Origins of CJEU Judgements regarding Directive 2000/78 and Directive 2000/43, 
infra. 
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CJEU Judgements regarding Directive 2000/78 and Directive 2000/43 since Mangold 
 
Country 
Total number 
of preliminary 
references 
since 
26/02/2004 
Total number 
of Directive 
2000/78 
references 
since 
26/02/2004 
% of total 
references 
involving 
Directive 
2000/78 
Total number 
of Directive 
2000/43 
references 
% of total 
references 
involving 
Directive 
2000/43 
Majoritarian 
Democracies 
     
Denmark 87 9 10,3% 1 1,1% 
Sweden 81 1 1,2% 0 0% 
Finland 71 1 1,4% 0 0% 
Constitutional 
Democracies 
     
Germany 989 34 3,4% 1 0,1% 
Austria 254 10 4% 0 0% 
 
Puzzle and Hypothesis 
How can we explain Danish courts’ uncharacteristic enthusiasm for preliminary references to the CJEU 
in the field of EU anti-discrimination law? One hypothesis, explored below, derives from the 
observations of Eliantonio & Muir, who note that there is a growing body of EU initiatives that 
emphasize procedural access to justice and remedies,10 and that this development has been particularly 
visible in the field of EU equality law.11 For example, Directive 2000/78 dedicates an entire chapter 
(Articles 9-14) to “Remedies and Enforcement.” Article 9(1) requires Member States to set forth judicial 
and/or administrative procedures to enforce the directive; Article 9(2) requires Member States to ensure 
that associations, organizations, and other legal entities that may have a legitimate interest in the 
compliance of the directive are permitted to participate in judicial and/or administrative proceedings; 
Article 12 sets forth that Member States must disseminate information about the directive to persons 
concerned; and Article 14 states that Member States “shall encourage dialogue with appropriate non-
governmental organisations which have, in accordance with their national law and practice, a legitimate 
interest in contributing to the fight against discrimination . . . with a view to promoting the principle of 
equal treatment.”  
Directive 2000/43 includes an additional requirement that Member States “designate a body or bodies 
for the promotion of equal treatment of all persons without discrimination on the grounds of racial or 
ethnic origin” tasked with providing “independent assistance to victims of discrimination in pursuing 
                                                     
10  See Mariolina Eliantonio & Elise Muir, Concluding Thoughts: Legitimacy, Rationale and Extent of the Incidental 
Proceduralisation of EU Law, 8 REVIEW OF EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 175-204 (2015). 
11  See Elise Muir, Procedural Rules in the Service of the 'Transformative Function' of EU Equality Law: Bringing the 
Prohibition of Nationality Discrimination Along, 8 REVIEW OF EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 153-76 (2015). 
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their complaints about discrimination”. (Article 13). Although not obligated by EU law, many Member 
States have national equality bodies that have mandates that go beyond evaluating and contributing to 
equal treatment in the areas of race and national origin. The Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR)12 
and the Board of Equal Treatment,13whose roles will be discussed in greater detail in the following 
section, also cover gender, age, disability, sexual orientation, religion and faith.14   
Have the unusually detailed procedural provisions outlined in Directive 2000/78 and 2000/43 resulted 
in an additional pressure on Danish courts to alter their traditional resistance to making preliminary 
references in the field of anti-discrimination? The remainder of this paper attempts to shed light on this 
question. 
Road Map 
Part I briefly describes the circumstances under which Denmark transposed EU Directives 2000/43 and 
2000/78. Part II outlines the procedures for bringing an anti-discrimination claim in Denmark. Part III 
focuses on the specific procedural rules that govern collective actor participation in Danish anti-
discrimination litigation. Part IV provides a summary of the authors’ findings regarding two anti-
discrimination cases brought by Danish trade unions which were referred to the CJEU under the 
preliminary reference procedure. Part V concludes.  
In brief, we find strong evidence that the procedural requirements set forth in Directives 2000/43 and 
2000/78 to ensure access to justice and an effective remedy have had a transformative effect on anti-
discrimination law at the domestic level. With muted enthusiasm, Denmark has dutifully incorporated 
anti-discrimination rights laws into the national legal order, strengthened and expanded the country’s 
judicial capacity to process anti-discrimination complaints, and gradually expanded the powers of its 
national equality bodies. However, we are unable to establish a link between the directives’ provisions 
regarding the role of collective actors and the nature of preliminary references emanating from Denmark. 
Before and after the transposition of the directives, the principle collective actors pushing for 
preliminary references to the CJEU in the anti-discrimination field have been—and continue to be—
trade unions. 
Transposition 
Many Danes take a dim view of anti-discrimination laws, regarding them as regrettable foreign imports, 
inconsistent with the country’s consensus-based policymaking style and culture of equality. Particularly 
among right-wing voters, the prevailing narrative is that anti-discrimination laws are unnecessary and 
probably counter-productive.15 
 
Denmark has a long history of establishing working conditions though collective bargaining. Parliament 
has been reluctant to interfere in private arrangements through national legislation, and has traditionally 
                                                     
12  Founded in 1987 and reformed in 2002 as the Danish Institute for Human Rights, the organization’s responsibilities have 
evolved over time. Its mandate covers the grounds of ethnicity and race, disability and gender equality in all domains, and 
according to its website, in practice, it addresses “all grounds for discrimination in any domain, taking into account gender, 
age, disability, sexual orientation, religion and faith, ethnicity and race.” See https://www.humanrights.dk/about-
us/mandate  
13  The Board of Equal Treatment, a quasi-judicial body founded in 2009, covers the grounds of sex, race, color, religion or 
belief, political opinion, sexual orientation, age, disability, national origin, social origin and ethnicity in the field of 
employment. Outside of the labor market, it deals with complaints only on the grounds of sex, race and ethnicity. See 
https://ast.dk/naevn/ligebehandlingsnaevnet/ligebehandlingsnaevnet?page=1175  
14  See Danish Institute for Human Rights Website, “Mandate”, available at https://www.humanrights.dk/about-us/mandate. 
15  See generally, Tore Vincents Olsen, DISCRIMINATION AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION IN DENMARK (2008). 
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done so only when negotiations between social partners have completely broken down.16 Parliament’s 
preference to leave labor matters to collective negotiations extends to issues of non-discrimination in 
the workplace as well. In 1969, a parliamentary committee tasked with researching anti-discrimination 
legislation concluded that it would be preferable to have trade unions address the issue without 
legislative meddling. Parliament passed an Anti-Discrimination Act in 1996, but only in the wake of a 
report issued by the Ombudsman that Denmark’s failure to provide legal redress against discrimination 
in the private workplace violated its international obligations. Revisions of the 1996 Anti-Discrimination 
Act (in 2004 and 2008) became the main vehicle by which Denmark brought its legislation in line with 
Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78.17 
The job of transposing Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78 fell to a center-right government coalition that—
prior to assuming power—had objected to the contents of the directives when they were discussed in a 
parliamentary European Committee in 2000. As members of the opposition, the center-right parties 
could not prevent the Council of Ministers from approving the directives, but as members of the 
government, they were obliged to transpose them into national law. According to Vincents Olsen, the 
government’s view on the anti-discrimination laws “seemed based on the assumption that the legislation 
in question had the character of clarification of principles, if not the rules, already in place in Danish 
society.”18 In the interviews that the authors conducted for this paper, interviewees consistently reported 
that Denmark would not have passed new anti-discrimination legislation had it not come under pressure 
to meet its obligations under EU law. 
Processing Anti-Discrimination Claims in Denmark 
The Danish judicial system is a three-tier system consisting of 24 district courts, two courts of appeal 
(the Court of Appeal for the Western Circuit (Vestre Landsret) and the Court of Appeal for the Eastern 
Circuit (Østre Landsret) and the Supreme Court (Højesteret)). The district courts, courts of appeal, and 
the Supreme Court all have general authority, meaning they have jurisdiction to hear all types of legal 
disputes, regardless of the subject matter or nature of the dispute. In cases involving trade and commerce, 
matters may be dealt with in the first instance by the Maritime and Commercial Court (Sø- og 
Handelsretten), which, technically speaking, holds a status equal to the district courts.19  
Since 2009, the Danish Board of Equal Treatment (Ligebehandlingsnævnet) (hereinafter, “the Board”) 
presides over cases involving complaints involving discrimination on the grounds of disability, gender, 
race, skin color, religion or belief, political opinion, sexual orientation, age and national, social or ethnic 
origin in the field of employment.20 The Board consists of three judges and nine “ordinary members” 
who are appointed by the Ministry of Employment. Usually panels consist of one judge and two ordinary 
members. Statistics compiled by the Board show a steady increase in anti-discrimination claims brought 
before it.21 Prior to the establishment of the Board, anti-discrimination complaints were divided between 
                                                     
16  See Jackie Lane & Natalie Videbaek Munkholm, Danish and British Protection from Disability Discrimination at Work–
Past, Present and Future, 31 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 91, 
101 (2015). 
17  See id. at 102. The resulting Act on the Prohibition of Discrimination in the Labour Market, etc. prohibits discrimination on 
the grounds of “race, colour, religion or belief, political opinion, sexual orientation, age, disability or national, social or 
ethnic origin.” 
18  See Tore Vincents Olsen, DISCRIMINATION AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION IN DENMARK (2008) at 16. 
19  See Jens Peter Christensen, “The Supreme Court in Today’s Society,” in Jens Peter Christensen et al. (eds.) The Supreme 
Court of Denmark (2015) at 11-13. 
20  See Consolidated Act No. 905 of 3 September 2012 with later amendments.   
21  See Board of Equal Treatment, Annual Report 2015, available at availhttps://ast.dk/naevn/ligebehand 
lingsnaevnet/nyheder-fra-ligebehandlingsnaevnet/arsberetning-ligebehandlingsnaevnet-2015; see also the Board’s official 
website: https://ast.dk/naevn/ligebehandlingsnaevnet/tal-og-statistik-fra-ligebehandlingsnaevnet (showing that the total 
Angelina Atanasova & Jeffrey Miller 
48 Department of Law Working Papers 
a Gender Equality Board (Ligestillingsnævnet), which dealt with gender discrimination claims and the 
Committee for Ethnic Equal Treatment (Klagekomiteen for Etnisk Ligebehandling), which dealt with 
claims of discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin. Age and disability discrimination complaints 
were processed through the regular court system.22  
The Board considers complaints on the basis of written observations only; no oral evidence is taken. 
The Board’s decisions are legally binding, and parties have the right to appeal the Board’s decision to 
the national courts. If a defendant does not comply with the Board’s decision, the Board may bring an 
action against the defendant in court, taking over the procedural and financial burden from the plaintiff.23 
Legal Standing of Collective Actors in Denmark 
Officially, Denmark has two national equality bodies: The Board of Equal Treatment and the Danish 
Human Rights Institute (DIHR). Both are members of Equinet, a European network of equality bodies, 
defined by Equinet as: “independent organisations assisting victims of discrimination, monitoring and 
reporting on discrimination issues, and promoting equality.”24 As discussed in the section above, the 
Board of Equal Treatment mainly performs a quasi-judicial function, processing complaints based on 
the grounds enumerated in the EU’s anti-discrimination directives. 
DIHR, among other tasks, is authorized to provide the public with information about Denmark’s anti-
discrimination laws and give advice about how to file a complaint. It may participate in pending court 
cases as amicus curiae, and since 2015, has the right to bring complaints before the Board on its own 
initiative in “cases that are a matter of principle or of general public interest”.25 Until recently, DIHR 
acted mainly as a source of information and expertise for individuals who were interested in learning 
more about their rights and how to exercise them.26 Increasingly, DIHR participates directly in litigation 
on behalf of individuals who claim to be victims of discrimination. For example, DIHR has contributed 
amicus curiae in cases before the Danish Supreme Court pertaining to discrimination on the grounds of 
disability with respect to family reunification and access to citizenship,27 and has submitted an amicus 
brief in a case currently pending before the Court of Appeal for the Eastern Circuit regarding the rights 
of individuals under guardianship to vote.28  
Trade unions and NGOs have the right to represent individuals in legal proceedings under slightly 
different circumstances. As a general rule, only certified attorneys may represent individuals in court 
                                                     
number of cases received by the Board has doubled from 194 in 2009 to 426 in 2012, followed by a slight drop in the 
following years after 2012). 
22  See Board of Equal Treatment, “Om Ligebehandlingsnævnet” https://ast.dk/naevn/ligebehandlingsnaevnet/om-
ligebehandlingsnaevnet 
23  The jurisdiction of Danish labor courts and labor arbitration bodies is limited to cases involving collective agreements and 
alleged violations of collective agreements. As such, they do not have jurisdiction to hear anti-discrimination employment 
claims. See Act no. 106 of 26 February 2008 with later amendments on the Labour Court and Labour Arbitration [Lov om 
Arbejdsretten og faglige voldgiftsretter]. The one exception to this rule is when equal treatment is covered as part of a 
collective agreement See Section 1(6) of the Act on Discrimination in the Labour Market, etc. For further information see 
Pia Justesen, Country Report Non-discrimination Denmark. 2016 at 76-77. In Decision 199/2011, the Board rejected a 
complaint from a postal service employee because it dealt with a violation of a collective agreement. 
24  See Website of Equinet: http://www.equineteurope.org/-Equality-bodies- 
25  Act No. 1570 of December 2015, cited in Pia Justesen, Country Report Non-discrimination Denmark. 2016 at 10. 
26  See id. at 79. 
27  See Decision of the Danish Supreme Court No. 16/2016 http://www.hoejesteret.dk/hoejesteret/nyheder/Afgorels 
er/Pages/Afslagpaaaegtefaellesammenfoeringvarikkediskrimination.aspx and No. 120/2016 
http://www.hoejesteret.dk/hoejesteret/nyheder/Afgorelser/Pages/Afslagpaaindfoedsretvarikkediskrimination.aspx 
28  Email correspondence with Maria Ventegodt Liisberg, Danish Institute for Human Rights, Department Director, Equality 
Department (11 May 2017). 
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cases. This requirement is slightly relaxed for trade unions and other membership organizations in cases 
involving pay and employment matters, which pursuant to Section 260 of the Administration of Justice 
Act, allows for in-house jurists to represent individuals, even if they are not certified attorneys. A trade 
union is also permitted to file suits in its own name on behalf of its member, but formally speaking, the 
member—and not the trade union—remains the only party to the case. NGOs do not enjoy the same 
status as trade unions in this respect. NGOs can assist in preparing a case, but the plaintiff must be 
represented by a certified attorney.29  
Denmark does not have a strong tradition of actio popularis. Associations, organizations, or trade unions 
acting in the public interest must represent a specific, identifiable plaintiff. In Decision No. 88/2011, the 
Board of Equal Treatment rejected an NGO complaint that alleged discrimination on the basis of race 
and ethnic origin based on a newspaper report that the owner of a campground would refuse access to 
people of Roma origin. The Board concluded that it could not hear the compliant because the NGO did 
not refer to any specific individual whose rights had been violated.30 However, as noted above, DIHR is 
authorized to bring cases before the Board that are in the general public interest, and has done so on at 
least two occasions. In one case, DIHR challenged a daycare center’s policy of allowing only female 
staff members to assist children with using the bathroom and changing diapers and clothes.31 In another 
case, DIHR challenged a Danish high school’s policy of segregating students by ethnic group, which 
resulted in a settlement favorable to DIHR’s position.32  
In short, we find evidence to support the view that the procedural requirements set forth in Directives 
2000/43 and 2000/78 transformed Danish anti-discrimination law. In the interviews we conducted for 
this paper, stakeholders consistently stressed that the directives, which were transposed into national 
law in 2004, were instrumental in pushing Denmark to implement judicially enforceable anti-
discrimination rights and remedies that did not exist before. The change was particularly pronounced in 
the fields of age and disability discrimination. We also observe a steady increase in the institutional 
capacity of Denmark to address anti-discrimination claims. The Board of Equal Treatment, created in 
2009, is a significant upgrade from the Gender Equality Board and the Committee for Ethnic Equal 
Treatment. Statistics compiled by the Board show that its docket has been steadily growing.33 DIHR’s 
powers to ensure that the directives are properly implemented have also been gradually strengthened 
over time. It has served as a national equality body with regard to race and ethnicity since 2003, with 
regard to gender since 2011, and has the power to independently file complaints before the Board of 
Equal Treatment since 2015.34 
However, we see little evidence to suggest that the directives’ provisions regarding the role of collective 
actors have influenced Danish preliminary references in the field of EU anti-discrimination law. The 
principal collective actors that appear before the CJEU are not the Danish equality bodies or NGOs, but 
trade unions. To date, Danish courts have referred 8 cases to the CJEU requesting guidance on the 
correct interpretation of Directive 2000/78; trade unions participated in all of them.35 To the best of our 
                                                     
29  See Pia Justesen, Country Report Non-discrimination Denmark. 2016 at 79. 
30  See id. at 80. 
31  See Press Release, available at https://ast.dk/naevn/ligebehandlingsnaevnet/nyheder-fra-ligebehandlingsnaevn 
et/lbn/nyheder-2017/mandlige-ansatte-i-en-bornehave-matte-ikke-hjaelpe-born-ved-toiletbesog-ble-og-tojskiftning 
32  For additional details, see https://menneskeret.dk/nyheder/forlig-sag-fordeling-elever-paa-grund-etnicitet. Email 
correspondence with Maria Ventegodt Liisberg, Danish Institute for Human Rights, Department Director, Equality 
Department (11 May 2017). 
33  See Board of Equal Treatment Website, “Tal og statistik fra Ligebehandlingsnævnet”, available at https://ast.dk/naevn/ 
ligebehandlingsnaevnet/tal-og-statistik-fra-ligebehandlingsnaevnet. 
34  See Website of Equinet, “Denmark: Danish Institute for Human Rights” available at http://www.equineteurope.org/Danish-
Institute-for-Human-Rights. 
35  Results based on CURIA database search: Subject matter: “Directive 2000/78”; Source of a question referred for a 
preliminary ruling: “Denmark”. 
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knowledge, DIHR and Danish NGOs participated in none of them. And this is not a new development. 
Trade unions were also involved in all 7 Danish preliminary references36 brought under EU gender 
equality directives37 between 1988 and 2000. Chart 1 provides a visual representation of Danish 
preliminary references over time with special attention paid to references involving EU anti-
discrimination directives.  
Chart 1 
38Note 
                                                     
36  See Case C-226/98, Case C-109/00, Case C-66/96, Case C-400/95, Case C-179/88, Case 109/88, Case C-400/93. We note, 
however, that other collective actors may have encouraged the trade unions to take advantage of the preliminary reference 
procedure. Specifically, the Equal Status Council, founded in 1975 and dissolved in 2000, has been cited as influencing 
litigation activity at the EU level between 1988 and 2000. See Claire Kilpatrick, Gender Equality: A Fundamental 
Dialogue, in Silvana Sciarra (ed.) LABOUR LAW IN THE COURTS: NATIONAL JUDGES AND THE ECJ 80 (2001); see also Dorte 
Sindbjerg Martinsen, The Europeanization of Gender Equality – Who Controls the Scope of Non-Discrimination? 14 
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 544 (2007). 
37  Data has been collected for preliminary references on gender equality coming from Denmark on the following Directives - 
Directive 2010/41/EU repealing (Directive 86/613/EEC), Directive 2010/18/EU repealing (Directive 96/34/EC), Directive 
2006/54/EC repealing (Directive 2002/73/EC, Directive 98/52/EC am., Directive 97/80/EC, Directive 96/97/EC, Directive 
86/378/EEC, Directive 76/207/EEC, Directive 75/117/EEC), Directive 2004/113/EC, Directive 92/85/EEC, Directive 
79/7/EEC. Directives requiring the establishment of national equality bodies were not introduced until Directive 
2002/73/EC, Directive 2004/113/EC, Directive 2006/54/EC and Directive 2010/41/EU.  
38  The chart is based on data obtained through CURIA with the following search criteria: period 01/01/1973 – 09/05/2017 – 
period or date = "Date of the lodging of the application initiating proceedings" under the reference for a preliminary ruling 
and preliminary reference – urgent procedure, Court = "Court of Justice", source: Denmark. Reports on the cases after 
2015 are not yet available in CURIA, therefore, the cases included in the chart are those submitted until 2015.The total 
number of preliminary references referred by Danish courts in the period between 1973 – 2015 is 172, out of which 7 are 
under directives related to gender equality, 9 under Directive 2000/78 and 1 under Directive 2000/43. Joined cases are 
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The following section provides an analysis of the authors’ findings regarding two cases involving 
Directive 2000/78 brought by Danish trade unions which were referred to the CJEU under the 
preliminary reference procedure. The case studies are based on official court documents and interviews 
with individuals who were directly involved in the litigation. Both cases involved plaintiffs who alleged 
that they had been discriminated against on the grounds of disability. Although we learned that the 
Danish trade unions reached the preliminary reference stage under somewhat different circumstances, 
in both instances the involvement of the trade unions were crucial. They appear to be the only collective 
actors in Denmark with the legal expertise, financial resources, and motivation to take legal battles all 
the way to Luxemburg.  
Selected Danish Preliminary Reference Cases on EU Anti-Discrimination Law 
HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge), joined cases C-335/11 and C-337/11 [2013] 
HK Danmark involved two plaintiffs whose employment had been terminated after absences from work 
for medical reasons. Jette Ring was terminated from her position as a customer service center operator 
for the firm Dansk Almennyttigt Boligselskab (DAB). Lone Skouboe Werge had been employed as an 
administrative assistant by the firm Pro Display A/S. Both plaintiffs were represented by the trade union 
Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund Danmark (HK Danmark). According to its website, HK 
Danmark is a trade union with approximately 250,000 members39, who “work within the retail sector 
and as administrative staff within both the public and the private sectors.” Unique among Danish trade 
unions, HK Danmark is a repeat player before the CJEU, which is perhaps best known for its 
representation of the plaintiff in Danfoss, a landmark European court case in the field of equal pay for 
men and women.40 
The preliminary reference in joined cases C-335/11 and C-337/11 was the culmination of several years 
of outreach spearheaded by a group of legal practitioners who regularly represented Danish employees. 
After Directive 2000/78 was transposed into Danish law, employees’ representatives held regular 
meeting and workshops with trade union members to raise awareness about the new workers’ rights and 
how to exercise them.41 At roughly the same time, Danish courts began to issue decisions that interpreted 
the disability-related provisions of Directive 2000/78 quite narrowly. Particularly disconcerting for 
disability rights advocates, two early cases from the Court of Appeal for the Western Circuit determined 
that plaintiffs with, respectively, multiple sclerosis and post-traumatic stress syndrome, were not 
disabled. The court reached this result because the plaintiffs had only requested reduced working time 
as an accommodation for their disabilities, and, in the court’s opinion, reduced working time was not an 
accommodation required by Danish law.42 Later decisions of the Court of Appeal for the Eastern Circuit 
and the Danish Board of Equal Treatment took a more forgiving approach to the question of who 
                                                     
represented as separate cases. For example, joined case 335/11 and 337/11 is counted as 2 cases. The year corresponds to 
the year when the application of the respective case is lodged before the CJEU. 
39  See Website of HK Danmark, “About HK Danmark” at https://www.hk.dk/omhk/about-hk. 
40  Other cases brought by HK Danmark via preliminary reference include: Case C-476/1, HK Danmark (Glennie Kristensen) 
v. Experian A/S [2013] (raising issues related to age discrimination under Directive 2000/78); Case C-109/00, Tele 
Danmark A/S v HK Danmark [2001] (involving interpretation of gender equality provisions); Case C-400/95, Handels- og 
Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark (Larsson) v. Dansk Handel & Service (Føtex Supermarked A/S) [1997] 
(requesting guidance on absence due to pregnancy and confinement); Case C-179/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes 
Forbund i Danmark v. Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening [1990] (involving absence due to illness attributable to pregnancy or 
confinement). 
41  Information obtained in interview with Danish legal practitioner familiar with the case. 
42  See Danish Western High Court Judgment of 11 October 2007, published in UFR2008.30V; see also Danish Western High 
Court Judgment of 11 October 2007, No. B-2777-06 (unpublished). 
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qualified as disabled under the Act, but it remained the view among many employees’ representatives 
that a preliminary reference could provide Danish courts with greater clarity about the scope and 
appropriate application of the Directive. They also believed that the CJEU would probably take a more 
expansive view of the Directive than Danish courts had.43  
The reference poses several questions, but from the perspective of the employees’ representatives, the 
key goals were to clarify the definition of disability and—with a nod to the aforementioned Danish 
Western High Court judgments of 2007—establish whether a reduction in working hours could be 
considered a reasonable accommodation. Counsel for the plaintiffs were extremely pleased with the 
CJEU’s response.44  
The CJEU acknowledged that since its ruling in Chacón Navas, the European Union had approved the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and that the CRPD formed an integral 
part of the EU legal order. Therefore, Directive 2000/78 “must, as far as possible, be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with that convention.” With respect to the specific questions raise in the preliminary 
reference, the CJEU held that so long as the individual met the definition of disability, it was irrelevant 
whether the impairment was curable or incurable. It further held that a reduction in working time could 
be a reasonable accommodation, but that it was up to the Danish court to determine whether the 
accommodation constituted a disproportionate burden on the employer.45 
FOA on behalf of Karsten Kaltoft vs Billund Kommune, Case C-354/13 [2013] 
Mr. Kaltoft was dismissed by the Municipality of Billund, Denmark where he was employed as a 
childminder for 15 years.46 He was considered obese during his whole career and was encouraged by his 
employer to reduce his weight. Mr. Kaltoft was represented by Fag og Arbejde (FOA), which brought 
the case to a local court in Denmark - Retten i Kolding (District Court, Kolding), claiming his dismissal 
was a result of discrimination on the basis of obesity.47 FOA is the third largest union in Denmark, with 
a membership consisting of 186,000 assistants and workers in the healthcare and social fields, nursery 
schools and kindergartens, employed by municipalities, with 39 local branches across the country48. 
Although FOA handles many cases at national level, this is the only case in which they have acted as a 
legal party before the CJEU.  
Local stakeholders familiar with the Kaltoft case reported in interviews that bringing a case to court was 
not the first and most preferred step that unions in Denmark take. The complaint of a worker would first 
reach a local office of a union, and if no compromise with the employer is negotiated, the case moves 
up to the central office of the union. As a last resort, the union can take the case to court, covering the 
financial burden for the litigation process, and providing legal support by an in-house lawyer or a 
specialized external attorney.  
The Kaltoft case was led by an external attorney who was hired to represent the claimant in cooperation 
with the FOA legal team. Even though the plaintiff’s side was pushing for a preliminary request to the 
CJEU, they thought it highly unlikely that the local court would agree to send a reference, as it was 
widely believed that this is “reserved” mainly for the high courts in Denmark.49 
                                                     
43  Information obtained in interview with Danish legal practitioner familiar with the case. 
44  Information obtained in interview with Danish legal practitioner familiar with the case. 
45  See Joined Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge), [2013] at ¶¶ 30 -32, 41 & 59. 
46  See Case C-354/13 FOA on behalf of Karsten Kaltoft v Billund Kommune [2013] at ¶17. 
47  See id. at ¶¶ 18 & 29. 
48  See Website of FOA, “About FOA” at https://www.foa.dk/Forbund/Om-FOA. 
49  A search in CURIA for all cases referred by Danish courts under the preliminary ruling procedure reveals that the most 
active ones are the Danish Supreme Court and the two Danish High Courts, respectively Højesteret and Østre Landsret, 
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A preliminary reference was sent to the CJEU by the Retten i Kolding in June 2013. The local judge 
submitted four questions to the CJEU concerning obesity—either as a potential “self-standing ground 
of discrimination” within the general framework of equality, set by the Treaties (Art. 6 TEU) and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU—or as a part of the vague concept of disability, covered by 
Council Directive 2000/78.50 The two lawyers had a say in formulating the questions referred to the 
CJEU, which were then referred to the CJEU by the local court.51 
Inspired by a similar case in the USA involving a bus driver, whose seat was adjusted to his physical 
condition of obesity as a part of a reasonable accommodation measure, the FOA considered that obesity 
could be defined as a disabling condition in Europe too. The CJEU rejected obesity as a “self-standing 
ground of discrimination” but, in response to the fourth referred question, responded positively, setting 
out the necessary conditions under which obesity could be recognized as a disability.52 In the end, the 
judgment of the national court focused on the fact that Mr. Kaltoft’s obesity was not a reason for his 
dismissal.53 The FOA team has not given up the fight for Mr. Kaltoft’s rights. They are about to appeal 
the case (information obtained in October 2016) to the Supreme court in Denmark, which serves as the 
second and last instance for this case. 
Kaltoft has not provoked any similar cases related to obesity, but other cases in the disability domain 
have followed up after its publication. On the one hand, the case has opened the minds not only of 
employees but also of the local union branches to think “more broadly what disability” could be, 
including psychological conditions such as ADHD and depression. On the other hand, there appears to 
be a growing camp that is concerned that the parameters of the concept of disability could be stretched 
too far.  
Based on interviews conducted in October 2016, the perception of Danish stakeholders working in the 
equality field at national level was that the CJEU was more likely to issue positive decisions in the 
equality field compared to national courts. The CJEU is clearly perceived by some trade unions as a 
potentially powerful partner with the ability to influence the outcome of national disability claims. 
Conclusion 
At the outset of this paper, we asked why Danish courts have been uncharacteristically enthusiastic 
about making preliminary references involving Directive 2000/78. Building on the work of Eliantonio 
and Muir, we hypothesized that the EU anti-discrimination directives’ relatively detailed procedural 
requirements regarding access to justice and the participation of collective actor may have caused, or 
contributed to, this anomalous result. We found ample evidence to suggest that the directives’ procedural 
provisions had a profound effect on Danish anti-discrimination law at the domestic level, strengthening 
the national equality bodies’ powers. As a result, the number of cases brought before the Board of Equal 
Treatment has steadily increased and DIHR has become a more active participant in national litigation.  
That said, the involvement of collective actors involved in preliminary references has not changed. Just 
as the trade unions led the charge for preliminary references in the field of gender equality in the late 
1990s, Danish trade unions remain the key actors pushing for preliminary references to the CJEU in the 
anti-discrimination field today. Danish trade unions inform employers about their duties and employees 
about their rights under EU law, and when they deem it necessary, they back their members in court—
                                                     
Vestre Landsret, followed by the Maritime and Commercial Court So- og Handelsretten, which send approximately 85% 
of the total number of preliminary requests referred to the CJEU. 
50  See Case C-354/13 FOA on behalf of Karsten Kaltoft v Billund Kommune [2013] at ¶ 30. 
51  The process of drafting the questions was confirmed in an interview with national stakeholders familiar with the case. 
52  Case C-354/13 FOA on behalf of Karsten Kaltoft v Billund Kommune [2013] at ¶ 65. 
53  See Press Release, available at http://www.domstol.dk/kolding/nyheder/Pressemeddelelser/Pages/Domafsagtden31marts 
2016.aspx 
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with legal expertise and financial support—to ensure that EU law is appropriately applied. Although we 
were unable to establish why Denmark has been so active in referring cases involving Directive 2000/78, 
based on the analysis above, we feel confident that the answer lies in a closer examination of the 
motivations of Denmark’s trade union, rather than the directives’ procedural rules regarding access to 
justice and collective actor participation. 
  
 
The litigation of anti-discrimination cases in France by collective actors:  
a selective mobilization hindered by tradition 
 
Sophie Latraverse* 
 
In France, since the year 2000, institutional and legal reforms fostered by EU directives have allowed 
the emergence of significant evolutions regarding the impact and enforceability of discrimination law. 
However, French political and legal traditions have been reluctant to adopt this approach because it 
conflicts with the traditional theory of equality and the defiance of the legal environment towards legal 
doctrines that question the systematic application of the law in order to respond to particular interests. 
French civil society, including NGOs and trade unions, shares this defiance and resists acting in support 
of the rights of particular communities. In this context, the French equality bodies, i.e. the High 
Authority against Discrimination and for Equality (HALDE), created in 2005, and the Defender of 
Rights, which was integrated into the HALDE in 2011, have been determining actors in support of the 
enforcement and promotion of the anti-discrimination legal framework. As regards NGOs, traditional 
human rights NGOs are not significantly engaged and prefer criminal law and the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) to the EU anti-discrimination legal framework. Significant cases relating to 
Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) grounds, including referrals 
to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), were either supported by the French equality 
body, private parties or new activist NGOs acting in specialized areas such as religious and LGBTI 
rights. As regards the implication of trade unions, the analysis of legal developments show that while 
they have contributed to the development of anti-discrimination law in the context of the fight for the 
rights of union representatives, they have only supported a few isolated cases with respect to other 
grounds. 
EU law has been at the core of the enforceability of anti-discrimination law in France. Transposition of 
the EU Directives has led to the creation of a comprehensive legal framework and the adoption of the 
institutional reforms necessary to insure its effectiveness. 
The French equality body, the High Authority against Discrimination and for Equality (HALDE), which 
was created in 2005 and integrated into the Defender of Rights in 20111, was conceived to bring about 
effective enforcement. Both institutions have been determining actors in support of the enforcement and 
promotion of the anti-discrimination legal framework since 2005.  
However, the European anti-discrimination legal framework is perceived by French political and legal 
actors as the superfluous importation into the French legal system of an Anglo-Saxon political and legal 
approach, which conflicts with the inner logic of French civil law, the theory of equality and paramount 
legal principles such as the universal application of the rule and the refusal to recognize minorities, 
which anchor the French conception of public good. 
In addition, the French conception of democracy considers it illegitimate to pursue social change through 
legal action. Therefore, anti-discrimination law is perceived as a foreign mutation, introducing 
mechanisms which disrupt the institutional play and construct a covert activism that intervenes to 
counteract political action and social mobilization.  
                                                     
*  Director of the Secretariat General of the Défenseur des droits, French Equality Body and Expert for France for the European 
Network of Legal Experts in Gender Equality and Non-discrimination. 
1  Law 2004-1486 of 30 December 2004 creating the High Authority against discrimination and for Equality (Haute autorité de 
lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité/ HALDE) which had been replace by the Organic Law n° 2011-333 of 29 
March 2011 creating the Defender of Rights (Défenseur des droits). 
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The anti-discrimination agenda is received with defiance by social actors as well.  
Traditional anti-racist and human rights NGOs prefer to invest in the symbolic denunciation of racism 
through criminal procedure. Trade unions are not really open to focusing their action towards the 
interests of what they perceive to be minority groups. 
The implementation of EU anti-discrimination law in France embodies the paradox of the attitude of 
French society towards European-driven social change. While anti-discrimination law has been 
transposed into national law and has prospered significantly, it crystalized such defiance that it remains 
an instrument that escapes mainstream means of action. It is a domain of specialists; its impact and 
influence on legal reasoning remains fragile.  
After presenting an overview of the rhetoric used by French institutions and social actors to limit the 
impact of the anti-discrimination legal framework, we will present the actions of the equality body, 
NGOs and trade unions. 
The Core of French Resistance 
French society’s political tradition is based on democratic expression through political mobilization 
aimed at supporting change through and by the state. Religious freedom, equality between men and 
women and the fight against racism are paramount collective values and as such must be recognized and 
enforced by the state through penal sanctions and public policy. 
They are deemed to have been the subject of exemplary action on the part of the French Republic, which 
has led to a high level of collective awareness and mobilization on these issues. It attributes paramount 
worth to the fact that, as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon approach, the Republican tradition promotes 
universal values for all, without creating opposing social groups and promoting particular interests. 
Individual rights are always balanced by the principle of equality and one’s connection to the people. 
According to this philosophy, racism, islamophobia and homophobia must be dealt with by insuring 
equal treatment for all, whereas the anti-discrimination agenda supports the specific claims of victimized 
sub-groups. This approach is deemed to be bad for social cohesion and would not favor effective equality 
in the long run. 
The concept of discrimination has long been dismissed as irrelevant by the social sciences and the 
political discourse, under the influence of the analytical framework of inequalities inherited from 
Marxism, combined with the Jacobinism of the French Universalist approach that sees individuals as 
holding identical rights. Inequalities are held to be a matter of systemic class struggle. According to 
French social democrats, the legitimate strategy to fight discrimination is to educate and reduce 
economic disparities, a solution which will in fine settle all integration problems.2 
Ever since 2000, the European pressure on legal action as the mean chosen to impose a specific approach 
to the analysis and agenda on the fight against discrimination is perceived by most political forces as a 
domain where France must fight against European politics. This position has had tremendous 
implications for collective actors. 
This resistance is particularly visible in the hostile reactions of jurists and judges, political actors and 
trade unions. They consider discrimination law as an instrument that allows individuals, or very small 
groups, to use the courts to by-pass French democratic institutions in order to implement a foreign 
                                                     
2  P.ICARD, Y.LAIDIE et al, Le principe de non-discrimination : l’analyse des discours, The principle of non-discrimination: 
Analysis of the legal discourse CREDESPO, June 2016: http://www.gip-recherche-justice.fr/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/R.F.214.04.03.21-1.pdf; 
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political agenda for social change monitored by European politics to foster the construction of a liberal 
society of singular components and parallel communities.3 
In addition, some protected grounds, such as religion and opinions - if they impose requirements beyond 
the protection of religious and political freedoms - are criticized by most French actors as illegitimate. 
They appear as the political imposition of foreign considerations giving rights to sub-groups without 
consideration for the public interest.  
The resistance of jurists: limiting the impact of Anglo-Saxon legal reasoning on the integrity of 
French law 
Before 2000, the few cases that were brought before the courts failed by reason of difficulties relating 
to the burden of proof of claimants and the reluctance to resort to the collective analysis of the situation 
of persons sharing a similar situation related to a prohibited ground of discrimination, in the context of 
an individual case. 
French law has historically been structured around its own theory of equality, formal and universalist, 
which still constitutes the foundation of French public law, proposing a line of reasoning along the ideas 
of “equal application of the law” and equality before the state and public service. All acceptable 
exceptions are subject to the necessity of pursuing a “paramount public interest”. 
Regarding private law, it is governed by the tradition of freedom of contract in civil law and therefore 
holds that restrictions on this principle must be required by law, public order or a paramount public 
interest. 
French political and legal traditions are systematically cautious of doctrines that question the systematic 
application of the law in order to respond to particular interests.  
Many scholars have discussed the influence of anti-discrimination law on the equilibrium of French 
legal reasoning. Today, impact studies show that judges, while officially accommodating the principle 
of non-discrimination, often limit their reasoning to an application of the legal theory of equality and 
clearly confirm open resistance to its wider application because of its consequences for civil procedure 
and legal reasoning.4 
While the jurisprudence of the higher courts in matters related to employment law has supported the 
implementation of the legal framework of the EU directives, important difficulties remain before lower 
courts and administrative and civil jurisdictions. 
The judge has particular problems with the idea of abandoning the general application of the rule, and 
passing on to an approach that finds individual solutions to particular situations.5 Inequality is no longer 
a fact, it becomes an action, individual or collective, that can be sanctioned against a designated 
                                                     
3  For example, the political journalist A.-G. Slama : « Quand on considère l'usage qui est fait en ce moment de la notion de 
lutte contre la discrimination, il est difficile de ne pas en conclure que ce combat s’exerce surtout contre la démocratie. 
Cette notion repose sur le principe universaliste d’égalité de tous devant la loi, qui est nécessaire au consensus républicain. 
Elle deviant mortelle quand elle est mise au service d’un particularisme, dans le but de la subvertir» : ”When one considers 
the use that is being made of the concept of discrimination, it is difficult to conclude that this fight is not one targeting 
democracy itself. It becomes lethal when it serves particular interests with the purpose of bypassing its basic 
principles” .Our translation, « Discrimination et subversion », Le Figaro, 13 novembre 2006. 
4  P.ICARD, Y.LAIDIE et al , Op . Cit.. 
5  M. MERCAT-BRUNS, J. PERELMAN, et al. Les juridictions et les instances publiques dans la mise en œuvre du principe 
de non-discrimination: perspectives pluridisciplinaires et comparées, Courts and public autoritiesimplementing non-
discrimination law : comparative and pluridisciplinary perspectives, École de droit de Sciences Po, June 2016: 
http://www.gip-recherche-justice.fr/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/gip_rapportfinal_les-juridictions-et-les-instances-
publiques-la-non-discrimination-final.pdf. 
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respondent, held responsible for the impact of collective choices over time and, possibly, bring about 
sanction in the absence of intentional fault.  
It highlights the fundamental rhetorical difference between legal systems regarding procedural rules and 
evaluation of the merits of the case: it goes to the purview of the trial process, the scope of liability, the 
very concept of equitable behavior and the function of legal action. But before all else, it goes to the 
heart of the definition of equality and the reluctance of the French to the idea of treating persons 
differently in different situations.  
One of the solutions of French lawyers and judges is to frame legal discussion outside the legal 
framework of anti-discrimination law; another is to generalize to all citizens the scope of a protection in 
favor of equal treatment afforded by the principle of non-discrimination. In the Ponsolle case, the Court 
of Cassation created a general principle of equal pay applicable to all workers, i.e. between men, between 
women, and between men and women.6 
The resistance of political actors: limiting the introduction of foreign concepts contrary to the French 
legal and political tradition 
The French Republic has systematically refused to ratify international conventions for the recognition 
and protection of rights of minorities. 
The concept of minority is considered to be contrary to the French conception of the public good. It 
allows sub-groups to claim specific rights, thereby altering social cohesion and the very concepts of 
equality and public interest.  
In this context, the concept of indirect discrimination translates the legal empowerment of minorities 
and supports the construction through European law of the conditions for the covert recognition of 
minority rights benefiting from the adaptation of the general rule to specific circumstances. 
Many members of Parliament hold a very negative view of anti-discrimination law. For example, in 
2008, the Senate adopted a resolution denouncing European law as importing a Community-based 
approach to equality that was contrary to the principles of the French Constitution.7 
As another example of an effort to adapt the principle of non-discrimination to the French tradition by 
generalizing the requirements of equal treatment, in Article L1110-3 of the Code of Public Health, 
Parliament created a general principle of non-discrimination in access to health services without 
reference to a list of protected grounds. 
The resistance of trade unions: limiting support to legal action 
In France, political action and social activism are perceived as the only democratic mechanisms of 
communication between the people and the institutions. 
The separation of powers is a necessity, and normative power cannot be delegated to judges, who can 
only interpret and apply the law but can in no way jurisprudentially impose on citizens independent 
norms or act as social regulators. Such legal activism, activated by private interests, is foreign to French 
traditional mechanisms of power struggle. 
This reluctance is emblematically illustrated by the refusal of trade unions to get significantly involved 
in anti-discrimination litigation, except on the ground of anti-union discrimination. The justification is 
                                                     
6  Cass. Soc., 29 October 1996, n° 92-43680: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT0000070 
38205 
7  Senate resolution on the proposal for a new anti-discrimination Directive in access to goods and services, adopted on 30 
October 2008: http://www.senat.fr/rap/l08-072/l08-072_mono.html 
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that they have a mandate to represent the collective interests of the workers and that anti-discrimination 
cases pursue interests of sub-groups of the working unit.  
In addition, the trade unions consider that their function is to support “the struggle” and the “negotiation 
process”. Thus, their function is not to engage in judicial activism. 
For example, they have not supported claims by old North African workers questioning their 
discriminatory status and their ensuing careers against Renault and the National Railway (SNCF). 
Moreover, in the context of the discussions relating to the adoption of a class action in anti-
discrimination cases, the trade unions’ lobby went so far as to argue, with success, in favor of the 
preeminence of traditional social dialogue methods over legal action8, i.e. negotiations under the 
exclusive direction of legally appointed trade unions9, while preserving their exclusive right to initiate 
class actions in relation to discrimination in the workplace. As a result, their strategic choices to initiate 
an action will afford no challenges. NGOs are prevented from representing claimants in class actions 
relating to discrimination in employment and cases of alleged discrimination before accessing 
employment, such as those questioning hiring practices.10 
The Actors of the Implementation of Anti-discrimination Law  
The pro-European context of the early 2000’s and the pressure of the European Commission have 
brought about institutional and legal reforms that have allowed the emergence of significant evolutions 
in France regarding the impact and enforceability of anti-discrimination law.  
It is first the French equality body that has undertaken a strategy to develop the jurisprudence in order 
to allow effective application of the anti-discrimination legal framework and foster effective action 
before the labor law jurisdictions.  
However, while some specialized NGOs have integrated anti-discrimination law in their activities, their 
contribution remains focused on specific grounds and most anti-racist NGOs have pursued their former 
approach. 
Trade union action has contributed to the development of anti-discrimination law, but only through the 
indirect impact of jurisprudence developed in the context of discrimination against union 
representatives.  
The contribution of the equality body 
Overview 
Article 71-1 of the Constitution of 1958 and Organic Law n° 2011-333 of 29 March 2011 created the 
Defender of Rights, an independent administrative authority that is, amongst other functions, the 
national equality body that succeeded HALDE. HALDE had been created in 2005 as part of the 
transposition of Council Directive 2000/43 of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, and Council Directive 2002/73 of 23 
                                                     
8  Pécault-Rivolier, L., Rapport au ministre du travail sur les discriminations au travail/ Report to the Minister of Labor on 
discrimination in employment, 6 December 2013,http://www.justice.gouv.fr/publication/rap-l-pecaut-rivolier-2013.pdf 
9  In France representative trade union are not elected but designated by decree of the Minister of employment. The decree 
issued on 1 June 2013, constitutes the first revision of the list since the last decree of 31 March 1966: 
http://social.blog.lemonde.fr/2013/06/01/la-liste-des-syndicats-representatifs-au-journal-officiel/  
10  Articles 87 and 88 of the Law n° 2016-1547 of 18 November 2016 of Modernization of the Justice of the XX1st Century: 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2016/11/18/JUSX1515639L/jo 
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September 2002 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards 
access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions. 
The competence of the Defender of Rights covers all discrimination prohibited by law and international 
conventions ratified by France. The scope of its mission encompasses all requirements of the Directives 
(Article 13 of Directive 2000/43, Article 1 par 7 of Directive 2002/43 and Article 20 of Directive 
2006/54 recast) , i.e. providing independent assistance to victims of discrimination in pursuing their 
complaints (Article 27), conducting independent surveys concerning discriminations, publishing 
independent reports (Article 34) and making recommendations to the government (Article 32), 
employers and civil society actors relating to its findings on discrimination (Article 25). 
Assistance of victims, investigative powers and dispute resolution 
Its competence relating to the assistance to be provided to victims takes the form of an independent 
investigation of individual and collective complaints. The investigation is initiated of its own accord or 
following a written request from the claimant, a trade union or an NGO. 
It is carried out at arms-length but is not quasi-judicial. It takes the form of an administrative 
investigation. 
Its competence to investigate complaints and render decisions extends to all issues relating to claims 
against the government and public services, as well as the ‘best interest of the child’, as defined in article 
3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and ethics in the activities of public and private 
security forces. Therefore it covers most human rights issues as well as all questions relating to 
children’s rights and relations between the police, security forces and citizens, except questions related 
to defence rights in criminal law. 
The Defender of Rights has investigative powers that allow him to request any information, on any 
support, from any person, public or private (Article 18). He can also take testimony from any person 
and proceed to verification in situ (Article 22). 
The investigation can give rise to a non-binding decision concluded on the merits of the complaint. If it 
finds the complaint well-founded, he can address recommendations to all interested parties, who have a 
certain amount of time to comply. These recommendations can include a request to pay damages or to 
issue a disciplinary sanction (Article 29). The Defender of Rights can also make general 
recommendations to the parties, government, public bodies or groups of interest and propose legislative 
and regulatory reforms and amendments to existing legislation (Article 32). 
The Defender of Rights can deal with any case by pursuing an ‘equitable settlement’, which in French 
law consists of proposing a solution correcting the unfairness resulting from a strict application of the 
law despite the absence of effective means of legal action, and he may recommend mediation to the 
parties (Article 25).  
In case of non-compliance, the Defender has the power to issue ‘injunctions’, failing which he will draw 
public attention to his recommendations and the failure of the Respondent to comply (Article 25). In 
addition, he may alert the relevant authorities if disciplinary sanctions against the respondent are 
required (Article 29).  
However, the Defender’s decisions do not otherwise bind the parties or the courts, and claimants are not 
required to address their complaints to the Defender of Rights. Claimants can initiate actions directly 
before courts in all cases. 
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Relationship to courts 
The law sets out at Article 33 of the Organic Law an original role for the Defender of Rights, who may 
intervene as an advisor to criminal, civil and administrative courts at all levels: the law creates on the 
one hand the possibility for criminal, civil and administrative courts to seek his observations in cases 
under adjudication, and on the other hand, it allows the Defender of Rights to file his investigation in 
the court record and submit observations arguing the facts and the law on his own initiative.  
The Court of Cassation and the Conseil d’Etat have given some further indications as to the status of the 
Defender of Rights before the courts: the Defender of Rights is not a party to the case11 but acts as 
amicus curiae; he is not a court or a tribunal since his decisions are not binding, and he cannot be sued 
in court because he cannot be held to be detrimental to the defeated party12 until the Defender of Rights 
decides to give some publicity to his decision. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union has not yet had the opportunity to render a decision on the 
standing of HALDE and the Defender of Rights. Considering the nature of the procedure before the 
Defender of Rights and his status before the courts, as defined by Article 33 its Organic Law, according 
to the test adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Belov case13, the Defender of 
Rights does not seem to be a jurisdiction that can address referrals to the Court within the meaning of 
Article 267 TFEU: he meets the Court’s definition of a body pursuing administrative investigations and 
taking administrative decisions that cannot directly address referrals to the Court of Justice.  
As regards his standing before the Court, the Defender of Rights has been involved in a referral to the 
CJEU by the Conseil d'Etat, in which he requests the authorization to present conclusions on the basis 
that he is party to the procedure in the sense of the article 23 RPCJEU.14  
Institutional strategy 
Since 2005, both equality bodies have pursued a strategy focused on contributing to the adjudication of 
cases before the courts by collecting necessary evidence to be filed in the court record, contributing to 
the development of legal arguments in strategic cases and allowing the creation of the critical volume 
of jurisprudence necessary to create the conditions for the effective enforcement of anti-discrimination 
law. 
At the time of its creation, civil procedure did not allow claimants to have access to certain evidence in 
possession of the defendant in order to establish facts in support of his or her case. In this context, 
claimants failed to establish discrimination before French courts on the basis of the fundamental civil 
principle that claimants had to sustain the burden of proof. 
HALDE and the Defender of Rights have pursued a strategy of investigation to intervene as amicus 
curiae in the proceedings and file evidence in all cases where claimants had brought their case to court 
and the equality body found that there had been discrimination.  
In addition, HALDE has specifically argued cases relating to the right to access evidence in order to 
construct of a line of jurisprudence that develops the right to access evidence as a substantive right, 
directly related to ensuring that the proper conditions exist to enforce anti-discrimination laws. 
The Court of Cassation went so far as to hold that in derogation to the usual rules of procedure, the trial 
judge has a duty to unilaterally ask defendants to provide evidence that allow the court to evaluate the 
                                                     
11  Cass. Soc., 16 November 2010, pourvoi n° 09-42956.   
12  CE, 13/07/2007 n° 294195; CE 23/07/2010 n°299384. 
13  CJEU, 31 January 2013, C-394/11, Belov vs CHEZ ElektroBalgarian AD. 
14  Conseil d'Etat n°399922 of 19 July 2017 in CNIL, Defender of Rights and others vs Google Inc, relating to the right to 
privacy and the right to withdrawal of personal data in application of the Decision of the Court in Google Spain. 
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veracity of the allegations of unequal treatment of the claimant15, and that refusal to communicate such 
evidence could justify a shift in the burden of proof against the defendant.16 
This was the first step of a more comprehensive strategy to present legal arguments on the application 
of anti-discrimination law, facilitate enforceability, and multiply cases. Before the courts, the equality 
body has built a rhetoric based on the specificity of the issues that can only be addressed in an anti-
discrimination law framework, outlining the specific contribution of prohibited grounds of 
discrimination which relate to characteristics of the person that can be considered to impose 
considerations of public order and public interest in contract law and public law.  
Since 2005, the action of the equality body has given rise to a substantial corpus of cases on issues 
related to access to evidence and the implementation of the shift in the burden of proof, which have 
reached the Court of Cassation and Conseil d’État, thereby providing the authority necessary to be 
recognized by the French legal system as a whole.  
This evolution has had a significant impact on the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws on the 
grounds of age, disability, sex and pregnancy in labor law, before the Social Chamber of the Court of 
Cassation, and in matters related to employment in the public service before the Conseil d’État. 
Regarding the ground of sexual orientation, it is mainly raised in relation to cases alleging harassment 
in the workplace. 
Even if some philosophical hesitations remain about the use of the concepts of race and ethnic origin17, 
their enforceability has been recognized by the Court of Cassation in cases built by the equality body. 
The Court has gone so far as to recognize the admissibility of statistical evidence and social studies to 
support the presumption of discrimination.18  
In addition, the HALDE and the Defender of Rights have developed and spent substantial energy in 
influencing and supporting evolutions in the academic curriculum of universities and developing 
training programs for professionals, trade unions and NGOs, encouraging them to go beyond their 
reflexes and propensities to apply traditional French law to solve the same legal issues.  
The substantive contribution of discrimination law to the French legal corpus was recognized in a 
professional seminar co-organized by the Court of Cassation, the Conseil d’État, the National Bar and 
the Defender of Rights to honor the 10th anniversary of the creation of the French Equality Body. This 
Seminar was introduced by the Presidents of both French supreme courts. At the morning session the 
heads of each competent chamber of the High jurisdictions, as well as Justice Jean-Claude Bonichot 
from the European Court of Justice, and Justice Françoise Tulkens, former vice-president of the 
European Court of Human Rights, presented each court’s contribution to ten years of judicial 
development. In the afternoon, lawyers who had argued landmark cases presented their judicial strategy 
and their analysis of legal developments of the last 10 years.19 
The limited impact of the European legal framework on the action of NGOs 
All NGOs, including trade unions (see section II.3), that have been in existence for a period of more 
than 5 years can intervene before the court on their own.20 In addition, Article 2 of the Law n° 2001-
1066 of 16 November 2001 transposing Council Directive 2000/43 (Supra) and Council Directive 
                                                     
15  Cass. Soc. 28 March 2008, n° 97-45258, Fluchère. 
16  IBM c. Buscail, CA Montpelier, 25/03/2003 N° 0200504. 
17  Constitutional Council, 15 November 2007 n° 2007-557 DC. 
18  Cass. soc., 15 December 2011, n° 10-15873 ; Cass. 1st Civ., 9 November 2016, n° 15-24.207 to 15-25.877, see infra. 
 
20  Article 31 NCCP and Article R779-9 of the Code of Administrative Justice. 
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2000/78 of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation, expressly provide for the competence of NGOs and trade unions to represent and/or act on 
behalf of plaintiffs in anti-discrimination cases.21  
Since the transposition of EU anti-discrimination law, most NGOs have kept to their former means of 
intervention, except for a few noteworthy organizations. 
Anti-racist NGOs (SOS Racisme, le MRAP, la Ligue des droits de l’homme, LICRA, MRAP) are active 
and intervene in anti-discrimination cases based on ethnic origin in private and public access to goods 
and services. In pursuing their anti-racist agenda, they favor initiating penal cases relating to intentional 
and overt racial discrimination. To our knowledge, they have not been involved in cases relating to 
access to goods and services before civil and administrative courts that apply Directive 2000/43. 
However, with the support of the Open Society, they have combined efforts to initiate civil actions 
against the State to challenge racial profiling by the French police. In this context, with the influence of 
the lawyers in charge of the case, non-intentional discrimination and the shift in the burden of proof 
provided by Directive 2000/43 have been the pillars of a judicial strategy before the civil court in 12 
emblematic cases that were decided by the Court of Cassation on 9 November 2016. 22 
NGOs that are active in defending the rights of migrants (GISTI), of Travelers (ANGVC, UFAT, France 
Liberté Voyage) and the rights of Roma (FNASAT - Romeurope) have intervened in a variety of cases 
related to access to public service that are based on mainstream public law. When they raise issues 
related to discrimination, the subject matters generally relate to principles of equal application of rights 
protected by the European Convention of Human rights, with which administrative courts are very 
familiar. 
Very few NGOs intervene in employment cases, except specialists such as AVFT (Association 
européenne contre les violences faites aux femmes au travail) in matters of sexual harassment.  
Some NGOs that intervene in relation to homophobia and sexual orientation, such as AutreCercle, 
ADHEOS or Homoboulot, are very active in promoting best practices but only intervene before the 
courts in isolated cases (see infra Hay Case). 
NGOs that intervene in the field of disability have a very active dialogue with the State and public 
services. They pursue projects for the integration of disabled persons in housing, education, employment 
and leisure, but intervene very little before the courts. They have however contributed to the 
dissemination of the concept of reasonable accommodation provided by Article 5 of Directive 2000/78, 
and its impact on employment practices has been very significant. 
The support of NGOs in legal cases related to discriminatory practices on the grounds of sex is non-
existent. Historically, Frenchwomen’s rights activists have been particularly engaged in issues related 
to violence against women and reproductive rights, but issues related to employment are deemed to be 
the competence of trade unions. This explains why there have been very few successful cases relating 
to discrimination on the ground of sex before the creation of HALDE. However, since 2005 effective 
adjudication has rapidly given rise to accelerated enforcement of situations of discrimination in 
employment on the grounds of sex. 
As regards cases referred to the CJEU by French jurisdictions, although EU law has made a fundamental 
contribution to the enforceability of anti-discrimination law in France, there have been only two 
references to the CJEU, and both have been referred by the Social Chamber of the Court of Cassation 
with the support of specialized NGOs. 
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The first case, Hay, related to allegations of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation with 
respect to access to legal holidays related to family events in violation of Directive 2000/78. It was 
brought by a claimant who was himself a SUD union representative, and president of an NGO supporting 
gay rights called ADHEOS. He first filed a claim with HALDE, which gave rise to the presentation of 
observations in support of an argument of indirect discrimination regarding conditions of employment 
pursuant to Article 1132-1 of the Labor Code and Article 3.1 C) of Directive 2000/78 before the Courts 
and then was challenged up to the Court of Cassation. The Social Chamber made a referral to the CJEU.23 
The second referral from the Court of Cassation relates to the Bougnaoui case. It raises the issue of 
whether employers may limit the right to wear the Islamic veil in private employment and the 
admissibility of justifications based on requests of clients pursuant to Article 1132-1 of the Labor Code 
and Article 3.1 C) of Directive 2000/78. The case was brought with the support of the NGO ADDH-
CCIF(Association de défense des droits de l’homme – Collectif contre l’islamophobieen France) which 
defends the religious rights of Muslims. 24The ADDH intervenes in many cases to challenge difficulties 
of access to public service, to goods and service and to employment, in relation with the wearing of 
religious signs, and particularly the Islamic veil.  
A mobilization of trade unions focusing on discrimination against union representatives 
As noted above, all NGOs and trade unions that have existed for more than 5 years can intervene before 
the courts on their own.25  
The paradox is that even if trade unions are not significant actors supporting implementation of 
European anti-discrimination law, they chose to structure the fight for the rights of union representatives 
around the approach of European anti-discrimination law. Hence, their action has had a determining 
impact on the implementation of discrimination law. It triggered jurisprudential recognition of the shift 
in the burden of proof and provided the volume of cases necessary to challenge existing rules of 
procedure and establish a solid jurisprudence to overcome difficulties involving access to evidence. 
The approach to evidence of discrimination developed by the trade unions and recognized by the Court 
of Cassation consists of identifying a point of abrupt change in the progression of the employee’s career 
based on the first manifestation of the employer of the discriminatory ground: initially this approach 
was based on the impact of engaging in union activities; after 2000, it was further used to establish the 
impact of pregnancy, of the knowledge of sexual orientation, and the manifestation of a disability. 
This panel is usually completed by the comparative analysis of the situations of persons identified to the 
prohibited ground and the situation of others. This method, identified in France as the Clerc method, has 
been recognized by the Court of Cassation and Conseil d’État as a relevant and conclusive way to 
establish a presumption of discrimination, allowing a shift in the burden of proof. After this first step, 
the employer must establish that the situation of this particular employee is objectively justified and 
unrelated to a discriminatory factor.26 
Today, trade unions intervene mostly in cases related to discrimination based on union activities or on 
issues related to the status of employees, such as age limitations in employment or access to retirement 
rights.  
In conclusion, French jurisprudence shows the emergence of a substantial corpus of cases relating to the 
implementation of European anti-discrimination law, but most of them are the result of cases appealed 
to higher courts in labor matters, pursued by individual private parties, a handful of specialized lawyers 
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25  Supra section II.2 
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and with the support of the equality body acting indirectly in the context of its mandate pursuant to 
Article 7 paragraph 1 of Directive 2000/43 and Article 9 paragraph 1 of Directive 2000/78.27 Few cases 
to date have involved collective actors as parties to lawsuits. It is remarkable that equality bodies, NGOs 
and trade unions have not litigated EU equality law much in France.  
This is not to say however that such collective actors do not play an important role in advancing EU 
equality law in the French context. To start with, as shown above, the equality body has developed a 
sophisticated strategy to facilitate the domestication of EU equality law and relevant concepts in a 
particularly hostile landscape. 
Secondly, strategic litigation carried out in very specific areas and supported by new organizations that 
are mobilized to target grounds of discrimination outside of the mainstream of traditional activism in 
French civil society have led to (rare) examples of referrals to the CJEU. These cases have not been the 
result of mainstream litigation: they are the result of very active and well-organized communities that 
have been empowered by EU anti-discrimination policies, such as the LGBTI community in the Hay 
case, and the main organization defending religious rights of Muslims in the Bougnaoui case. It is 
interesting to note that both have been the product of referrals by the Social Chamber of the Court of 
Cassation relating to the interpretation of the scope of the protection of Directive 2000/78. 
Thirdly, collective actors may have a role to play in seeking a change of approach to the notion of 
indirect discrimination defined at Article 1 of the Law of 27 May 2008 completing transposition of EU 
Law in relation to anti-discrimination. The concept of indirect discrimination is new to French legal 
culture and is seldom argued, although it is a key concept of EU equality law. There have been few 
decisions on the subject, some of which involved collective actors.  
The first decision of the Court of Cassation, in 2007, resulted from an argument raised by the judges 
themselves in a matter brought to the Court’s attention by an individual plaintiff on an issue of annual 
regulation of working hours where the rule implemented had an adverse impact on the salary of 
employees who were on sick leave during periods of increased time of service.28 
The second action was brought by a group of 38 female employees claiming retirement rights with the 
support of their trade union. They succeeded in arguing that collective agreement employment 
classifications attributing retirement points to a specific function mainly occupied by women were 
discriminatory on the ground of sex for the purpose of calculating retirement benefits, when compared 
to points attributed to a similar employment occupied by men.29 
A third action questioned the comparable age of retirement of the employees of the Opéra de Paris, stage 
technicians, a profession exclusively occupied by men, leaving at age 55, and dressers/make-up artists, 
who were all women, leaving at age 65. The Court expressly invoked Directive 2006/54 of 5 July 2006 
on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in 
matters of employment and occupation (recast) to reach the conclusion that the policy amounted to 
indirect discrimination on the ground of sex30.  
Two additional cases have been concluded regarding indirect discrimination on the grounds of origin 
pursuant to Article 1132-1 of the Labour Code and Article 1 of the Law of 27 May 2008 that defines 
indirect discrimination.  
The first one related to the situation of abuse of a home servant. It was brought by a lawyer specialized 
in discrimination law, acting on a pro bono basis, in a matter referred by an NGO supporting rights of 
illegal migrants (as the NGO had no means to support the litigation, financially or otherwise). The 
                                                     
27  Note that very few cases have been brought before civil and administrative courts in relation to access to goods and services. 
28  Cass. soc. Sportfabrics, n° 05-43962, 09/01/2007. 
29  Cass. soc., AGIRC, n°10-21489, 06/06/2012. 
30  Cass. Soc. Opéra National de Paris, n°12-14752 and 12-14964, 30 September 2013. 
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plaintiff argued that violent treatment of illegal migrants in the workplace did not require a comparator 
to reach the conclusion that it was indirect discrimination in employment on the ground of origin, and 
was successful before the Court of Cassation.31 
The second case was brought with the support of the equality body and concluded that the prohibition 
of statistics on the grounds of origin did not forbid establishing a presumption of discrimination by all 
available means. Therefore, the equality body and the plaintiff could present evidence by counting 
employees of foreign origin that had been hired in the last six years on the basis of their last name, in 
order to establish a presumption of discrimination on the grounds of national origin.32 
 
                                                     
31  Cass. soc., Dos Santos, n° 10-20765, 03/11/2011. 
32  Cass. Soc., Airbus, n°10-15873, 15 December 2011. 
  
 
Litigating anti-discrimination cases in Germany: what role for collective actors? 
 
Mathias Möschel* 
 
This paper argues that the role of collective actors in Germany in litigating anti-discrimination cases 
and in influencing the interpretation of EU law in this domain via the mechanism of preliminary 
references to the CJEU has been very limited and at best indirect. This is due to resistance from 
(mainstream) legal academia and a rather restrictive legal framework that was reluctantly set up in 
Germany in 2006 to implement the EU anti-discrimination directives. 
Introduction 
This contribution will look at the role played by collective actors in Germany in litigating anti-
discrimination cases in Germany and at how they have – or have not - used EU law and/or influenced 
the interpretation of EU law by triggering preliminary reference rulings.  
As stated in the workshop outline, “hardly any preliminary rulings involving collective actors have 
emanated” from Germany on the issue of anti-discrimination law. This might seem surprising for a 
number of reasons. First, the sheer number of inhabitants of the country and therefore the number of 
cases (potentially) litigated in courts might warrant higher referral numbers than say from Malta. 
Second, German courts are consistently among the most active users of the preliminary reference 
procedure to the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU)1. Third, even within the 
domain of anti-discrimination law, a number of the most famous individual non-discrimination cases 
and numerous age discrimination cases before the CJEU have originated from Germany2, thus 
contributing to the development of EU law in this domain. However, collective actors have been 
practically absent from this picture.  
I hereby posit that the limited involvement by collective actors is mainly caused by the hostility towards 
anti-discrimination law demonstrated at the time that four EU anti-discrimination directives, namely 
Directive 2000/43/EC (hereinafter Race Equality Directive), Directive 2000/78/EC (hereinafter Equal 
Treatment Employment Directive), Directive 2002/73/EC and Directive 2004/113/EC were transposed 
into German law via the Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (the General Equal Treatment Act, 
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comes in second place with 1326. See Court of Justice of the European Union, “Annual Report 2015. Judicial Activity”, 
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28 July 2016 (sex and age).  
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hereinafter AGG)3. This hostility has translated into a domestic legal framework on anti-discrimination 
legislation, which left reduced avenues for collective actors to make use of the preliminary ruling 
mechanism.  
As a consequence, this paper is subdivided into three parts. Part I will look at the mostly hostile reactions 
by the German legal and political community to the introduction of the AGG. Part II will then look at 
the legal framework which resulted from this hostility and in particular the heavy limitations on the use 
of the AGG by collective actors. Part III will then analyze what nevertheless such actors have attempted 
to do and try to identify how they could instead make better use of what is available to them.  
Part 1 – German hostility to anti-discrimination legislation 
It is a well-known fact that Germany was politically quite reluctant to implement the non-discrimination 
directives and in particular the Race Equality Directive and the Equal Treatment Employment Directive. 
Indeed, the European Commission had to threaten Germany with infringement procedures due to its 
delay in implementing these instruments and once Germany finally did in 2006 with the AGG, the 
launch of other such procedures had to be threatened due to incorrect implementation4.  
Partly the political resistance was driven by German economic actors who feared or predicted a flood of 
litigation by rejected job applicants and/or abuse of the possibilities to litigate (so-called “AGG-
Hopping”)5, i.e. fake job applications followed by litigation to make money out of rejections6 with 
increased costs for German companies to deal with such claims. 
This political-economic reluctance was backed up by more technical legal opinions from German 
academics. The main legal arguments and/or fears were that anti-discrimination legislation restricts the 
(constitutional) principle of private autonomy and contractual freedom7. Other arguments were that such 
legislation might lead to high damage awards, when “[i]n Germany there is as yet no culture of anti-
discrimination, such as it is commonly known especially in the Anglo-Saxon nations”8. 
What is surprising is the almost virulent tone of the legal critiques expressed against anti-discrimination 
legislation by some scholars and practitioners in a domain (law) which is otherwise more known for its 
(dry) technical language. Indeed, one author talked about the introduction of a “Republic of virtues by 
the new Jacobins”9. Another one insinuated that Germany was becoming totalitarian again10. A third 
author published a critique in one of Germany’s best-known generalist law reviews stating that the 
Anglo-American approach adopted in the AGG presumably derived from the philosophy of the 1968 
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generation and imposed political correctness11. In yet another law review article, a legal practitioner 
even went so far as to call the German equality body which EU member states had an obligation to 
identify on the basis of the anti-discrimination directives, an “unconstitutional monster”12.  
As a consequence of such resistances coming from various domains, the AGG was framed restrictively 
rather than expansively, raising doubts by some authors as to whether this was a correct implementation 
of the EU anti-discrimination directives13. The material scope of the AGG has been limited in various 
ways. One such example concerns the statutory limitations on the prohibition of discrimination in certain 
mainly contractual relations, whereby such discrimination is excluded “where the parties or their 
relatives are closely related or a relationship of trust exists”14. Moreover, a specific exemption exists 
with regard to tenancy, in as much as discrimination in housing rentals only applies to those who rent 
out more than 50 units15. In other words, in Germany the prohibition on discrimination mainly applies 
to standard contracts that are bound to apply in a large number of cases but not in closely negotiated 
contractual relations.  
This restrictive approach is also particularly visible in the domain which is the object of this study, 
namely the level of intervention of collective actors in anti-discrimination lawsuits as can be seen in the 
next section. However, as appears from the 2014 European Commission report on the Race Equality 
Directive and the Equal Treatment Employment Directive, Germany does not seem to be in breach of 
EU law16.  
Part 2 – The legal framework for collective actors  
Under the AGG 
In fact, whereas an earlier bill of the AGG had still foreseen the possibility for anti-discrimination 
organizations to bring anti-discrimination claims in the name of a victim of discrimination if they had 
been authorized to do so by a power of attorney (Bevollmächtigtenbefugnis), such a possibility was 
cancelled in the final bill. This created a legislative inconsistency. Indeed, the general statute 
establishing the procedures before labour law courts allowed such a representation of victims by 
organizations in trials, which meant that potentially in general labour law claims plaintiffs could be 
represented by organizations, whereas in claims brought under the AGG they could not. Rather than 
levelling up the standards, the German legislator decided to level them down by reforming general 
labour law as well, thus preventing representation by organizations both under the AGG and under the 
general labour law procedures17. 
                                                     
11  Klaus Adomeit, “Political correctness - jetzt Rechtspflicht!”, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2006), p. 2169. 
12  Wolfgang Phillip, “Ein verfassungswidriges Monstrum. Die Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes”, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Verwaltungsrecht (2006), p. 1235.  
13  See on these critical voices on various aspects of the conformity with EU law of the AGG e.g.: Ralph Göbel Zimmermann 
& Liisa Marquardt, “Diskriminierungen aus Gründen der „Rasse“ und wegen der ethnischen Herkunft im Spiegel der 
Rechtsprechung zum AGG”, Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht (2012), p. 369 and Sabine Berghahn, Micha Klapp & Alexander 
Tischbirek (eds.) for the Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes, “Evaluation des Allgemeinen 
Gleichbehandlungsgesetzes”, Nomos, 2016, pp. 73, 115, 116, 187. 
14  Article 19, para. 5 AGG.   
15  Id. 
16  Report from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 17 January 2014, COM(2014) 
2 final, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/com_2014_2_en.pdf (last visited on 20 May 2017). 
17  See more in detail on this: Wolfgang Däubler & Martin Bertzbach (eds.), Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, Nomos, 
2nd ed., 2008, p. 728.  
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The main provision of the AGG dealing with collective actors is § 23, entitled “Support from Anti-
discrimination organizations”. It offers the possibility for anti-discrimination organizations “to be 
entrusted with the legal affairs of disadvantaged persons”18. However, there are certain limitations as to 
how far such “support”, especially in court hearings, can go. On the one hand, there are certain 
organizational requirements that need to be respected. Anti-discrimination organizations “must operate 
on a non-profit and non-temporary basis”, their articles of association must contain as an objective the 
“particular interest of persons or groups of persons discriminated against” and they need to have at least 
“75 members or be composed of at least seven organizations”19. On the other hand, the limitations 
concern the modalities with which they can intervene in anti-discrimination lawsuits.  
First of all, the strongest level of intervention, namely the possibility for anti-discrimination 
organizations to bring claims to protect collective interests independently and in their own name, for 
example in the case when no victim of discrimination brings a claim, is excluded20. This exclusion not 
only extends to anti-discrimination organizations but also to the German equality body, which has been 
created to implement the EU anti-discrimination directives. This explains why preliminary reference 
procedures, such as those initiated from Belgium21 are not possible in Germany. It also explains why 
one of those decisions, namely the Feryn judgment by the CJEU22 could be presented and critiqued in 
German scientific and journalistic writings as an (inacceptable) case of victimless discrimination23 or 
hypothetical discrimination24.   
Second, a lower level of intervention, namely the representation of someone’s interests in their name 
when authorized by a power of attorney, has been reduced to a minimum as mentioned above, and is 
basically limited to court proceedings where no formal legal representation by an attorney is required. 
This mainly means that they can intervene in this way in first instance proceedings but no further25.  
Hence, the main way in which such anti-discrimination organizations can support victims of 
discrimination in court proceedings is by providing legal advice to them, by making third-party 
interventions and/or by referring them to specialized lawyers in the field who could take up their cases. 
There are then specific provisions for certain collective actors or institutions to bring claims for 
violations of the AGG. One is foreseen in Article 17, para. 2 of the AGG. In the case of gross violations 
of the AGG in a company, works councils (Betriebsräte) or trade unions of that company may bring a 
case to court. However, this does not include claims for individual damage awards.  
The other is the German equality body, the Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes (hereinafter ADB) 
which deals with discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, sex, religion, disability, age and/or 
                                                     
18  § 23, para. 3. 
19  § 23, para. 1. 
20  It should be noted here that the German legal system in general is not necessarily favourable at the procedural level to let 
collective interests or individual interests with a collective dimension (such as environmental law or anti-discrimination 
claims) be defended by actors who might not be considered to be directly harmed. See Sabine Schlacke, Überindividueller 
Rechtsschutz, Mohr Siebeck, 2008.  
21  See on this point the contribution on Belgium by Elise Muir and Sarah Kolf in this working paper.  
22  CJEU, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racism-bestrijding v. Firma Feryn NV, Case C-54/07 [2008], ECR I-
5187. 
23  See e.g.: “Diskriminierung braucht kein Opfer“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 July 2008, p. 13.  
24  See Frank Bayreuther, “Drittbezogene und hypothetische Diskriminierungen“, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht (2008), p. 
986. 
25  See on this point: Franz-Jürgen Säcker & Gregor Thüsing (eds.), Münchner Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Band 
1, 2. Halbband: AGG, Beck, 5th ed., 2007, pp. 406-407. 
Litigating anti-discrimination cases in Germany: what role for collective actors? 
European University Institute 71 
sexual orientation. It was created in 2006 with the AGG and started operating in 200726. Article 27 of 
the AGG identifies the ADB’s tasks inter alia as allowing it to provide generic assistance and advice to 
victims of discrimination, to mediate between parties under certain conditions in order to obtain out-of-
court settlements, and to write or commission scientific studies. Its mandate has not been 
changed/strengthened since its inception. In other words, the ADB’s competences largely mirror the 
narrow possibilities given to anti-discrimination organizations and does not include the possibility to 
make third party interventions in courts or to assist with preliminary reference procedures to the CJEU. 
This restrictive approach has generally been deemed to be in compliance with EU law requirements27 
but has been critiqued in a 2016 Evaluation Report of the AGG as not going far enough, as causing 
unnecessary obstacles in practice28 and, with regard to the ADB (whose independence from the 
competent Ministry could be also be improved29), as ranging among the weaker anti-discrimination 
bodies from an EU Member States comparison with some potential for increased competences especially 
as far as the intervention in concrete anti-discrimination is concerned30. 
Outside the AGG 
However, the AGG is not the only domain in which collective procedures or claims can be brought with 
regard to anti-discrimination law. According to § 23, para. 4 of the AGG, “the special rights of action 
and powers of representation of associations for the benefit of disabled persons shall remain 
unaffected”31, meaning that at least for this ground of discrimination, organizations can represent certain 
social rights of disabled individuals in courts32 if such individuals give their consent to such 
representation. A separate representation of rights deriving from the AGG is not established nor is a 
completely independent representation of a disabled individual. 
Besides this, there are other statutory possibilities for collective actors to bring anti-discrimination 
claims. The Act for Injunctive Relief (Unterlassungsklagegesetz) allows consumer protection 
associations under certain conditions to obtain injunctive relief for violations of law without claiming 
the infringement of personal rights. However, this is limited to violations of consumer protection laws.  
Another specific possibility for collective actors to bring anti-discrimination claims is established by 
Article 15 of the Disability Equal Treatment Act (Behindertengleichstellungsgesetz). According to this 
statute, disability associations may sue for violations of the obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation. However, such obligations are only imposed on public actors.  
One should also mention that under the Bavarian state constitution33, everyone can bring what has been 
called popular actions (Popularklagen) against violations of the Bavarian Constitution, meaning that this 
                                                     
26  For an overview and assessment in English, see: Matthias Mahlmann, „Country report Non-discrimination. Germany“, 2016, 
pp. 93-96 accessible at: http://www.equalitylaw.eu/downloads/3706-2016-de-country-report-nd (last visited on 3 May 
2017).  
27  Wolfgang Däubler & Martin Bertzbach (eds.), Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz Baden Baden: Nomos, (2nd ed., 2008), 
p. 729 and Franz-Jürgen Säcker & Gregor Thüsing (eds.), Münchner Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, Band 1, 
2. Halbband: AGG, Beck, 5th ed., 2007, p. 403. 
28  Sabine Berghahn, Micha Klapp & Alexander Tischbirek (eds.) for the Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes, “Evaluation 
des Allgemeinen Gleichbehandlungsgesetzes”, Nomos, 2016, pp. 159-161. 
29  Ibid., pp. 176-180. 
30  Ibid., pp. 192-196. 
31  Article 23, para. 4. 
32  According to Article 63 of the German Social Code (Sozialgesetzbuch - SGB), organisations can bring claims concerning 
rights resulting from Title IX of the SGB which contains a whole set of special obligations towards people with disabilities. 
33  Article 55.  
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also permits collective actions (Verbandsklagen). The limits here are both geographical (Bavaria) and 
personal in the sense that only state action can be challenged.  
Last but not least, anti-discrimination organizations and/or associations have the possibility to bring 
human rights’ challenges under certain international human rights conventions, such as the United 
Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (ICERD), the United Nations’ 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the United 
Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCPRD) and/or the European Social 
Charter (ESC) of the Council of Europe. Under the optional protocols of these conventions, it is possible 
to bring individual claims for violations of these conventions once all domestic remedies have been 
exhausted. It is clear that the human rights bodies that adjudicate such claims do not interpret EU anti-
discrimination law and therefore do not contribute strictu sensu to the development of EU law. However, 
there is potential overlap with certain aspects of EU non-discrimination law and anti-discrimination 
organizations might opt for this avenue, rather than going to the EU level where, at least under German 
law, their possibilities to intervene directly are very limited.  
In conclusion under this part, today, there is still some debate whether especially the rules for collective 
actors implementing the EU anti-discrimination directives under the AGG are actually consistent with 
EU law. One thing is certain: Germany implemented a minimalist version of what is allowed and reports 
consistently ask for a strengthened position of such collective actors.  
Part 3 – The reality and the future 
The question at this point becomes, how have collective actors navigated these limited waters in 
practice? Have they tried to use the little wiggle room made available for them? Have they tried to 
expand such spaces? And how has EU law featured in this process? Have they actively suggested EU 
preliminary references to German courts? This part looks at the practice by analyzing case law and also 
by conversations/emails with some actors in the field.   
As far as the use of Article 23 is concerned, the restrictive legal framework described above has also 
had an impact on the limited role that collective actors have played in using or directly influencing the 
interpretation of EU law via preliminary reference procedures. One might also add that the German 
courts possibly in many cases provided satisfying answers in using EU law at the internal level or did 
not believe that a preliminary reference was necessary, thus “preventing” more anti-discrimination cases 
from reaching the CJEU.  
Scratching a little bit under the surface, some nuances nevertheless emerge. For this, a number of 
German NGOs/institutions/umbrella organizations working in the domain of anti-discrimination were 
contacted to obtain something of a real-life picture34.  
On the one hand, there is one actor, the Büro zur Umsetzung von Gleichbehandlung e.V. (hereinafter the 
BUG), which has strategic anti-discrimination litigation as its goal and which has been involved in a 
                                                     
34  Emails were sent to the following NGOs/institutions/umbrella organizations: “Öffentlichkeit gegen Gewalt e.V.; 
Antidiskriminierungsbüro (ADB) Köln” (answer received on 11 January 2017 – on file with the author); “Gender/Queer 
e.V.” (answer received on 11 January 2017 – on file with the author); “Büro zur Umsetzung von Gleichbehandlung e.V. 
(BUG)” (answer received on 12 January 2017 – on file with the author); “Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes (ADB)”, 
(answer received on 13 January 2017 – on file with the author); “Antidiskriminierungsberatung Brandenburg der 
Opferperspektive e.V.” (answer received on 10 February 2017 – on file with the author); Antidiskriminierungsnetzwerk 
Berlin des Türkischen Bundes in Berlin-Brandenburg (no answer received); “Bildungswerkstatt Migration & Gesellschaft 
e.V.” (no answer received); “TransInterQueere.V.” (no answer received); “Deutsches Studentenwerk” (no answer 
received); “Antidiskriminierungsbüro (ADB) Sachsen (no answer received); “Anti-Rassismus Informations-Centrum, 
ARIC-NRW e.V.” (no answer received); “Antidiskriminierungsverband Deutschland” (no answer received); 
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number of anti-discrimination cases before German courts35. It is interesting to note that one of the cases 
currently pending before the CJEU on the interpretation of Article 4 of the Equal Treatment Employment 
Directive dealing with certain exemptions by religious employers36 is being litigated by a directly 
involved person, Vera Egenberger. She is the founder and manager of the BUG and therefore knows the 
importance of litigation and EU law. Even though it cannot strictly speaking be considered a case 
directly initiated by a collective actor, it nevertheless constitutes an interesting link between collective 
actors and the interpretation of EU law in this domain.   
On the other hand, the various anti-discrimination associations, with the more limited powers granted 
to them, provide counselling to victims of discrimination by referring them to specialized lawyers who 
then sometimes raise preliminary reference rulings. For example, a number of the German CJEU rulings 
on anti-discrimination stem from one lawyer in Hamburg, Klaus Bertelsmann, who has litigated quite a 
few (employment) anti-discrimination cases before the CJEU, some of which were referred by the 
BUG37. So, we can see that there is - at least -an indirect influence that collective actors can have on EU 
law interpretation in the domain by counselling victims of discrimination and referring them to 
experts/lawyers who litigate their cases38. 
In conclusion, with regard to Article 23 AGG, the influence of collective actors in the sense indicated 
by this contribution has been relatively limited and at best indirect, compared to what happens in other 
geographic realities.  
With regard to the possibility of using Article 17 AGG by works councils or trade unions, an expert 
from the ADB indicated that it was unknown to them whether works councils had ever pursued this 
path39. This is also confirmed in a recent evaluation report commissioned by the ADB which indicates 
that a certain ignorance of the rules, coupled with a tendency for these organizations to solve disputes 
outside of courts might explain their inactivity from this perspective40.  
As to the use of consumer protection claims for anti-discrimination purposes in cases falling into the 
domain of contracts for goods and/or services, this has not been dealt with before German courts yet. 
                                                     
35  http://www.bug-ev.org/ (last visited on 3 May 2017). Some of the most important cases litigated under the AGG can be 
found here: http://www.bug-ev.org/themen/recht/agg-urteile.html 
36  See: Vera Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung e.V., Case C-414/16, OJ C 419, 14 November 
2016, p. 27–28. 
37  As indicated in an email by Klaus Bertelsmann dated 1 February 2017 (on file with the author), these were: Hofmann v. 
Barmer Ersatzkasse, Case C-184/43, 12 July 1984; Bilka Kaufhaus v. Karin Weber von Hartz, Case C-170/84, ECR 1607; 
Maria Kowalska v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Case C- 33/89, 27 June 1990; Nimz v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 
Case C-184/89, ECR I-297; Edith Freers and Hannelore Speckmann ν. Deutsche Bundespost, Case C-278/93, ECR [1996] 
I-1165; Draehmphael v. Urania Immobilien Service oHG, Case C-180/95, ECR [1997] I-2195; Hellen Gerster v. Freistaat 
Bayern, Case C-1/95, ECR [1997] I-5253; Silke-Karin Mahlburg v. Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Case C-207/98, ECR 
[2000] I-00549; Bärbel Kachelmann v. Bankhaus Hermann Lampe KG, Case C-322/98 (GC), ECR [2000] I-07505; Helga 
Kutz-Bauer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Case C-187/00,ECR [2003] I-02741; Susanne Bulicke v. Deutsche Büro 
Service GmbH, Case C-246/09, ECR [2010] I-7003; Rosenbladtv.Oellerking Gebäudereinigungsges.mbH, Case C-45/09, 
12 October 2010; Vera Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung e.V., Case C-414/16.  
38  It should be noted that Mr. Bertelsmann’s experience dates back to the times when in particular gender equality/equal pay 
cases were being litigated and/or referred to the CJEU. Moreover, activist judges undoubtedly played a certain role as well 
in this domain. On both points see: Claire Kilpatrick, “Gender Equality: A Fundamental Dialogue”, in Silvana Sciarra (ed.), 
Labour Law in the Courts. National Judges and the European Court of Justice, Hart Publishing, 2001, in particular pp. 51-
55. However, especially with regard to activist judges, from the perspective of an association it seems easier to refer one’s 
client to a specialized activist lawyer in the domain who can litigate the case anywhere in Germany or before the CJEU 
than planning a litigation strategy by “feeding” cases into the court of a judge who likes to raise preliminary rulings to the 
CJEU. 
39  See email from Petra Wutz, dated 13 January 2017 (on file with the author).  
40  Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes, “Evaluation des Allgemeinen Gleichbehandlungsgesetzes”, 2016, pp. 142-143. 
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However, seemingly the possibility for associations to bring claims has mainly been used in competition 
law41. 
With regard to the possibility for disability associations to independently litigate, one of the first cases 
taking advantage of such a possibility was lost by such an association. The decision by the German 
Supreme Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) involved essentially a reasonable 
accommodation claim for access without barriers to train platforms for individuals in wheelchairs 
against the German railway company42. The problem was that the cost of this case was established at 
30.000 euros to which the extra-legal costs sustained by the defendant were added43. This early decision 
and the high reimbursement requested had a chilling effect on disability associations that might have 
entertained challenging other structural issues relating to disability discrimination in Germany in spite 
of the favourable rules established in legislation. As a consequence, associations that effectively have 
the power to bring disability related claims against the state were shocked into a silence by this early 
decision.  
As far as the Bavarian Popularklage is concerned, one has to mention a recent case dealing with upper 
age limits for certain local representatives under Bavarian law, invoked inter alia the equality principle 
but also the prohibition of age discrimination enshrined in the AGG. Both the Bavarian Constitutional 
Court44 and thereafter the Federal Constitutional Court45 rejected the claims. The case demonstrates that 
it is possible that EU (non-discrimination) law comes into play in such cases. 
Last but not least, as to the possibility for anti-discrimination organizations to bring human rights 
challenges, one could mention two cases brought against Germany by two different 
associations/organizations both concerning publications containing racially discriminatory language. 
The first was brought by the Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma46 and the second by the TBB/Turkish 
Union in Berlin Brandenburg47. Although both are not cases concerning the application or the 
interpretation of EU anti-discrimination law, they nevertheless show that (anti-discrimination) 
organizations/associations do seize international instances protecting against discrimination when and 
as soon as the procedural hurdles are lower. 
In terms of forward-looking comments, the sense that one gets is that even within the limited legislative 
framework, collective actors could make better use of the potential avenues mentioned above. This does 
not only concern specific anti-discrimination associations but also consumer protection associations, 
disability associations and also trade unions or work councils. Moreover, it could be that within the 
limits of discrimination cases arising in Bavaria by Bavarian authorities, collective organizations might 
have another means of intervening in a more independent way and of raising preliminary references. 
In conclusion, the problem in Germany stems from an initial hostility to anti-discrimination law in 
general, which translated into a restrictive legal framework and, with the exception of one specific 
association which has a strategic litigation approach, anti-discrimination associations have not really 
used the EU litigation avenue. It therefore comes as little surprise that EU law has played a limited role 
in the first place and that in turn collective organizations have only played an indirect role in shaping 
EU law in this domain. 
                                                     
41  Id.. 
42  BVerwG, 9 C 1.05, 5 April 2006.  
43  Id., paras. 45 and Beschluss.  
44  Bayerischer VerfGH, 5-VII-12, 19 December 2012.  
45  BVerfG, 2 BvR 441/13, 26 August 2013.  
46  CERD Committee, Central Council of German Sinti and Roma et al. v. Germany, Communication no. 38/2006, 
CERD/C/72/D/38/2006, 3 March 2008. 
47  CERD Committee, TBB/Turkish Union in Berlin Brandenburg v. Germany, Communication no. 48/2010, 
CERD/C/82/D/48/2010, 4 April 2013. 
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The EU Equality Directives represented a key turning point in the field of anti-discrimination law in 
Italy. However, the Italian law-maker failed to implement the Directives systematically, and this 
generated confusion about their interpretation and application. This also affected the participation of 
collective actors. With the aim of understanding whether EU equality law has facilitated collective 
actors’ access to courts, the paper examines the role that they have played in the anti-discrimination 
cases brought before the Court of Justice of the EU. In Italy, collective actors participated in a limited 
number of preliminary references, mostly in the field of discrimination on the grounds of nationality. 
The work of collective actors, both inside and outside the courtroom, has been crucial in creating a 
decentralized form of enforcement of EU equality law. Through litigation and campaigns, collective 
actors contributed to the full implementation of EU anti-discrimination law, filling the gaps left by the 
Italian law-maker. The paper concludes that, on the one hand, EU law introduced important tools to 
enhance protections against discrimination in Italy; but, on the other, the unsystematic transposition of 
EU law created some obstacles to the protection of migrants from discrimination and to collective 
actors’ access to courts. 
Introduction 
This paper develops two main questions relating to Italian anti-discrimination law and practice. The first 
is how EU equality law affected the Italian legal framework. The second looks at whether the 
introduction of EU anti-discrimination law has facilitated collective actors’ access to courts, with a focus 
on the Court of Justice of the EU (hereinafter, CJEU).1 To answer the first question, I analyse the Italian 
legal framework before and after the adoption of the Equality Directives. The second question, instead, 
requires a more contextual analysis. First, I look at how the implementation of EU anti-discrimination 
law changed the rules about collective actors’ locus standi. Then, I identify the proceedings before the 
CJEU where collective actors have participated. As part of the research conducted for this paper, I 
interviewed the participants in the proceedings and consulted Italian press articles, NGOs’ documents 
and other non-legal sources that provide insights into the context of the litigation. Finally, the paper 
assesses whether EU law had a positive impact on Italian judicial remedies against discrimination.  
Preliminary Remarks on Italian Anti-Discrimination Law 
Italian anti-discrimination law evolved in three stages. The first stage created its constitutional 
foundation; the second was brought about by labour law reforms; the third was triggered by the 
introduction of the EU Equality Directives. These three stages are summarized in the first sub-section 
below, while the other sub-section focuses on the provisions relating to the creation of the Italian 
Equality Body and on collective actors’ participation in anti-discrimination proceedings. 
                                                     
*  Ph.D. Researcher, Department of Law, European University Institute. 
1  This paper was first presented at the workshop ‘How EU law shapes opportunities for preliminary references on fundamental 
rights: discrimination and other examples’, held at the EUI on 24 February 2017 and organized by Professors Elise Muir, 
Claire Kilpatrick and Bruno de Witte. I would like to express them my gratitude for the opportunity to participate in this 
interesting project and for their valuable feedback on my work. 
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The Three Stages of Italian Anti-Discrimination Law 
The first stage of the evolution of Italian anti-discrimination law dates back to the drafting of the 
Constitution in 1947. Article 3 enshrines the cornerstone of Italian anti-discrimination law: the principle 
of equality. Its first part states that all are equal before the law (principle of formal equality); and the 
second part commits the Italian law-maker to removing the economic and social obstacles that constrain 
the realization of equality among citizens (principle of substantive equality). An ideal of social equality 
lies behind the second part of the article, which requires the law-maker to do his utmost to grant equal 
opportunities to all and, therefore, constitutes the basis for positive actions against discrimination. In the 
Italian Constitution we also find the first explicit reference to a ground of prohibited discrimination: sex. 
Article 37 states that women are entitled to enjoy the same pay and rights as men in the workplace.  But 
the second part of the article requires special protection and adequate working conditions for women to 
ensure the fulfilment of their ‘essential role in the family’. The Constitution, in sum, states that women 
are equal but different from men. This mirrors the common perception about gender roles in post-fascist 
Italy.2 At that time, men and women were considered psycho-physically different, and accordingly 
charged with different responsibilities both in the work sphere and in the family sphere.3 
The second stage saw the constitutional principles enacted by the Italian law-maker. The first major 
anti-discrimination legal tools were adopted in the field of labour law. However, this did not happen 
overnight; only in the seventies, prompted by a period of workers' strikes and demonstrations, did Italy 
undertake a process of labour reforms. This period of political struggles culminated in the introduction 
of the Workers' Statute, which, besides generally strengthening workers' rights, in article 15 provided 
special protection against discrimination on the grounds of political belief and trade union affiliation.4 
A few years later, in 1977, a law on equality of treatment between men and women in the workplace 
was adopted, extending the protection of article 15 to discrimination on the grounds of sex.5 The 
introduction of this second law was to a great extent due to Community law: indeed, two directives on 
the prohibition of sex discrimination in employment had been adopted shortly before.6 
EU law vastly marked the third stage in the evolution of Italian equality law. Under the impulse of the 
EU Equality Directives of 2000, Italian equality law was revolutionised, leading experts to call this ‘the 
golden age’ of anti-discrimination law in Italy.7 In 2003, the Italian government adopted two decrees, 
one implementing the Race Equality Directive8 and the other the Framework Directive.9 However, 
Favilli rightly noted how such transpositions were made in an almost literal way, with no attempt at 
coordination with the pre-existing Italian legal instruments of anti-discrimination.10 This unsystematic 
                                                     
2  Barbera explains that, even if the constitutional norm might seem contradictory, it correctly mirrored social perceptions at 
the time and maintained social cohesion. Marzia Barbera, “Parità Di Trattamento Tra Uomini E Donne in Materia Di 
Lavoro,” Enciclopedia Giuridica Treccani VII (2010). 
3  Maria Vittoria Ballestrero, “Il Lavoro Delle Donne Secondo Barassi,” Lavoro E Diritto, no. 1/2002 (2002). 
4  Art. 15 of Law 300/1970, Statuto dei Lavoratori. 
5  Law 903 of 1977, ‘Parità di trattamento tra uomini e donne in materia di lavoro’. For the sake of precision, however, it 
should be noted that the first norm adopted in the field of discrimination on the grounds of sex was Law 7 of 1963, which 
prohibits the dismissal of a female worker because of marriage. 
6  Directive 75/117/EEC and Directive 76/207/EEC; Flavia Cannata, L’eguaglianza nella previdenza di genere (Milano, Italy: 
Franco Angeli, 2014), 61. 
7  Fausta Guarriello, “Il nuovo diritto antidiscriminatorio,” Giornale di Diritto del Lavoro e Delle Relazioni Industriali, 2003, 
341. 
8  Legislative Decree 215/2003 implementing the Directive 2000/43/EC prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of race and 
ethnic origins. 
9  Legislative Decree 216/2003 implementing the Directive 2000/78/EC prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation, disability, age, religion and belief in the workplace. 
10  Chiara Favilli, “Italy, Country Report Non-Discrimination, State of Affairs 01 January 2016,” European Equality Law 
Network, October 4, 2016, 7. 
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transposition, as I shall show, generated problems of interpretation. New legislation was also adopted in 
2006,11 whereby the prohibition on disability discrimination was extended beyond the field of 
employment, and in 2010,12 which transposed the ‘Gender Recast’ Directive 2006/54, bringing together 
the main instruments for equality between men and women. 
At present, all the main Italian anti-discrimination provisions are the result of the transposition of 
European directives. This is also true for the equality clauses provided by the directives in the field of 
migration and EU citizenship. These clauses establish that, in some situations, migrants and citizens 
should be treated equally.13 The only partial, but important, exception is the Italian Immigration Law 
adopted in 1998.  
The Immigration Law, which preceded the Equality Directives, already contained a prohibition on direct 
and indirect discrimination on the grounds of nationality, race, religion and ethnic origin (article 43 and 
44).14 Discrimination on these grounds can be challenged by victims via a special judicial remedy: the 
‘civil action against discrimination’, which is widely used in practice.15 This action can be also brought 
directly by trade unions in case of ‘collective discrimination’ in the workplace, which is  discrimination 
against a group of people that are not directly or immediately identifiable.16 However, only the trade 
unions that are ‘the most representative at the national level’ have legal standing, and only against acts 
of the employer in the workplace. As next section will show, collective actors’ access to courts was 
substantially increased in 2003 by the law transposing the Equality Directives.  
Notwithstanding the evident overlap between the scope of the Immigration law and the Race Equality 
Directive, articles 43 and 44 were not repealed by the Italian legislature.17 And luckily so, for they also 
prohibit discrimination on the grounds of nationality, which is explicitly excluded from the scope of the 
Race Equality Directive.18 The directive, in fact, despite applying also to third-country nationals, does 
not protect them from differential treatments based on their nationality.19 Even if, at first sight, the 
difference between the grounds of nationality and race/ethnic origin might seem a formal one, it has 
practical repercussions for Italian equality litigation, as this paper will show.  
Judicial Remedies Against Discrimination and the Role of Collective Actors 
Regarding judicial remedies against discrimination, in 2011 the Italian law-maker reformed the anti-
discrimination proceedings by including a special fast-track procedure.20 Even if this was an important 
step towards the systematization of the field, access to courts is still regulated by each specific anti-
                                                     
11  Law 67/2006, “Misure per la tutela giudiziaria delle persone con disabilità vittime di discriminazioni”. 
12  Legislative Decree 5/2010: "Attuazione della direttiva 2006/54/CE relativa al principio delle pari opportunità e della parità 
di trattamento fra uomini e donne in materia di occupazione e impiego". 
13  The strongest equality norm regards Union citizens who, under article 18 of the TFEU and article 24 of the Citizenship 
Directive 2004/38, are entitled to equal treatment with national citizens. Equal treatment clauses are also provided by the 
Long-Term Resident Directive and the Single Permit Directive, with a more limited scope of application. The last norm 
adopted in the field is Directive 2014/54 ‘on measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context 
of freedom of movement for workers’, of 16 April 2014. Although the deadline for transposition has already passed, it has 
not been transposed into the Italian legal framework. 
14  Legislative Decree n. 286 of 25 July 1998, “Testo unico delle disposizioni concernenti la disciplina dell'immigrazione e 
norme sulla condizione dello straniero”. 
15  Azione civile contro la discriminazione’: introduced by article 44 of the Immigration Law 286/1998. 
16  Article 44(10) of the Immigration Law 286/1998. 
17  Article 2(2) of the Legislative Decree 215/2003 makes them explicitly safe. 
18  Preamble 13 and article 3(2) of the Race Equality Directive. 
19  Discrimination on the grounds of nationality is instead prohibited with regard to Union Citizens, see article 18 TFEU. 
20  Article 28, Legislative Decree 150/2011. 
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discrimination instrument. This also means that each anti-discrimination law has its own locus standi 
rules for participation by collective actors.21 This fragmentation creates uncertainty, leading experts to 
call for a systematization of the field. 
Under the EU Equality Directives, Member States shall ensure that collective actors may participate in 
anti-discrimination proceedings on behalf of, or in support of, victims. This is one of the strategies that 
the EU law maker uses to secure an effective implementation of its policies, a phenomenon that scholars 
called ‘proceduralization’ of EU equality law.22 However, when transposing the directives, the Italian 
law-maker decided to go beyond what EU law requires and introduced a remedy against collective 
discrimination. This remedy enables qualified collective actors to challenge in court a discriminatory 
act by themselves when a victim is not immediately and directly identifiable.23 This might happen, for 
example, in the case of a public statement against LGBT people: the victim is not a single individual but 
an indeterminate group of people discriminated against for their sexual orientation. 
Under the law transposing the Race Equality Directive, in order for collective actors to have locus standi, 
they need to be registered on an official list managed by the Italian government’s Department for Equal 
Opportunities.24 Subject to the same registration, they are entitled to bring actions against collective 
discrimination.25 Moreover, since these provisions on collective actors’ standing are regulated by the 
Italian transposition of the Race Equality Directive, formally they only apply to cases of discrimination 
on the grounds of race or ethnic origin; discrimination on the grounds of nationality is excluded.26 This 
means that, for instance, if a registered association wants to challenge collective discrimination enacted 
by a school against non-Italian children, the association cannot use the transposition of the Race Equality 
Directive (because it does not cover nationality) or the Immigration Law, because it applies only to 
collective discrimination in the workplace. This gap in protection had serious consequences: in cases of 
collective discrimination based on nationality (like the case of Nabil discussed later) collective actors’ 
locus standi has been contested. Still, in most cases, Italian judges have adopted a functional 
interpretation of the law, stating that collective discrimination may be challenged by collective actors 
on the grounds of nationality. 
Another step towards the ‘proceduralization’ of EU equality law involved the creation of ‘Bodies for 
the promotion of equal treatment’, provided by the Race Equality Directive.27 In Italy, this body is 
UNAR.28 UNAR started operating in 2004, with a focus on discrimination based on race and ethnic 
origin. Over time, even though its mandate has never been officially expanded, UNAR has extended the 
                                                     
21  For discrimination in the workplace, see article 5, Legislative Decree 216/2003. For discriminations on the grounds of race 
and ethnic origins, see article 5 Legislative Decree 215/2003. For discriminations on the grounds of sex, see article 37, 
198/2006. For discrimination on the grounds of disability, see article 4 of the Law 67/2006. 
22  Elise Muir, “Procedural Rules in the Service of the ‘Transformative Function’ of EU Equality Law: Bringing the Prohibition 
of Nationality Discrimination Along,” Review of European Administrative Law 8, no. 1 (June 25, 2015): 153–76. 
23  Article 5(2) Legislative Decree 216/2003 transposing the Framework Directive; article 37 and 55 of the Legislative Decree 
198/2006 on equality between men and women; article 4(3) of Law 67/2006 on disability rights. Each Italian anti-
discrimination law establishes which collective actors are entitled to bring action against collective discrimination and 
whether they must fulfil some requirement. For instance, the transposition of the Framework Directive states that trade 
unions and associations representing the affected interest can challenge collective discrimination. 
24  The list is managed by the Department for Equal Opportunities of the Presidency of Council of Ministers, as provided by 
article 5 of Legislative Decree 215/2003.  
25  Article 5(3) of Legislative Decree 215/2003. 
26  Italian Immigration Law also provides for a remedy against ‘collective discrimination’ on the grounds of nationality, but this 
applies only to discrimination in the workplace and can only be pursued by the trade unions that are ‘the most representative 
at the national level’. See art. 44(10) of the Immigration Law. 
27  Article 13 of the Race Equality Directive. 
28  UNAR stands for Ufficio Nazionale Antidiscriminazioni Razziali, and was instituted by the Legislative Decree 215/2003, 
article 7. 
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grounds of discrimination it deals with to include sex, disability, nationality, and sexual orientation. By 
law, the body can intervene in court, but in fact it mainly performs monitoring activities and manages a 
contact centre for victims of discrimination.29 The Council of Europe criticized UNAR because it does 
not ‘comply with the principle of independence and its powers are incomplete’.30 The criticism seems 
to be well-founded, since the body is under the Department of Equal Opportunities of the Italian 
government and its director is appointed by the Italian Prime Minister. This exposes UNAR to political 
pressures, as denounced by European and international organizations and confirmed by the political 
scandals that have dogged the organization over recent years.31 
According to official reports, in Italy, when it comes to judicial remedies against discrimination, most 
litigation has focused on discrimination on the grounds of nationality or race/ethnic origin.32 This is 
probably due to a combination of cultural and social factors. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that 
there are many associations working in support of immigrants’ and ethnic minorities’ rights, while this 
is not the case for other fields. This also means that, in Italy, most discrimination cases where collective 
actors are involved concern migration and race/ethnic origin. Accordingly, the cases selected for the 
analysis below are all in this field. 
Anti-discrimination Litigation in Italy: Analysis of the Most Relevant Cases in the Light of Collective 
Actors’ Participation 
This second section considers the role that collective actors play in anti-discrimination proceedings; 
special attention is given to the cases brought before the CJEU. I singled out the preliminary rulings 
where it was possible to detect collective actors’ participation. Four cases feature the presence of 
collective actors, but only two of them deal precisely with anti-discrimination issues: Kamberaj and 
Martinez Silva.33 I decided to also include in my analysis a third case, Nabil, even though it did not lead 
to a preliminary reference; the case of Nabil is relevant because it shows how EU equality law proved 
problematic for collective actors, since it does not provide them with locus standi to challenge collective 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality. 
All three cases (Kamberaj, Martinez Silva and Nabil) happen to be in the field of anti-discrimination on 
the grounds of race/ethnic origins and nationality. This reflects the general trend of anti-discrimination 
litigation in Italy, since these types of discrimination are the most frequently alleged.34 Still, each of the 
cases offers a different perspective on EU equality law. Indeed, the first concerns a case of 
discrimination against a long-term resident migrant; the second, discrimination against a third-country 
worker; and the third, collective discrimination. Analysed together, these three cases offer a multifaceted 
view on the impact that EU law has had on Italian anti-discrimination law. 
Equal Treatment and Housing Benefit: Kamberaj v. IPES 
The first case analysed is Kamberaj. Four collective actors supported the applicant’s complaint against 
a norm that was allegedly discriminatory towards third-country nationals. The Kamberaj case gave rise 
                                                     
29  UNAR, Relazione Annuale 2014, available at: http://www.unar.it/unar/portal/?p=1178 (last access on 4 August 2017) 
30  Council of Europe, ECRI Report on Italy 2015, CRI(2016)19, published on 18 March 2016, at page 15. 
31  European Equality Law Network, News Report, 05 October 2015; ibidem, News Report, 8 March 2017; both available at 
http://www.equalitylaw.eu/country/italy (last access on 4 August 2017). 
32  Favilli, “Italy, Country Report Non-Discrimination, State of Affairs 01 January 2016”; UNAR, Relazione Annuale 2014. 
33  The two that I excluded are joined Cases C-22/13, C- 61/13 to C-63/13 and C-418/13, Mascolo v. MIUR, EU:C:2014:2401; 
and Case C-89/13, D’Aniello and others v. Poste Italiane SpA, ECLI:EU:C:2014:299. Both deal with the legitimacy of 
stipulating a fixed-term work contract. 
34  See footnote 30. 
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to a preliminary reference that was decided by the CJEU in April 2012. First, I will briefly outline the 
proceedings; then, I will explain the collective actors’ strategy and I will assess its impact. 
Kamberaj: the proceedings 
In the case of Kamberaj, the CJEU, upon request from the Labour Law Tribunal of Bolzano, interpreted 
two directives.35 One was the Race Equality Directive; the other was the Long-Term Resident Directive, 
which provides for equal treatment between long-term resident migrants and Member State nationals.36  
The proceedings were initiated by Mr Servet Kamberaj, an Albanian national residing in Italy since 
1994. Four local associations intervened: Associazione Porte Aperte/Offene Türen, Human Rights 
International, Associazione Volontarius, and Fondazione Alexander Langer. Mr Kamberaj brought a 
‘civil action against discrimination’ (article 44 of the Italian Immigration Law) to challenge the decision 
whereby IPES (the social housing institute) rejected his application for a housing benefit. IPES rejected 
Mr Kamberaj's application because the budget for third‑country nationals’ housing benefits for 2009 
was exhausted. In Bolzano, the funds for housing benefits are allocated according to a ‘linguistic’ 
criterion:37 every year the province decides on the amount of money to allocate to each of the three 
linguistic groups (Italian, German and Ladin speaking)38 and to the third-country national migrants’ 
group. However, in 2008, the province adopted a different method to calculate the funds for third-
country nationals.39 This resulted in a disadvantage for the latter group, which saw a rise in the number 
of rejections of applications for benefits. This comparatively more disadvantaged treatment was 
challenged for violating EU equality law. The Bolzano judge, acting upon the request of Mr Kamberaj’s 
lawyer and the four associations, decided to stay the proceedings and refer the case to the CJEU. 
In its decision, the Court of Justice first clarified that the Race Equality Directive did not apply in this 
case. In fact, Mr Kamberaj was treated differently because of his status as a third-country national, while 
the Directive applies only to discrimination based on race or ethnic origin.40 The Court stated that the 
Directive ‘does not cover difference of treatment based on nationality’ and it applies without prejudice 
‘to any treatment which arises from the legal status of third-country nationals’.41 However, the Court 
also noted that Mr Kamberaj enjoyed a right to equal treatment stemming from his status as a long-term 
resident; in fact, article 11 of the Long-Term Resident Directive granted him the right to be treated 
equally vis-a-vis Italian nationals with regard to social assistance. For this reason, the Court declared 
the province’s policy incompatible with EU law. 
The role of the four associations 
Reports, local press articles and interviews with members of the intervening associations (Associazione 
Porte Aperte/Offene Türen, Human Rights International, Associazione Volontarius, Fondazione 
Alexander Langer) enabled me to understand their litigation strategy and their role in the Kamberaj case. 
                                                     
35  Case C-571/10, Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano (IPES) and Others 
[2012]. 
36  See art. 11(1) of Directive 2003/109. 
37  Article 5(7) of the Law of the Province n. 13/1998. The Province of Bolzano is characterized by the institutionalization and 
protection of the three linguistic groups that are historically present in the region. See Pallaoro and Coletti, ‘Nuove’ 
minoranze in Alto Adige/Südtirol: impatto sugli strumenti a tutela delle ‘vecchie’ minoranze, in Medda-Windischer and 
Carlà (edited by) Politiche Migratorie e Autonomie Territoriali. Nuove Minoranze, Identità e Cittadinanza in Alto Adige e 
Catalogna / Migrationspolitik und Territoriale Autonomie. Neue Minderheiten, Identität und Staatsbürgerschaft in Südtirol 
und Katalonien. 
38  All Italian and Union citizens, to facilitate the allocation of benefits, must select a linguistic group to which they belong.   
39  Deliberation 1885 of 20 July 2009 by the Autonomous Province of Bolzano.  
40  Kamberaj ruling, para. 48 and 49. 
41  Ibidem, at 49. 
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To begin with, it is not coincidental that precisely these four associations intervened in the Kamberaj 
proceedings. Since 2008 they had been partners in a EU-funded project promoting non-discrimination 
in the Province of Bolzano.42 The project consisted partly in providing legal advice to victims of 
discrimination (but not representing them) and partly in raising awareness about non-discrimination.  
The quasi-institutional role played by the four associations made them a reference point for other 
collective actors in the area. In fact, when the problem of housing benefits for third-country nationals 
emerged, meetings with other organizations working in the field were organised. The network 
collectively decided to challenge the province’s deliberation in court and to seek a preliminary reference 
to the Court of Justice. Two pilot cases were identified through contacts with trade unions; the lawyers 
of these unions eventually conducted the litigation.43 This gave the four associations the convenient 
option of intervening in the cases without bearing the costs of the litigation. 
As mentioned, two pilot cases were initiated with the aim of challenging the discriminatory distribution 
of housing benefits: Kamberaj was not the first case brought before the Bolzano Tribunal. The first was 
N.N.,44 an action brought a month before Kamberaj by the same trade union’s lawyers (Simonato and 
Pintor) and where the same four associations intervened, but which was decided by a different judge of 
the Tribunal. Remarkably, although N.N. was similar in many respect to Kamberaj (the facts of the cases 
were also the same), it led to a different result. In the case of N.N., the judge did not find any 
inconsistency between Italian and EU law, and accordingly did not refer a question to the Court of 
Justice. The judge recognised that Mr N.N. was a victim of discrimination, but she merely ordered that 
he receive individual compensation without challenging the overall legitimacy of the province’s policy. 
This is a remarkable example of how, everything being the same (same case, same argument, same 
lawyers), the judge is the ultimate master of the preliminary reference proceedings.  
Arguably, the associations’ role was particularly crucial in the aftermath of the proceedings. In fact, the 
ruling of the CJEU found that the province’s allocation of benefits was discriminatory to the extent that 
it concerned long-term resident migrants, like Mr Kamberaj. However, treating third-country nationals 
differently because of their nationality is not prohibited under EU law. Thus, the Bolzano province could 
have resolved the issue simply by granting equal treatment to long-term residents,45 but maintaining the 
less favourable treatment for all other migrants. In this context, the advocacy campaign conducted by 
the four associations was crucial: they spread information about the CJEU’s ruling among their network 
of associations and via the local press.46 The associations successfully conveyed the message that the 
allocation of the housing benefit unlawfully discriminated against migrants, ignoring the fact that this 
was true only for long-term residents. Their campaign left the province no choice but to change the law 
and to introduce a more equal way to allocate benefits. 
                                                     
42  The project’s name was ‘Azioni di Tutela dalle Discriminazioni’, European Social Fund 2/220/2008. 
43  Report of the European Social Fund Project number 2/220/2008, ‘Azioni di Tutela dalle Discriminazioni. Rapporto di 
attività’, page 36. 
44  Order of the Tribunal of Bolzano, N.N. case, issued on 16 November 2010, RG 665/2010, available at 
http://www.humanrightsinternational.org/it/attualita-ricerche/news/italia-tribunale-di-bolzano-ordinanze-no-6652010-e-
no-6662010.html.  
45  This is how the Province accommodate the situation of Union citizen migrants, who are treated like members of the linguistic 
minorities. 
46  The Court of Justice decision was published in the main local press (see ‘Sussidio casa, stroncatura dell’UE’, published in 
‘Alto Adige’ on 14 December 2011), on the Human Rights International’s website (http://www.humanrights 
international.org/it/attualita-ricerche/news/lussemburgo-italiaalto-adige-successo-davanti-la-corte-di-giustizia-europea-
contro-le-discriminazio.html, last access on 4 August 2017).  
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Equal Access to Family Benefit: The Cases of Martinez Silva and Nabil 
Martinez Silva, at first glance, does not seem to be a public interest litigation case: neither a third-party 
intervention nor a collective actor was involved. However, one of the lawyers representing Mrs Martinez 
Silva, Alberto Guariso, was a member of the ASGI’s board (Association for Juridical Studies on 
Immigration), the most important Italian network of legal experts in the field of migration law.47 For 
many years, ASGI has been a leading actor in conducting strategic litigation and advocacy campaigns.48 
A few years ago, the association established an anti-discrimination centre, whose director is, in fact, 
Alberto Guariso. This lawyer is also the link with the second case analysed in this section, Nabil, where 
he represented both the victim and the two collective actors: ASGI and the non-profit organization 
Avvocati Per Niente (APN), which was founded by Guariso. In the next two sub-sections, I will first 
give an overview of the two proceedings. I will then analyse the role of collective actors in the specific 
area where the two cases originated: equal access to family benefits. 
Martinez Silva: the proceedings 
Martinez Silva is an interesting example of (less visible) collective actors’ participation. The case has 
been referred by the Genova Court of Appeal and has been recently decided by the CJEU.49 This 
reference gave the Court of Justice the opportunity to interpret the Single Permit Directive for the first 
time.50 The questions asked by the Italian court touch upon the equality clause of the Directive: shall 
third-country workers enjoy equal treatment with Italian nationals with regard to certain benefits?51 As 
in Kamberaj, the applicant’s basis for claiming equal treatment derives from an EU directive on 
migration; this time the Race Equality Directive was not even called into question.  
Mrs Martinez Silva initiated a civil action against discrimination (article 44 of the Italian Immigration 
Law) in order to challenge the rejection of her application for benefits. This is a special type of family 
benefit directed to households below a certain income and with at least three minor children (hereinafter, 
the child benefit).52 The rejection was based solely on the fact that Mrs Martinez Silva is a third-country 
national with a single permit status.53 Indeed, when introduced in 1998, the child benefit was limited to 
Italian nationals residing in Italy. However, as the Genova Court of Appeal pointed out, the law has 
already been amended a number of times to include among the beneficiaries certain categories of non-
nationals: first, Union citizens; then, refugees; and, lastly, long-term resident migrants.54 In light of the 
foregoing, and recalling the equality treatment clause in the Single Permit Directive, the Court of Appeal 
asked the Court of Justice whether the Italian legislation excluding single-permit migrants from the 
recipients of the child benefit is compatible with EU Law. In its judgment, the CJEU first examined 
                                                     
47  ASGI official website: http://www.asgi.it/ 
48  About the role of ASGI in other cases of legal mobilization, Virginia Passalacqua, “El Dridi Upside down : A Case of Legal 
Mobilization for Undocumented Migrants’ Rights in Italy,” Tijdschrift Voor Bestuurswetenschappen En Publiekrecht, 
2016, 215–25. 
49  Case C-449/16, Kerly Del Rosario Martinez Silva v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS), Comune di Genova, 
21 June 2017, OJ C 410/08. See also the Order for Reference by the Genova Court of Appeal of 1 August 2016, case n. 
437/2015 RG, available at available at http://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/s-comune-genova-cda-genova-rg-
437-del-2015-ord-rinvio-cge-01-08-2016.pdf.  
50  Directive 2011/98/EU on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in 
the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State 
(OJ 2011 L 343). 
51  Article 12(e). 
52  The benefit is known as ‘allowance for households with at least three minor children’ (Assegno per i nuclei famigliari con 
almeno tre figli minori) and was introduced by article 65 of the Law 448/1998. 
53  Order for Reference, at 2. 
54  Order for Reference, at 13. 
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whether the child benefit can be considered as a social security benefit, and answered affirmatively.55 
Then, it stated that a single-permit migrant may not be excluded from receiving a benefit such as the 
child benefit by national legislation, because of the Directive’s equality treatment clause.56 This 
judgment represents an important endorsement of the arguments brought forward by Mrs Martinez 
Silva’s lawyers. 
Nabil: the proceedings 
The Nabil case did not give rise to a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice; nevertheless, it offers 
important insights into collective actors’ participation and into the problems they might face. Indeed, 
the lack of an organic and coherent transposition of the Race Equality Directive created problems for 
collective actors’ access to court.  
In Nabil, the claimants challenged the legality of a public statement issued by the Italian social security 
agency (INPS) whereby it declared that long-term residents are not eligible to receive the child benefit 
for the first half of 2013.57 The statement is clearly at odds with the equality clause of the Long-Term 
Resident Directive, which states that long-term residents should be treated equally vis-a-vis Italian 
citizens.58 Hence, the INPS’s statement was challenged in court as amounting to both  individual and 
collective discrimination. The individual discrimination was judicially contested by Mr Mohammed 
Nabil, a long-term resident with three children. Two associations, ASGI and APN, also challenged the 
INPS’s statement for enacting collective discrimination, as defined by the Italian transposition of the 
Race Equality Directive.59 Under that law, discrimination is collective when, due to its general scope, 
its victims are not directly and immediately identifiable; in this case, collective actors have the right to 
bring legal action by themselves. 
The case of Nabil was recently decided by the Italian Supreme Court.60 The substance of the case was 
no longer in doubt: the first-instance court declared the statement discriminatory on the grounds of 
nationality. However, INPS contested the claimants’ locus standi before the Appeal and Supreme 
Courts. With regard to Mr Nabil, the courts upheld INPS’ view: since the statement was not an individual 
rejection of Mr Nabil’s application for the child benefit, he could not complain about concrete 
discriminatory treatment.  
Regarding ASGI and APN, INPS challenged their locus standi, arguing that the prohibition of collective 
discrimination does not apply in cases of nationality discrimination, like Nabil. Indeed, the Italian law-
maker prohibited collective discrimination in the same law that transposed the Race Equality Directive, 
which addresses only discrimination on the grounds of race/ethnic origin. Accordingly, collective 
discrimination on the ground of nationality is not covered, since nationality is excluded from the scope 
of the Directive. INPS claimed that its interpretation was in line with the Italian framework, since 
nationality discrimination is considered less serious than discrimination on the grounds of race/ethnic 
origin.61 Like in Kamberaj, the fact that Italian law regulates separately discrimination on the grounds 
of nationality and racial/ethnic discrimination gives rise to problems of interpretation. And Nabil is not 
                                                     
55  Art. 3(1)(j) of Regulation 883/2004 defines and distinguishes between social security and social assistance benefits. 
56  See Martinez-Silva Judgment at 31. 
57  See Circolare n. 4 of 15 January 2013, where INPS states that, since the Long-Term Resident Directive was transposed in 
the Italian legal order on August 2013 (by the Legge Europea 97/2013) before that date the equal treatment clause does not 
apply. 
58  See the equality clause of the Long-Term Resident Directive 2003/109, at art. 11(1). 
59  Article 5(3) Legislative Decree 215/2003, transposing the Race Equality Directive. 
60  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Sezione Lavoro, INPS v. Nabil and ASGI and APN, n. 11166/17 (May 8, 2017). 
61  Ibid., para. 3.2. 
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an isolated case: recently the number of cases where collective actors’ locus standi was similarly 
challenged increased.62  
On 8 May 2017, the Italian Supreme Court issued its judgment in Nabil. The Court upheld the 
interpretation of the lower courts: it stated that collective actors do have locus standi in cases of 
collective discrimination on the grounds of nationality. The Supreme Court explained its decision by 
stating that nationality and race/ethnic discrimination are equally prohibited by Italian law, and therefore 
they should be equally regulated. The Court interpreted broadly the law transposing the Race Equality 
Directive, so that the remedy against collective discrimination includes also discrimination based on 
nationality. According to the Court, a different interpretation would not be in line with Italian law 
because it would leave acts that are clearly discriminatory, like the INPS’s statement, unpunished.63 The 
judgment in Nabil represents an important step for collective actors, which now see their right of access 
to the courts secured, especially in the field of migrants’ equality.  
Equal access to family benefit and the role of collective actors 
Family benefits have been at the centre of many battles for migrants’ equality in the last decade: the 
cases analysed here are just two of many. These proceedings fostered the implementation of the equality 
clauses provided by the Long-Term Resident and the Single Permit Directives. As the Court of Appeal 
in Martinez Silva recalled, the Italian law-maker intervened three times to extend the group of persons 
eligible for the child benefit. What the Court did not say is that, prior to the Italian law-maker's 
acknowledgement that the law needed to be amended, several cases had (mostly successfully) 
challenged the discriminatory character of the child benefit law, before both national and European 
courts.64  
ASGI, with its anti-discrimination centre, is involved in this battle on three fronts. First, it raises 
awareness about anti-discrimination law by conducting monitoring activity and advocacy campaigns. 
Secondly, it supports litigation against discrimination in courts by either bringing cases by its own 
members or by offering training and advice to other lawyers. Finally, ASGI works with institutions, 
establishing a dialogue with local governments, social security agencies and proposing legislative 
amendments. 
Although the work of ASGI and similar associations is remarkable, such a decentralised judicial 
enforcement of the Directives’ equality clauses has many drawbacks compared to centralized 
enforcement by the law-maker. It takes a long time, is costly and depends on the availability and 
expertise of lawyers or associations working in the anti-discrimination field. Indeed, even big 
associations like ASGI have a limited reach. Most of its activity is concentrated in Lombardy and the 
North of Italy; the association is almost absent in some regions of the South. More importantly, even if 
ASGI lawyers successfully challenge a norm/act in court because it is discriminatory, the judgement is 
valid only in relation to the case at issue, and does not influence the validity of the discriminatory norm 
in other cases. In this respect, obtaining a positive ruling by the Court of Justice can be of invaluable 
help: preliminary rulings are binding erga omnes, and the discriminatory norm would be deprived of its 
effects. 
                                                     
62  Interview with Alberto Guariso, 6 February 2017. 
63  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Sezione Lavoro, INPS v. Nabil and ASGI and APN, n. 11166/17 at 5. 
64  The case of a Tunisian migrant worker's eligibility for the child benefit was brought before the ECtHR: Dhahbi v. Italy, 
European Court of Human Rights, n. 17120/09, 8 April 2014; see also the infringement procedure brought by the EU 
Commission against Italy regarding long-term resident migrants, Infringement Proceedings 2013_4009. There are many 
Italian cases challenging the exclusion of migrants from family benefits, for example: El Housni against INPS, Tribunale 
di Genova, Order n. 2656 of the 24 September 2012; Case 351/2010 RGL, Azem v. INPS, Tribunale di Gorizia, 1 October 
2010. 
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Conclusion 
The implementation of EU equality law in Italy has proceeded along two parallel tracks. At the 
institutional level, the Italian law-maker transposed the EU anti-discrimination directives in an 
unsystematic way, at the expense of coherence and legal certainty. It also created an Italian Equality 
Body, UNAR, but it mainly performs monitoring tasks and is not active in courts. Instead, at the local 
level, collective actors are working for the effective implementation of anti-discrimination norms 
through litigation, especially in the field of race/ethnic origin and nationality discrimination. Focusing 
on such decentralized enforcement of EU equality law, this paper has sought to understand whether the 
‘proceduralization’ of EU equality law helped collective actors’ access to courts. However, the answer 
is not clear-cut, for some ambiguities emerged within the EU equality law and procedures.  
In the case of Kamberaj, four associations intervened via an Italian legal procedure. These associations 
used EU equality law to support their claims, but not EU procedural norms. The same holds true for the 
second case, Martinez Silva. The collective actor did not use any of the EU law procedures to participate 
in the case; the lawyer and member of a collective actor (ASGI) was privately hired to represent Mrs 
Martinez Silva in the case. Finally, the Nabil case illustrates how, under certain conditions, the 
discrepancy in the scope of EU law and Italian Immigration law might even hinder access to courts for 
collective actors. Since some norms for collective actors’ participation have been introduced in Italian 
law in relation to the Race Equality Directive, their validity in proceedings regarding nationality 
discrimination has been challenged, making collective actors’ locus standi contested. Eventually, the 
Nabil case concluded with a positive ruling for collective actors. However, an intervention by the Italian 
law-maker is desirable, since it could remedy the fragmentation in the anti-discrimination field and 
provide for a single set of procedures valid for all grounds of discrimination. 
This paper showed that, EU norms, such as the equality clauses of the migration directives, provide 
useful new tools to advance equality in Italy. These norms were often used fruitfully by collective actors, 
as the cases about litigation for migrants’ equal treatment demonstrated. On the other hand, the 
unsystematic implementation of some EU law provisions created obstacles for collective actors’ 
participation. Namely, the exclusion of nationality discrimination from the scope of the Race Equality 
Directive was problematic. EU law does not fully protect third-country nationals from illegitimate 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality, and this generates ‘equality gaps’, as noted by Muir.65 To 
offset these inequalities, collective actors are actively engaged in litigation, advocacy and campaigns at 
the local and national level to concretely advance equal treatment for third-country nationals. Hopefully, 
judgments like the one delivered in Nabil by the Italian Supreme Court will open new doors to facilitate 
their work. 
 
                                                     
65  Elise Muir, “Enhancing the Protection of Third-Country Nationals Against Discrimination: Putting EU Anti-Discrimination 
Law to the Test,” Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law, no. 1–2 (2011): 136–56. 
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Introduction  
The EU data protection framework is comprised of a blend of primary law provisions (Article 16 TFEU, 
and Articles 7 and 8 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), secondary legislation, and soft law initiatives. 
The primary law framework is bold and progressive: in addition to the established right to private life 
(Article 7 EU Charter), it also includes an independent right to data protection (Article 8 EU Charter), 
setting it apart from other international legal instruments. EU secondary legislation, enacted in 1995 
long before these primary law provisions existed, is similarly ambitious in its scope and its endeavour 
to implement a fundamental rights oriented approach to data protection law. Yet, despite its broad scope 
and laudable aspirations, the 1995 Data Protection Directive (DPD)1 was under-enforced at national 
level in EU Member States and received scant attention at supranational level by EU institutions until 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.2 
Since the EU Charter acquired binding force pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty, there has been an explosion 
of data protection jurisprudence before the CJEU. The author estimates that between December 2009 
and December 2016, the CJEU delivered forty judgments and had six cases pending before it where data 
protection was a consideration of more than marginal relevance.3 Twenty-seven of these cases are 
preliminary references, with the remainder involving either actions for annulment against decisions of 
EU institutions or bodies (eg. refusals to provide access to documents on privacy/data protection 
grounds4), or infringement proceedings against a Member State (eg. for failure to guarantee the 
independence of the national supervisory authority5). As the interpretation and application of data 
protection law gathers steam, the secondary law framework for data protection in the EU will experience 
                                                     
*  Assistant Professor of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science. 
1  European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/23. 
2  See, for instance, the empirical findings of David Erdos in the context of ‘new media’ where he found that although DPAs in 
the EU tend to adopt an expansive interpretation of the law, implementation of the law has been weak and unharmonised. 
David Erdos, European Data Protection Regulation and Online New Media: Mind the Enforcement Gap (2016)43(4) 
Journal of Law and Society 534–564.  
3  These are preliminary figures that are personally compiled based on a search in the Curia database using the ‘subject matter’ 
filter to search for ‘data protection’ cases. I noted that one data protection judgment (that I am aware of) was missing from 
these results and added this manually, and I then conducted a cursory qualitative analysis of the judgments to gauge their 
origins; nature; and, relevance: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ps9eXCKpuuORsnoGK9FOvmrBieNxP 
DPeh8RLE-B-dVI/edit?usp=sharing . 
4  Case T-194/04 The Bavarian Lager Co Ltd v Commission [2007] ECR II-04523.  
5  Case C-518/07 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I-1885. 
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its first relatively modest overhaul from a substantive perspective6: a new General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) shall enter into force across EU Member States on 25 May 2018.7 
Despite this recent jurisprudential boom and pending the introduction of the GDPR, soft law 
instruments, such as Opinions of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and the ‘Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party’ (A29WP) continue to provide most guidance on the substantive 
provisions of EU data protection law. The A29WP is an advisory body comprised of a representative of 
each of the national data protection regulators that, amongst other things, delivers opinions on relevant 
and topical matters of data protection interpretation. Yet, on paper at least8, the most important actors in 
the current governance system for data protection in the EU are ‘supervisory authorities’, or data 
protection authorities (DPAs). Pursuant to Article 28(1) DPD, each Member State must designate one, 
or several, public authorities to monitor the application of the data protection rules within its territory. 
In carrying out their role, the DPAs are said to act as ‘ombudsman, auditor, consultant, educator, policy 
advisor, negotiator and law enforcer’.9 Irrespective of the national law applicable to a data processing 
operation, each DPA is competent to exercise its powers on the territory of its own State and may be 
asked to do so by other Member States.10 DPAs also cooperate when necessary for the performance of 
their duties.11 Given their statutory role in data protection enforcement, these DPAs are included in the 
definition of ‘collective actors’ for the purposes of this paper.  
Before proceeding, it should be noted that although the EU data protection regime is generally 
considered to be a ‘comprehensive system’, as unlike for instance the US framework, it adopts a cross-
sectoral approach to data protection regulation, the general data protection legislative framework does 
not apply to former second and third pillar measures (Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Police 
and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters respectively). The DPD stipulates explicitly that it shall 
not apply to the processing of personal data ‘in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of 
Community law, such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union’.12 
Similarly, the GDPR states that it does not apply to the processing of personal data by Member States 
when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU (concerning 
policies on border checks, asylum and immigration).13 Moreover, the EU data protection reform package 
due to enter into force next year includes a ‘Law Enforcement Directive’ (LED) alongside the GDPR.14  
                                                     
6  As Peter Hustinx, former European Data Protection Supervisor, has noted the GDPR is more about ‘continuity than change.’ 
Yet, while the substantive data protection framework remains largely unchanged post-GDPR, it is suggested below that it 
will revolutionise data protection governance through, inter alia, the creation of a new EU Agency with the power to adopt 
decisions that bind national data protection authorities.  
7  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L119/1. 
8  As mentioned above, the DPAs have not yet played a considerable role in elevating data protection issues to supranational 
level by seeking preliminary references.  
9  C Bennett and C Raab, The governance of privacy: Policy instruments in global perspective (MIT Press, 2006). 
10  Article 28(6) DPD. 
11  Article 28(6) DPD. This occurred, for instance, when DPAs collaborated to investigate Google’s new data use policy across 
its entire suite of offerings in 2012. See, ICO, ‘Google to change privacy policy after ICO investigation’, 30 January 2015. 
Available at: https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2015/01/google-to-change-privacy-policy-
after-ico-investigation/ . 
12  Article 3(2) Directive 95/46 EC. 
13  Article 2(2)(b) GDPR. 
14  Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA [2016] OJ L 119/89.  
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While the EU Charter applies to EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies as well as EU Member 
States when they are ‘implementing EU law’15, including in the fields covered by the former second and 
third pillar, the precise application of the right to data protection in these fields remains unknown. To 
date, when interpreting the right to data protection the CJEU has suggested that secondary data 
protection legislation – in particular, the Data Protection Directive – gives expression to this right. 
However, this then begs the question of what the content of the right to data protection is in the former 
second and third pillars where the DPD will not apply. On this basis, it is possible to assume that as of 
next May, the GDPR will inform the content of the right to data protection in the former first pillar while 
the LED will inform the content of this right in the law enforcement context. Given the fundamental 
rights status of data protection, this conclusion appears unsatisfactory and merits further probing. Yet, 
the differentiated application of the right to data protection in this context is recognised by the A29WP. 
On the one hand, the A29WP insists that a human rights compliant approach must be taken to law 
enforcement activities, for instance initiatives to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. 
However, on the other hand, it implicitly acknowledges the limits of the right to data protection in this 
context when it cautions against the ‘blanket application of exceptions to data protection legislation, 
ignoring the conditions for such exceptions, and offering in return no real content and substance to 
privacy and data protection’.16  
Given the fragmented application of the legislative framework in this field, and the lack of guidance 
from the CJEU on the application of the right to data protection beyond the former first pillar, this 
working paper shall focus on the role of collective actors in the enforcement of the right to data 
protection under the 1995 Directive and the GDPR only. This paper shall therefore examine the role of 
collective actors pursuant to each of these legislative initiatives in turn.  
The role of collective actors pursuant to the Data Protection Directive  
When examining the role of collective actors in the enforcement of the right to data protection under the 
DPD, it is necessary to distinguish between the role of the national DPAs and the role of other collective 
actors, including civil society organisations.  
The role of national DPAs 
The independence of DPAs  
A defining feature of supervisory authorities (or DPAs) is their independence: Article 28(1) DPD states 
that DPAs ‘shall act with complete independence in exercising the functions entrusted to them’ while 
recital 62 DPD specifies that the establishment of supervisory authorities ‘exercising their functions 
with complete independence, is an essential component of the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data’. Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, this 
independence has been imbued with fundamental rights status and, as the CJEU is noted, is derived from 
primary law.17 The constitutionalisation of the independence of DPAs in Article 8(3) EU Charter and 
Article 16(2) TFEU sets these data protection regulators apart from other economic regulators – such as 
energy or rail regulators.  
                                                     
15  Article 51(2) EU Charter.  
16  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 14/2011 
on data protection issues related to the prevention of money laundering and 
terrorist financing, 13 June 2011, 3.  
17  Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, C-362/14, EU:C:2015:650, para 40.  
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One potential consequence of this independence, and perhaps of the differing normative conceptions of 
the right to data protection across EU Member States, is that the manner in which the mandate of data 
protection authorities has been interpreted, and the extent to which data protection law has been 
enforced, ostensibly differs significantly across EU Member States.  
The mandate of DPAs  
Supervisory authorities, or DPAs, are entrusted with the task of overseeing data protection compliance 
within their respective jurisdictions. According to Article 28 DPD, DPAs should have advisory powers; 
investigative powers; and, effective powers of intervention. These powers also include the power to 
engage in legal proceedings where data protection law has been violated or to ‘bring these violations to 
the attention of judicial authorities’.18  
The DPD is silent on the issue of what priorities the DPA should pursue when exercising these powers 
and, in particular, whether they ought to prioritise the protection of the right to data protection of 
individuals through their activities. It may be argued that all aspects of data protection enforcement 
promote the right to data protection and therefore such explicit guidance is not required (for example, it 
could be claimed that ensuring a high level of data protection renders economic data flows possible). 
However, as discussed further below, one area where such prioritisation may be relevant is in the context 
of complaint-handling. Article 28(4) DPD states that DPAs ‘shall hear claims lodged by any person, or 
by an association representing that person, concerning the protection of his rights and freedoms in regard 
to the processing of personal data’ (emphasis added).19 Furthermore, recital 63 suggests that DPAs ‘must 
have the necessary means to perform their duties, including powers of investigation and intervention, 
particularly in cases of complaints from individuals’ (emphasis added). Thus the Directive appears to 
envisage that the handling of individual complaints is a facet of the powers of DPAs. However, in some 
Member States, DPAs have eschewed such systematic complaints handling of individual complaints in 
order to dedicate scarce regulatory resources to more systemic issues. For instance, in Ireland s.10(1)(a) 
of the Data Protection Act 1998 appears to give the Data Protection Commissioner discretion as to 
whether individual complaints are investigated. It states that:  
The Commissioner may investigate, or cause to be investigated, whether any of the provisions of this 
Act have been, are being or are likely to be contravened by a data controller or a data processor in 
relation to an individual either where the individual complains to him of a contravention of any of 
those provisions or he is otherwise of opinion that there may be such a contravention. 
Anecdotal evidence would suggest that Member States have thus interpreted their obligations in 
different ways. For instance, in Ireland there is no obligation to investigate complaints, in Estonia a 
‘public interest’ threshold guides intervention while in Poland the DPA is obliged to proceed with every 
case in a formal manner. The CJEU was asked to pronounce on whether such a de minimis approach to 
the enforcement of data protection law on the part of DPAs was compatible with EU fundamental rights 
in a reference from a Dutch court.20 Unfortunately however, this reference was withdrawn leading to the 
current state of uncertainty regarding the responsibility of the DPAs. This is a far cry from similar 
provisions under the Equality Directives. For instance, Article 13(2) of the Race Equality Directive 
requires Member States to ensure that Equality Bodies provide ‘independent assistance to victims of 
discrimination in pursuing their complaints about discrimination’. The role of the DPAs is not stated in 
such terms, indicating that no such obligation of assistance exists to facilitate access to justice and legal 
redress.  
                                                     
18  Article 28(3) DPD; recital 63.  
19  It further specifies that the individual concerned shall be informed of the outcome of the claim. 
20  C-192/15, T. D. Rease and P. Wullems v College bescherming persoonsgegevens EU:C:2015:861.  
The role of collective actors in the enforcement of the right to data protection under EU law 
European University Institute 91 
The enforcement ‘track record’ of DPAs  
In the absence of comprehensive empirical research, it is not possible to draw any conclusions regarding 
the extent to which DPAs have been instrumental in advancing the right to data protection. Erdos’ 
empirical work in the context of ‘new media’ concludes that despite the expansive interpretation of key 
data protection provisions by DPAs, the enforcement of these provisions has been ‘limited’ and 
‘sporadic’.21 This would seem to confirm the prevailing impression that data protection has not been 
adequately enforced to date. A survey of the jurisprudence of the CJEU regarding data protection matters 
adds to this impression. It indicates that the role of DPAs in litigating contentious issues, and seeking 
further clarification on the interpretation of the DPD, has been very limited.  
Of the twenty-seven or so preliminary references before the CJEU between the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty and December 2016, only six involved domestic DPAs. This could perhaps be explained 
by the participation of DPAs in the work of the A29WP, which issues advisory opinions on the 
interpretation of key data protection provisions. It might be inferred that as difficult concepts can be the 
subject of advisory opinions by the A29WP, DPAs do not feel the need to litigate in order to clarify 
them. Yet, the CJEU has on occasion ignored these Opinions of the A29WP, and interpreted the DPD 
in a manner inconsistent with them.22 Moreover, the capacity of the A29WP to issue Opinions is finite, 
and it therefore needs to set its own strategic priorities for the interpretation of the data protection rules.23 
The more likely explanation for this lack of involvement of DPAs in preliminary references is that data 
protection enforcement at national level has been lacking, with the notable exception of enforcement 
actions for ‘easy wins’ such as cold-calling violations and data security breaches. As a result, the CJEU 
has not yet had the opportunity to consider the DPD’s most knotty provisions, for example the 
prohibition on automated decision-making in Article 15 DPD. It would also appear that of the twenty-
seven preliminary references received by the CJEU in this field, most have come from the same 
countries (Germany – six; Ireland – four; Netherlands – three; Austria – three; and, Spain – three). Some 
of these countries (most evidently, Germany) have a long-standing legal tradition of data protection 
while others (Ireland) have no such tradition but have several major technology companies established 
in the country. It is noteworthy that – until recently – no references have been received from large 
Member States, including France, the UK and Poland.24  
Furthermore, it would appear that as a result of the DPD’s failure to provide guidance on the strategic 
role of DPAs, there has been significant regulatory competition, or arbitrage, between independent 
DPAs. For instance, although Facebook is established in Ireland, and the Irish DPA has claimed 
jurisdiction over Facebook’s personal data processing activities in relation to EU residents, various other 
DPAs have sought to claim jurisdiction over Facebook (including the Belgian Privacy Commissioner; 
and various German DPAs).25 
The role of other collective actors  
Article 28 DPD, cited above, provides that DPAs shall hear claims lodged by any person, or ‘by an 
association representing that person’. Thus, it allows for representative organisations to intervene on 
                                                     
21  Note 2 above.  
22  See, for instance, C-141/12 and 372/12, YS v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and Minister voor Immigratie, 
Integratie en Asiel v M and S EU:C:2014:2081, which contradicts the A29WP Opinion on Personal Data (A29WP, ‘Opinion 
4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data’, adopted on 20 June 2007 (WP136)). 
23  For these purposes, the A29WP adopts an ‘Action Plan’ which sets out its priorities and identifies its objectives and 
deliverables for the coming year. The 2017 Action plan is available here: https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/18/2017/01/Pressrelease-Adoptionof2017GDPRActionPlan.pdf . 
24  Two preliminary references have been sent to the CJEU from the French Conseil d’État in 2017: 136/17, G.C. and Ors and 
507/17, Google (lodged in March and August 2017 respectively).  
25  Wirtschaftsakademie Schleswig-Holstein, C-210/16, [2016] OJ C260/18 (pending).  
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behalf of individual ‘data subjects’. This is only before the DPA however. It is important to recall that 
the administrative remedies available to a data subject before a national DPA are without prejudice to 
any judicial remedy that might be available to the individual data subject.26 The DPD also provides for 
‘judicial remedies, liability and sanctions’ in Chapter III. In particular, Articles 22-25 provide that 
Member States shall provide for a right to a judicial remedy; a right to compensation for damage suffered 
as a result of unlawful processing or breach of the Directive; and, for effective sanctions in case of 
infringement of the Directive. Whether or not collective actors can intervene before domestic courts 
depends on the procedural rules in place at Member State level. 
Therefore, thus far, Digital Rights Ireland27 is the only action taken on the part of a collective actor to 
have been referred to the CJEU.28 Although contested before the Irish courts, Digital Rights Ireland – a 
civil society organisation dedicated to ‘defending civil, human and legal rights in a digital age’29 – was 
ultimately allowed to take a proceeding in actio popularis (on behalf of the privacy and data protection 
rights of all individuals, rather than its own corporate rights) before the Courts. In granting the Plaintiff 
standing, the Court took into account several factors: that the Plaintiff was a sincere and serious litigant; 
that the case raises important constitutional questions; that the impugned provisions affect almost all of 
the population; that such proceedings would be an effective way to bring legal action; the public good 
to be protected; and, the Plaintiff’s right of access to the Court and the Court’s duty to uphold the 
Constitution.30 Furthermore, the Court allowed the Plantiff company to litigate the contested 
telecommunications data retention with regard to the infringement of the Plantiff’s rights as a legal 
person as well as those of natural persons despite the potentially different findings in relation to these 
two categories of litigants. The Court justified this on the grounds that it would be in the interests of 
justice and Court time for the Plantiff to do so.31 Following eight years of litigation, the Plantiff’s legal 
action culminated in the CJEU’s judgment. Digital Rights Ireland has highlighted a number of factors 
that made this victory possible, including: educating and sharing knowledge with the public to garner 
support; maintaining journalists as key allies; working with a number of specialists, including academics 
and practitioners; and, preparing groundwork and formulating arguments clearly for litigation.32 
Another ‘class action’ (or more accurately, an action based on assignment) is however pending at 
national level – an action taken by the group ‘Europe-v-Facebook’ (led by Max Schrems) before the 
Austrian Supreme Court.33 This litigation has been suspended while a number of preliminary questions 
are referred to the CJEU regarding the admissibility of this class action.34 The plaintiff in this action 
recognises that the applicable data protection law to this action is Irish data protection law, and that data 
protection law is not amenable to choice of law considerations.35 However, it is argued that the 
applicable civil law is that of the US State of California, unless this can be overridden by ius cogens, 
                                                     
26  Article 22 DPD.  
27  Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and 
KärntnerLandesregierung and Others, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, EU:C: 2014: 238. 
28  While the EDPS has intervened in a number of infringement proceedings and actions for annulment heard before the CJEU, 
it does not have leave to intervene in preliminary reference procedures. Order of the President of 12 September 2007, Case 
C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi OY, Satamedia, [2007] I-07075.  
29  See further: https://www.digitalrights.ie/ . Accessed on 29 August 2017.  
30  Digital Rights Ireland Ltd –v- Minister for Communication &Ors[2010] IEHC 221, para 91.  
31  Ibid, Para 92. 
32  See further: https://www.eff.org/node/81899.  
33  See further: http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/sk/PA_OGH_en.pdf . 
34  C-498/16, Maximilian Schrems v Facebook Ireland Limited, lodged on 19 September 2016 by the ObersterGerichtshof 
(Austria).  
35  See, ‘Copy of the Lawsuit filed – English translation of German original’, filed on 31 July 2014. Available at: 
http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/sk/sk_en.pdf ,paras 169 - 171.  
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mandatory requirements or public policy under Austrian law.36 Therefore, the plaintiff claims 
jurisdiction to hear this dispute, not on the basis of data protection law, but on the basis of Article 16(1) 
of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters.37Pursuant to this Regulation (Article 17(1)) the plaintiff claims this 
clause is invalid. The referring court has referred a number of questions to the CJEU regarding the 
admissibility of this claim pursuant to Regulation 44/2001. In particular, the referring court asks, first, 
whether a ‘consumer’ loses that status if his professional activities are linked to the claim.38 Facebook 
had argued that Schrems was a ‘professional litigant’ while Schrems claimed this amounted to a claimant 
losing his rights if he fought for them publicly. The second question referred to the Court was whether 
a consumer in a Member State can simultaneously invoke his own claims arising from an issue in his 
own jurisdiction and the claims of other consumers relating to the same issue if these other consumers 
are domiciled (i) in the same Member State; (ii) in another Member State; and (iii) in a non-Member 
State. The answers to these preliminary reference questions will have implications beyond the data 
protection context, and may facilitate group actions in other areas of EU law.  
A non-profit organisation – EPIC: the Electronic Privacy Information Centre – was also given leave to 
intervene as amicus curiae before the Irish High Court in the so-called Schrems II litigation. The US 
Government, as well as two industry trade associations (BSA Business Software Allieance and, Digital 
Europe) were also granted leave to intervene in this manner, although several other applicants were 
refused such leave to intervene as amicus curiae on the grounds that they could not offer further 
assistance to the court beyond that already being offered.39 It is noteworthy, in particular, that the Irish 
High Court declined the application of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission to intervene 
in this case on the grounds that it was ‘not satisfied that it [could] offer any assistance to the court that 
cannot be offered by the Data Protection Commissioner’.40 The Court had acknowledged that the 
proceedings came with the scope of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission’s functions. 
However, it noted that the remit of the Equality Commission ‘goes way beyond data protection and 
information technology issues and involves the protection and promotion of human rights and equality 
generally’ while the ‘Data Protection Commissioner is the entity in the State that has a particular remit 
with regard to issues of data protection’.41 It follows implicitly that the High Court therefore assumes 
that the Data Protection Commissioner will advocate a human rights focused interpretation of the data 
protection rules in the same way that the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission would have.  
Whether or not the actual or potential intervention of a DPA in legal proceedings pursuant to Articles 
22-24 DPD precludes the involvement of other public service organisations, such as the Irish Human 
Rights and Equality Commission in this instance, will be determined by the CJEU. In Fashion ID 
GmbH42 the Court is asked to consider whether these provisions preclude national legislation which 
grants public-service associations the power to take action against an alleged data protection infringer 
in order to safeguard the interests of consumers. The answer provided to this question will be of real 
                                                     
36  Ibid, paras 174 – 179. 
37  OJ [2001] L12/1. 
38  The Court was asked whether the plaintiff would cease to be a consumer if he ‘publishes books in connection with the 
enforcement of his claims’, delivers occasional lectures for remuneration, ‘operates websites, collects donations for the 
enforcement of his claims and has assigned to him the claims of numerous consumers on the assurance that he will remit 
to them any proceeds awareded, after the deduction of legal costs?’. 
39  Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems [2016 No. 4809], delivered on 19 July 
2016. Available at: https://arstechnica.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2016/07/Judgment-of-the-High-Court-of-Ireland-
in-the-case-data-protection-Commissioner-v-Facebook-relating-to-motions-to-allow-amicus-curia.pdf . 
40  Ibid, para 14.  
41  Ibid.  
42  C-40/17, Fashion ID GmbH & Co.KG v Verbraucherzentrale NRW eV [2017] C112/22.  
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significance to the role that collective actors – beyond national DPAs – such as consumer protection 
authorities can play in ensuring effective compliance with the right to data protection.  
The role of collective actors pursuant to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)  
The GDPR seems likely to enhance the role of collective actors in the enforcement of the right to data 
protection. The role of DPAs will be augmented as they will be able to speak with one voice – that of 
the new European Data Protection Board (EDPB) – on transnational data protection matters. A residual 
query remains whether they will adopt a ‘selective to be effective’ approach to their tasks in order to 
prioritise systemic complaints and problems over complaints lodged by individuals. Furthermore, the 
GDPR introduces new provisions providing for representative actions on the individual’s behalf by not 
for profit organisations thereby further enhancing the prospect of the more effective enforcement of the 
right to data protection.  
DPAs speaking with a single voice on transnational matters  
The choice of a regulation rather than a directive to replace the DPD was deliberate and was designed 
to introduce more substantive harmonisation of EU data protection law. However, it is the provisions of 
the GDPR concerning data protection enforcement that shall truly revolutionise, or ‘Europeanise’, this 
body of law.43 In particular, the A29WP shall be replaced by a new EU agency – an EDPB with the 
power to issue binding decisions – and a new ‘consistency mechanism’ shall be introduced to ensure 
that data protection matters pertaining to several Member States shall be interpreted and applied in a 
consistent matter.44 This should therefore eliminate the regulatory arbitrage mentioned above. While, at 
first glance, this procedural harmonisation might be most closely associated with the GDPR’s internal 
market rationale, its role in ensuring a fundamental rights objective – the effectiveness of the right to 
data protection – is equally as significant. At present, disputes regarding how the right to data protection 
applies in the context of transnational data processing activities are arbitrarily resolved. If the data 
controller has an establishment in the EU where decisions regarding data processing are made, then it 
will be this country’s DPA that resolves complaints concerning the data controller. Therefore, for 
instance, the Irish Data Protection Commissioner adjudicates complaints regarding Facebook’s data 
processing activities. At present, there is no formal mechanism (other than the drastic Article 259 TFEU 
mechanism) through which other national DPAs can contest the decisions of another DPA. Moreover, 
even when national DPAs cooperate, as several did in the context of the 2012 investigation to Google’s 
privacy policy, there is no obligation on data controllers to recognise their collective findings. Therefore, 
in the Google investigation culminated in six DPAs issuing separate data protection recommendations 
to Google to ensure compliance with national data protection rules.45 By harmonising data protection 
enforcement mechanisms the GPDR will therefore simultaneously promote the Regulation’s market 
integration objective while also ensuring a uniform and more effective level of protection for the right 
to data protection across the EU.  
                                                     
43  See further, O Lynskey, ‘The Europeanisation of data protection law’, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 
published online 21 December 2016. Available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-yearbook-of-
european-legal-studies/article/div-classtitlethe-europeanisation-of-data-protection-lawdiv/579DCFDE8EE5D8A3C83FE 
D4C9ACB8CCF.  
44  Articles 63-67, GDPR. 
45  For instance: Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Google to change privacy policy after ICO investigation’, 30 January 
2015. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2015/01/google-to-change-privacy-
policy-after-ico-investigation/ .  
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The prioritisation of DPA resources to ensure more effective rights protection?  
Articles 57 and 58 GDPR continues to allocate numerous tasks and powers to DPAs (22 mandatory 
tasks as well as 27 powers) while failing to set out any strategic plan for their exercise. The Centre for 
Information Policy and Leadership (CIPL) therefore advocates that in the absence of infinite resources, 
DPAs should adopt a ‘smart’ or responsive approach to regulation and should prioritise their tasks and 
powers in order to be more effective. If such an approach were accepted, enforcement and the imposition 
of sanctions would be treated as a last option and DPAs would favour a more cooperative (or responsive) 
relationship with those who they regulate. Moreover, in order to ensure a harmonised approach to data 
protection law across the EU, CIPL suggests that DPAs should agree upon a common approach to such 
prioritisation.  
This begs the question of whether ‘maximum compliance’ with the data protection rules equates to the 
more effective protection of the right to data protection. On the one hand, it might be argued that such 
an approach might free up resources for DPAs to engage in more strategic data protection litigation in 
order to safeguard the right to data protection. Data protection would therefore be promoted as a 
collective right or public good rather than an individual right. Such an approach is also arguably 
supported by the independence of DPAs, which should allow them to prioritise their resources as they 
deem appropriate. One potential objection to any such prioritisation is that it may deprive individual 
complainants, whose complaints might not be viewed as a priority by a DPA, of an administrative 
remedy. Article 57 GDPR states that each DPA shall ‘handle complaints lodged…and investigate to the 
extent appropriate’, indicating that DPAs should have some leeway as to how to handle complaints. 
However, Article 77 GDPR provides that ‘every data subject shall have the right to lodge a complaint 
with a supervisory authority’. It is suggested that whether or not the rapid rejection of such complaints 
for lack of ‘strategic importance’ would breach the right to an effective remedy would require a context 
specific assessment. This might require consideration of, amongst other things, whether alternative 
administrative remedies are available (such as the ability to complain to an Ombudsperson); whether 
judicial review of the DPA decision to not pursue the complaint is feasible; and, whether private 
litigation is possible. In Puškár, the CJEU has been asked to consider whether the requirement to exhaust 
domestic administrative remedies prior to legal proceedings is compatible with the right to an effective 
remedy in Article 47 EU Charter.46 Advocate General Kokott has opined that while this right is affected 
by such a requirement this may be justifiable as long as the rules governing the remedy do not 
disproportionately impair the effectiveness of judicial protection.47 In her reasoning, the Advocate 
General recognises that a gain in efficiency is a valid objective to pursue under EU law.48 Should the 
Court also recognise this objective in its judgment, it may pave the way for a ‘smart’ approach to data 
protection enforcement by DPAs. 
The enhanced role for ‘not-for-profit’ bodies, organisations and associations  
A further notable development in the GDPR, designed to strengthen the hand of individual data subjects 
vis-à-vis data controllers, is the introduction of specific rights to redress in Articles 77-79: to lodge a 
complaint with a DPA; to an effective remedy against a DPA; and to an effective remedy against a data 
controller or processor. Of most significance however is Article 80 GDPR, entitled ‘representation of 
data subjects’, which merits replication in full here. This provision provides as follows:  
 
1. The data subject shall have the right to mandate a not-for-profit body, organisation or association 
which has been properly constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State, has statutory 
                                                     
46  C-73/16 Puškár [2016] OJ OJ C 165/6.  
47  C-73/16 Puškár, Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 30 March 2017, EU:C:2017:253, para 69.  
48  Ibid, para 59.  
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objectives which are in the public interest, and is active in the field of the protection of data subjects' 
rights and freedoms with regard to the protection of their personal data to lodge the complaint on his 
or her behalf, to exercise the rights referred to in Articles 77, 78 and 79 on his or her behalf, and to 
exercise the right to receive compensation referred to in Article 82 on his or her behalf where provided 
for by Member State law. 
2. Member States may provide that any body, organisation or association referred to in paragraph 1 
of this Article, independently of a data subject's mandate, has the right to lodge, in that Member State, 
a complaint with the supervisory authority which is competent pursuant to Article 77 and to exercise 
the rights referred to in Articles 78 and 79 if it considers that the rights of a data subject under this 
Regulation have been infringed as a result of the processing. 
This is a major novelty in the GDPR. Pursuant to the GDPR, collective actors will be able to exercise 
the data subjects’ rights to complain to a DPA and to an effective judicial remedy, provided that the data 
subject mandates them to do so. This provision may be compared to those in the anti-discrimination 
directives. For instance, Article 7(2) of the Race Equality Directive provides that Member States shall 
ensure that  
associations, organisations or other legal entities, which have, in accordance with the criteria laid 
down by their national law, a legitimate interest in ensuring that the provisions of this Directive are 
complied with, may engage, either on behalf or in support of the complainant, with his or her approval, 
in any judicial and/or administrative procedure provided for the enforcement of obligations under this 
Directive. 
A close comparison of this provision with Article 80(1) GDPR reveals a broad similarity: ‘interested’ 
associations and organisations can, with the individual’s approval, engage in judicial and administrative 
procedures on the individual’s behalf. However, it also reveals a number of distinctions. The GDPR 
stipulates that the representative actor must be ‘not-for-profit’; have statutory objectives in the public 
interest and be ‘active in the field of the protection of data subjects' rights and freedoms with regard to 
the protection of their personal data’ while the Race Equality Directive simply specifies that the 
organisation has a ‘legitimate interest in ensuring that the provisions of the Directive are complied with’. 
The GDPR may be therefore narrower in this regard: for instance, the Irish Human Rights and Equality 
Commission might not be viewed as ‘active in the field of the protection of data subjects' rights and 
freedoms with regard to the protection of their personal data’ while it would certainly have a legitimate 
interest in ensuring that the provisions of EU data protection legislation are complied with. Furthermore, 
the GDPR provides that the representative actor can intervene ‘on behalf of’ the data subject while the 
Race Equality Directive provides that this representation may be either on ‘behalf or in support of the 
complainant’. Again, the GDPR is ostensibly more narrow in this regard although one would hope that 
it would not be construed as such.  
The GDPR does however go a step beyond the EU anti-discrimination directives. Article 80(2) GDPR 
allows Member States the possibility to introduce measures enabling representative actors to lodge a 
complaint before a DPA or to have an effective remedy against a DPA or data controller, independently 
of the data subject’s mandate. The anti-discrimination directives require the victim’s approval before 
such remedies can be exercised. These new provisions in the GDPR may therefore go some way to 
remedying the asymmetry of power and information between individual data subjects and those who 
process and control their personal information. Indeed, commentators have noted that whether or not 
these provisions are implemented will be a ‘litmus test as to how seriously all Member States…want to 
protect the privacy of its citizens’.49 Member States with a historically weak record of protecting the 
rights of data subjects, and affording greater weight to the consequences for industry of such compliance, 
are less likely to implement legislation to facilitate representative class actions without a mandate, or 
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actions for compensation with a mandate. The disparity between the levels of protection offered by 
Member States thus seems likely to continue even post-GDPR.  
Conclusions  
The role of collective actors in the enforcement of the right to data protection has, to date, under the 
DPD been quite limited. National DPAs have seemingly interpreted their mandates in different ways 
and few references to the CJEU have involved DPAs directly. Moreover, actions on the part of other 
collective actors – such as civil society organisations – are only now recently starting to bear fruit.  
The entry into force of the GDPR should however enhance the role of collective actors in the 
enforcement of the right to data protection. The actions of DPAs will be given increased transnational 
weight when acting through the EU’s newest agency, the European Data Protection Board, while explicit 
provision is made for representative actions on behalf of individuals. 
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Harmonisation in asylum carries the potential for the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
to shape EU asylum, and by extension international refugee law, as well as to enforce refugees’ rights. 
Strict procedural rules circumscribe the CJEU’s potential to become an ‘asylum Court’. Nevertheless, 
provisions in the EU asylum acquis influence the conditions for asylum seekers and refugees to gain 
access to national courts. Proceduralisation has been an explicit goal of the EU asylum policy since its 
inception. It has materialised in three legislative waves. The first resulted in the creation of a basic set 
of procedural guarantees, alongside a plethora of exceptional procedures. The second resulted in 
modest improvements in terms of harmonisation, and adherence to fundamental rights, but saw 
exceptional procedural arrangements either retained or introduced. The third, forthcoming wave, aims 
at further harmonisation that would, however, be heavily focused on the underlying goal of externalising 
protection to third countries. Procedural harmonisation sought to enhance the role of collective actors 
and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). While a ‘defence 
clause’ is absent, the legislation envisages information - provision to applicants, legal aid, and feeding 
into the establishment of country of origin information as their primary involvement. Additional 
functions are reserved for UNHCR, falling, however, short of establishing a genuine supervisory role. 
In practice, collective actors engage in strategic litigation on behalf of refugees, and both they, and 
UNHCR, have formally intervened in cases that reached the CJEU. They also engage in ‘hidden’ forms 
of support: legal advice to lawyers, liaison, and training.  
Introduction 
Lacking both an international judicial instance, and a global level monitoring mechanism with a 
possibility to deliver opinions in individual cases, international refugee law is particularly challenging 
to enforce. The creation of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) carried within it the potential 
for the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to shape EU asylum, and by extension 
international refugee law, as well as to enforce refugees’ rights. Strict procedural rules on direct access 
somewhat circumscribe the CJEU’s potential to become an ‘asylum Court’. Nevertheless, provisions in 
the EU asylum acquis influence the conditions for asylum seekers and refugees to gain access to national 
courts. One of the main advances of CEAS in relation to the international refugee law regime is that it 
seeks to harmonise in a detailed manner rules around asylum procedures at national level, including 
provisions on the right to an effective remedy, and related guarantees. In addition, refugee-assisting 
organisations, at national and EU level, as well as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), are increasingly engaging in strategic litigation in the field of asylum.   
Set against this backdrop, the paper examines the role of collective actors, understood in the broad sense 
to cover civil society organisations and independent organisations, as well as that of the Office of the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in judicially enforcing the rights of asylum seekers 
and refugees. It ascertains the type of proceduralisation taking place in EU asylum law, critically 
assessing the three waves of EU asylum procedural legislation: their content, quality and implications. 
The research then scrutinises selected provisions of the EU asylum instruments in force, highlighting 
                                                     
*  Departmental Lecturer of International Human Rights and Refugee Law, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford Department of 
International Development, University of Oxford. 
Evangelia (Lilian) Tsourdi 
100 Department of Law Working Papers 
what functions they foresee for collective actors, and for UNHCR, within CEAS. It analyses if, and how, 
these functions relate to their capacity to judicially enforce asylum seekers and refugees’ rights. The 
study, finally, draws examples from CJEU case-law on asylum involving collective actors and UNHCR, 
shedding light on the hidden processes behind asylum litigation and their often-ignored influence.  
Proceduralisation in the EU Asylum Policy: Three Legislative Waves  
One of the distinct features of the EU’s harmonisation project on asylum was that it also included 
harmonisation of national procedural rules. This is an ambitious aspect of the EU asylum policy, given 
that the 1951 Refugee Convention does not include relevant norms,1 and no harmonisation of national 
administrative procedures more broadly exists to date.2 The complexity of the matter, combined with 
the wish of Member States to see their own national administrative traditions reflected in the relevant 
EU legislation, led in practice to a cumbersome adoption procedure, and the establishment of highly 
differentiated standards.  
Nevertheless, proceduralisation in the EU asylum policy was not ‘incidental’,3 but rather an explicit goal 
of the EU asylum policy under the EU Treaties since its inception. Namely, the initial legal basis for the 
EU asylum policy included, as part of the substantive measures to be adopted: ‘minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting or withdrawing refugee status’.4 Minimum harmonisation 
must not be taken as a term necessarily pointing to a low level of harmonisation. As the CJEU has stated 
in a different area where minimum harmonisation was foreseen, namely the working time Directive: 
that provision does not limit Community action to the lowest common denominator, or even to the 
lowest level of protection established by the various Member States, but means that Member States 
are free to provide a level of protection more stringent than that resulting from Community law, high 
as it may be.5  
As a result of this first harmonisation round, Member States adopted the 2005 version of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive.6 Where minimum harmonisation was envisaged under the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
the instruments allowed Member States to adopt more favourable standards.7 For clarity, the expression 
‘more favourable’ refers to standards being more favourable for protection seekers. If they were more 
favourable for the Member States, i.e. by providing them with the possibility to be more restrictive 
where no discretion was foreseen in the directives, the standards in question would go against the effêt 
utile of the instruments, which was to harmonise standards in this policy area.  
                                                     
1  1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 25 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954, 189 UNTS 150, as 
amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, entered into force 4 October 1967, 606 
UNTS 267 (hereafter: 1951 Refugee Convention).  
2  Neither does a single body of procedural rules for executive rule-making in the EU exist. See, however, relevant material 
developed in the framework of the Research Network on EU Administrative Law (ReNEUAL) at: http://www.reneual.eu, 
and scholarly debate on the importance of establishing a corpus of procedural rules for the EU in: D. Curtin, H. Hofmann, 
J. Mendes, ‘Constitutionalising EU Executive Rule-Making Procedures: A Research Agenda’ (2013) 19 European Law 
Journal 1.  
3  Mariolina Eliantonio and Elise Muir conceptualise ‘incidental proceduralisation’ as the: ‘insertion of procedural rules in 
secondary EU law measures adopted on the basis of provisions enabling the EU to develop a substantive policy’. See M. 
Eliantonio and E. Muir, ‘Concluding Thoughts: Legitimacy, Rationale and Extent of the Incidental Proceduralisation of 
EU Law’ (2015) 8 Review of European Administrative Law 177, 178.  
4  See TEC Amsterdam, Article 63(1)(d) (emphasis added).  
5  Case C-84/94, UK and Ireland v Council (working time directive) [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:431, para 56.  
6  Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status, OJ L 326/13 (hereafter: 2005 Procedures Directive).  
7  See, for example, 2005 Procedures Directive, Article 5. 
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The ambition expressed in the Lisbon Treaty is higher, calling for the development of: ‘common 
procedures for the granting and withdrawing of uniform asylum or subsidiary protection status’.8 The 
Union is therefore now free to harmonise asylum law fully. On this basis, the co-legislators adopted in 
2013 the recast Asylum Procedures Directive.9 What level of harmonisation does the recast instrument 
foresee? The 2009 Commission proposal for a recast asylum procedures directive10 made reference to 
‘minimum standards’. However, it was issued before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 
December 2009. The amended recast proposal that was issued in 2011 referred to ‘common’ procedures 
reflecting the amended legal basis.11 What is the legal gravity of this reformulation? The instrument 
retains a ‘more favourable standards’ clause phrased in identical terms to the one employed in the first-
generation instrument.12 This observation is supported by the analysis undertaken in a subsequent section 
on the legal quality of the recast instrument.13 Hence it is clear that, although the level of harmonisation 
is enhanced compared to the first-generation instruments, there is no exhaustive harmonisation yet. In 
other areas of EU integration, the Court has checked the actual content of instruments in order to 
ascertain whether they do in fact fully harmonise a field.14  
Aspiring to harmonise EU asylum legislation further, the European Commission announced in April 
2016 its intention for: ‘a comprehensive harmonisation of procedures across the EU by transforming the 
current Asylum Procedures Directive into a new Regulation establishing a single common asylum 
procedure in the EU - replacing the current disparate arrangements in the Member States’.15 It released 
its proposal in July 2016; promoting the instrument as seeking to establish ‘a common procedure’ that 
was currently under negotiation.16 The goal of establishing a CEAS is broad enough to encompass 
further harmonisation as envisaged by the Commission. While a fully federalised system, where 
processing of individual claims lays in the competence of the Union, would require a Treaty change, 
this is not the case for ‘a common procedure’, as long as this refers in practice to further harmonisation 
of procedural rules concerning decision-making performed by national administrations and courts of 
individual Member States. The following subsections critically assess these three waves of EU asylum 
procedural legislation: their content, quality and implications.  
First wave, or when the exception became the norm  
The 2005 Procedures Directive, as the entire first generation of asylum instruments, was adopted by the 
Council acting unanimously.17 As one author characteristically notes, while asylum was no longer 
subject to an ‘intergovernmental’ system in the legal sense, decision-making was still intergovernmental 
in the political sense, in that national executives (in practice interior and justice ministers and their 
                                                     
8  See TFEU, Article 78(2)(c) (emphasis added).  
9  See Directive 2013/32/EU on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International Protection (Recast), OJ L 
180/60 (hereafter: 2013 Asylum Procedures Directive).  
10  See European Commission, ‘Proposal for a directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting 
and withdrawing international protection’, COM(2009) 554 final (hereafter: 2009 APD proposal).  
11  See European Commission, ‘Amended proposal for a directive on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection status (Recast)’, COM(2011) 319 final (hereafter: 2011 APD proposal).   
12  See Recast APD, Article 5.  
13  See below, subsection ‘Second wave: tangible progress or lipstick on a pig?’.  
14  See for example the Case C-323/93, Société Civile Agricole du Centre d'Insémination de la Crespelle et Coopérative 
d'Élevage et d'Insémination Artificielle du Département de la Mayenne [1994] ECLI:EU:C:1994:368.  
15  European Commission, ‘Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to 
Europe’ (Communication), COM(2016) 197, part I2, subsection c.  
16  European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a common procedure for international protection in the Union 
and repealing Directive 2013/32/EU, COM(2016) 467 final (hereafter: 2016 APR proposal).   
17  See TEC Amsterdam, Article 67.  
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officials,) retained extensive control over decision-making.18 Given the nature of the instrument, which 
was to have wide implications in national administrative and judicial practice, this decision-making 
technique held back the harmonising effect of legislation. It led to the inclusion of provisions in the 
instrument that contained ambiguous or contradictory wording, left a wide margin of discretion to 
Member States, and made numerous references to national law, derogations and exceptions.19  
The instrument did set out a number of basic principles and guarantees for the examination of asylum 
applications at first instance and at appeal, including: access to the procedure, right to remain pending 
the outcome of an application, right to a personal interview, various provisions on right to information, 
communication with UNHCR etc.20 However, alongside the ‘normal’ procedure, it established a series 
of ‘exceptional’ procedures, applicable in a variety of cases, which allowed for divergences from the 
basic principles and guarantees. Hemme Battjes classified the disparate provisions regulating 
exceptional procedures in the 2005 Directive under four categories: ‘preliminary examination 
procedure’; ‘normal border procedures’; ‘special border procedures’; and the ‘safe third neighbouring 
country procedure’.21 The leeway for Member States to diverge from the basic set of guarantees was 
such that the criticism of Cathryn Costello that through this instrument ‘exceptional procedures become 
the norm’ is fully justified.22 The European Commission thus admitted in 2010 that: ‘some of the 
Directive's optional provisions and derogation clauses have contributed to the proliferation of divergent 
arrangements across the EU, and that procedural guarantees vary considerably between Member 
States’.23  
Second wave: tangible progress, or lipstick on a pig? 
The Lisbon Treaty reaffirmed the passage to co-decision, already a legal reality since 2005. It stated 
explicitly that the majority of asylum instruments24 are to be adopted under the ordinary legislative 
procedure, i.e. co-decision.25 Hence, the European Parliament rose as co-legislator on an equal footing 
with the Council in the area of asylum. This entailed the emergence of new institutional dynamics, and 
the predominance of ‘trialogues’ in the legislative process.26 Coupled with the introduction of qualified 
majority voting, this new framework seemed more conducive to achieving higher levels of procedural 
harmonisation on asylum decision-making, and better safeguarding asylum seekers’ access to justice.  
Nevertheless, the negotiation process of the recast instrument proved cumbersome. The initial 2009 
Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) proposal sought to simplify procedural arrangements, reducing 
                                                     
18  See S Peers, ‘Transforming decision making on EC immigration and asylum law’ (2005) 30 E. L. Rev. 285, 286.  
19  For the effect of the use of such techniques in the entire body of immigration and asylum legal instruments see P De Bruycker, 
‘Le Niveau d’harmonisation Législative de la Politique Européenne d’immigration et d’asile’, in F Julien-Laferriere, H 
Labayle, O Edström (eds) La politique européenne d'immigration et d’asile: bilan critique cinq ans après le traité 
d'Amsterdam (Bruylant 2005) 45.  
20  See 2005 Procedures Directive, Chapter II and Chapter V.  
21  See for analysis, H Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law (Brill/Nijhoff 2006) 301-304.  
22  C Costello, ‘The European asylum procedures directive in legal context’, UNCHR New Issues in Refugee Research Series, 
Research Paper No. 134, 2006, 34 <http://www.unhcr.org/4552f1cc2.html>, 8.  
23  See European Commission, ‘Report on the application of Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards 
on procedures in Member States’, COM(2010) 465, 15.  
24  An exceptional procedure is foreseen only for the introduction of temporary measures ‘in the event of one or more Member 
States being confronted by an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries’; see 
TFEU, Article 78(3).  
25  TFEU, Articles 78(1)-(2), 289(1) and 294.  
26  Trialogues are tripartite meetings between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission during which a 
common position is sought between the amendments of the Parliament and the position of the Council on the Commission 
proposal. While not formally foreseen by the Treaties, trialogues have become a commonly used tool of pre-negotiation in 
practice.  
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exceptions to the basic set of principles and guarantees; and provided for additional guarantees, such as 
free legal assistance at first instance procedures, and special guarantees for vulnerable asylum 
applicants.27 It also sought to strengthen access to an effective remedy, namely through providing for a 
suspensive effect for appeals, subject to limited exceptions.28 This proposal was met with resistance at 
the Council level. Such was the legal impasse, that the Commission had to release an amended recast 
proposal in 2011. The additional amendments aimed at responding to Member States’ concerns by 
rendering the proposal more ‘cost-effective’ and ‘flexible enough to accommodate the particularities of 
national legal systems’.29 In practice, this led to the watering down of some of the additional guarantees, 
by, for example, further conditioning access to free legal aid, or reintroducing exceptions to the basic 
guarantees, and restricting the automatic suspensive effect of appeals. The text was further reformed 
during two years of negotiations, and by the adoption of the recast instrument in 2013, the level of legal 
clarity had been considerably diluted, and a great part of the Commission’s efforts to effectively 
harmonise procedural arrangements had been abandoned.   
Overall, the result of the procedural reform could be analysed as follows: modest improvements in terms 
of the level of harmonisation, as well as in terms of adherence to fundamental rights. This somewhat 
disappointing outcome led an academic commentator to describe the amendments as ‘lipstick on a pig’.30 
Characteristic examples of additional safeguards were: the establishment of several protective 
guarantees for ‘applicants with special procedural guarantees’,31 including unaccompanied minors, or 
LGBTI applicants; and the explicit strengthening of the role of collective actors and UNHCR in 
information provision and assistance.32 Moreover, the quality of effective remedy that Member States 
needed to make available was improved, by establishing that judicial authorities should be able to 
examine both points of law and facts.33 Parallel to these developments, robust procedural provisions 
were introduced to other instruments of the EU asylum acquis. New provisions in EU’s responsibility 
allocation Regulation enable applicants to challenge their transfer to a different Member State.34 In 
addition, new provisions in EU’s reception conditions directive enable applicants to challenge their 
detention,35 or challenge decisions related with the granting, reduction, or withdrawal of reception 
conditions.36   
Nonetheless, exceptional procedural arrangements were either retained or introduced, such as the 
possibility for Member States to prolong the length of border procedures for an undefined period,37 or 
the multitude of situations in which Member States could apply exceptional asylum procedures.38 In 
addition, several of the newly-introduced additional procedural guarantees were heavily conditioned. 
                                                     
27  See 2009 APD proposal, Explanatory Memorandum.  
28  Ibid.  
29  2011 APD proposal, Explanatory Memorandum.  
30  See S Peers, ‘The second phase of the Common European Asylum System: A brave new world – or lipstick on a pig?’, 
(Statewatch, 08 April 2013) <http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-220-ceas-second-phase.pdf>. 
31  See 2013 Asylum Procedures Directive, Article 2(d) and Recital 29.  
32  See further analysis below in section ‘Access to justice for asylum seekers and refugees: what role for collective actors and 
UNHCR?’.  
33  2013 Asylum Procedures Directive, Article 46. See also analysis in M Reneman, EU Asylum Procedures and the Right to 
an Effective Remedy (Hart Publishing 2014).  
34  See Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible 
for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or 
a stateless person, OJ L 180/31 (hereafter: 2013 Dublin Regulation), Article 27.  
35  Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception 
of applicants for international protection (recast), OJ L180/96 (hereafter: 2013 Reception Conditions Directive), Article 9. 
36  2013 Reception Conditions Directive, Article 26.  
37  See Recast APD, Article 43(3).  
38  See Recast APD, Article 31(8). 
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For example, Member States retain the possibility to deny the suspensive effect of appeals in various 
vaguely defined cases, thus affecting the applicants’ right to remain during the examination of their 
appeal, and, subsequently, their access to reception conditions during appeal.39 They also have the 
possibility to apply several conditions to accessing free legal aid and representation at the appeals 
stage.40 Finally, Cathryn Costello and Emily Hancox have argued that the focus on vulnerability is in 
itself unhelpful, since it allows for the proliferation of deviations from the basic procedural guarantees 
aimed at the ‘abusers’, as long as further procedural guarantees are devised to release the ‘vulnerable’ 
from the rigours of those procedures, compounding the overall level of complexity.41  
The forthcoming, third wave: further harmonisation, higher quality?  
The third wave of asylum procedural harmonisation is still under negotiation. Nevertheless, some trends 
can be clearly discerned through the 2016 Commission proposal. First, the Commission is seeking to 
achieve a higher level of harmonisation, and greater uniformity in the outcome of asylum procedures, 
employing this time additional means. Secondly, the focus on combatting what are considered abusive 
applications is retained, and, in fact, strengthened by the underlying goal of externalising protection 
obligations to third countries instead of processing the merits of asylum applications, and subsequently 
providing protection, in the EU territory. These goals are intertwined, with greater harmonisation 
serving primarily the goal of externalising protection obligations and seeking to combat perceived abuse, 
rather than a focus on quality of decision-making. I substantiate these points below.  
To achieve the first goals, i.e. a higher level of harmonisation, and uniformity in decision-making, the 
Commission has altered the type of proposed instrument, from a directive to a regulation. This type of 
instrument, which is directly applicable, and normally provides for less discretion in its application, has 
the potential to serve this purpose. However, while streamlining the current disparate procedural 
arrangements is a stated goal, exceptional procedures are not suppressed; in fact, their use is proliferated 
and enhanced. The proposed regulation establishes the obligation for Member States to accelerate the 
examination on the merits in a variety of broadly defined cases,42 including: making ‘clearly inconsistent 
and contradictory, clearly false or obviously improbable representations’,43 or misleading the authorities 
by presenting false information.44 Apart from acceleration, an optional border procedure,45 and an 
obligatory specific procedure for subsequent applications, are retained.46 These procedures contain less 
safeguards, such as limited time available to prepare for the examination of the claim, or the additional 
practical difficulty of gaining access to information and expert representation at border and transit zones. 
An intricate set of exceptions is foreseen for unaccompanied minors, who are in principle exempted 
from their application, but could still be subject to those special procedures, when, for example, they 
come from a safe country of origin.47 The image that emerges is one of complex procedural arrangements 
that will, as the previous versions of this instrument, lead to divergent national practice.  
                                                     
39  See Recast APD, Articles 9(1) and 46 (6), read together with Article 3(1), 2013 Reception Conditions Directive and analysis 
in M Peek and E Tsourdi, ‘Asylum Reception Conditions Directive 2013/33/EU’ in K Hailbronner and D Thym (eds), EU 
Immigration and Asylum Law (Beck/Hart/Nomos 2016) Article 3, MN 42-43. 
40  See Recast APD, Article 21.  
41  C Costello and E Hancox, ‘The Recast Asylum Procedures Directive 2013/32/EU: Caught between the Stereotypes of the 
Abusive Asylum-Seeker and the Vulnerable Refugee’, in V Chetail, P De Bruycker and F Maiani (eds), Reforming the 
Common European Asylum System: the New European Refugee Law (Brill/Nijhoff 2016) 377.  
42  2016 APR proposal, Article 40.  
43  2016 APR proposal, Article 40(1)(b).  
44  2016 APR proposal, Article 40(1)(c).  
45  2016 APR proposal, Article 41. 
46  2016 APR proposal, Article 42. 
47  2016 APR proposal, Article 41(5) and Article 42(5). 
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This situation is compounded by the underlying aim to externalise protection obligations. The proposed 
regulation would see the introduction of an obligatory admissibility phase.48 This would entail an 
examination, prior to assessing the individual’s protection needs, of elements such as whether a third 
country can be considered a first country of asylum49 or a safe third country50 for the applicant.51 Should 
this be the case, then the application is to be rejected as inadmissible and the applicant should be 
transferred to the third country in question. However, since this finding hinges on the cooperation of the 
third country, this decision would be revoked when it does not admit, or readmit, the applicant to its 
territory.52 Apart from the collaboration of third states, the operationalisation of the externalisation 
imperative is to be supported by harmonising practices. Notably, the proposed regulation foresees, for 
example, the designation of safe third countries at Union level,53 and, an increasingly important role for 
the European Asylum Support Office (EASO)54 in providing common analysis of country of origin 
information.55 While these practices will enhance a uniform approach, their impact on the quality of 
decision-making is less than certain, and depends on whether the designation of third countries as safe, 
and the inadmissibility finding on an individual level, will be based on a rigorous assessment of 
information, coming from a multitude of sources, including civil society. These eventual developments 
certainly foreshadow a new set of procedural challenges that applicants will have to face, and the 
importance of expert legal assistance, representation, and defence. Bearing this in mind, the next sections 
critically assess the role foreseen in the asylum acquis for collective actors, and UNHCR, as well as 
reflecting on actual practice.  
Access to justice for asylum seekers and refugees: what role for collective actors and UNHCR?  
Enhancing collective actors’,56 and UNHCR, involvement in the CEAS has been part of the efforts to 
better safeguard asylum seeker and refugee rights, and to facilitate their access to justice. Some of these 
functions, such as information provision to applicants, and feeding into the establishment of country of 
origin information, relate to both UNHCR and collective actors. Nevertheless, additional, distinct roles 
are foreseen for UNHCR, due to the special position it holds in the international refugee regime.  
UNHCR was created as a subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly, initially as a temporary 
organisation with a 3-year mandate.57 The 1951 Refugee Convention established a supervisory role for 
UNHCR in the international refugee regime: 
[t]he Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the 
                                                     
48  2016 APR proposal, Article 36.  
49  2016 APR proposal, Article 36(a) and Article 44.  
50  2016 APR proposal, Article 36(b) and Article 45.  
51  The applicant still retains the possibility to challenge the safety of the third country in their particular circumstances; see, for 
example, Article 44(3) and Article 45(4).   
52  2016 APR proposal, Article 44(6) and Article 45(7).  
53  2016 APR proposal, Article 46.  
54  See for its current mandate: Regulation 439/2010 of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office, OJ L 
132/11 (hereafter: EASO Regulation).  
55  See for example: 2016 APR proposal, Recitals 30, 49, 50, 52, 54, and Article 33(2)(a),(c), (3). 
56  This study follows the understanding of ‘collective actors’ adopted in the framework of this collection to cover to cover civil 
society organisations, and independent organisations, such as equality bodies, intended to represent individuals.  
57  See General Assembly Resolution 428 (V) of 14 December 1950, Statute of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees.  
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exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the 
provisions of this Convention.58  
The drafters of its statute did not want it to be as operationally active, or to replace government services 
as its predecessor, the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) had done.59 Its initial budget was 
300,000 US dollars, and it could only seek voluntary contributions from governments with the approval 
of the General Assembly.60 A lot of water has run under the bridge since then. The High Commissioner 
expanded its activities incrementally, with the authorisation of the General Assembly, by offering its 
services to help address the challenges posed by new and different groups of refugees and displaced 
persons in the developing world.61 States also came to gradually see assistance to refugees as a central 
part of their policy towards newly independent states.62  
Later in the 1990s the refugee agency assumed lead responsibility for the humanitarian operation in the 
former Yugoslavia as that country collapsed into civil war, rising in prominence to take on the role as 
the world’s foremost humanitarian organisation.63 Hence, instead of the initial reluctance on the part of 
States to recognise an operational role for the agency, it now employs 9,700 people in 126 countries.64 
Its budget is made up almost entirely of voluntary contributions, with 86 per cent coming from 
governments and the European Union; six per cent from other inter-governmental organisations and 
pooled funding mechanisms, and a further six per cent from the private sector, including foundations, 
corporations and the public.65 Funding for UNHCR is voluntary, a fact that ‘encourages a certain 
pragmatism in relations with states’.66 Combined with its increased operational role, these realities call 
for a delicate balance to be struck between the supervisory function bestowed upon it by the 1951 
Refugee Convention, and its capacity to effectively assist, and provide services to, refugees.  
Collective actors in asylum essentially are non-governmental, not for profit organisations, operating at 
national, or European, levels. The asylum instruments do not call for the establishment of specialised 
bodies at national level, independent from the national administration and judiciary, specifically tasked 
with supervising, and enforcing the application of the asylum acquis. Neither do they explicitly call on 
Member States to facilitate the defence of asylum seekers and refugees’ rights through relevant 
collective actors.67 The 2016 APR does not introduce such obligations either. This of course does not 
                                                     
58  1951 Refugee Convention, Article 35.  
59  See C Lewis, UNHCR and International Refugee Law: From Treaties to Innovation (Routledge 2012) 13-14 referring in fn 
65 of her work to the UK representative, Mr. Corley who mentioned that the High Commissioner ‘would not constitute an 
operational agency; furthermore, he would concern himself with refugee problems of a broader and more universal nature 
than those faced by the IRO’, UN GAOR, 4th Sess., 265th plen. mtg. at para. 14 (4 November 1949).  
60  D Callagher, ‘The Evolution of the International Refugee System’ (1989) 23 The International Migration Review 579, 581.  
61  See A Betts, G Loescher, and J Milner, UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection (Routledge, 2nd edn 2012) 
24-27.  
62  Ibid., 27-33.  
63  See A Hammerstad, The Rise and Decline of a Global Security Actor: UNHCR, Refugee Protection and Security (Oxford 
University Press 2014) 193 and analysis 193-211. 
64  See UNHCR, Figures at a Glance <http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html>; see also M Kagan, ‘“We live in a 
country of UNHCR”: The UN surrogate state and refugee policy in the Middle East’, UNCHR New Issues in Refugee 
Research Series, Research Paper No. 201, 2011 <http://www.unhcr.org/4d5a8cde9.pdf>. 
65  UNHCR, ‘Figures at a Glance’, op. cit.  
66  See M Barutciski, ‘The limits to the UNHCR's supervisory role’ in J C Simeon (ed), The UNHCR and the Supervision of 
International Refugee Law (Oxford University Press 2013) 59, 69. 
67  Cf., for example, Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement 
of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative co operation through the Internal Market Information System, OJ L 
159/11, Article 11(3), or Directive 2014/54/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on measures 
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prohibit relevant collective actors from taking up such action, where national procedural legislation 
allows them to do so. In addition, since asylum legislation is part of national administrative law, some 
functions of monitoring and follow-up of individual complaints can be taken up by national 
Ombudsmen.68   
The next sections outline the functions foreseen for collective actors and UNHCR in the procedural 
acquis in greater detail, before critically assessing insights into the role that both collective actors, and 
UNHCR, are playing in strategic litigation efforts before the CJEU.   
The role of collective actors and UNHCR according to the procedural acquis 
Having access to objective, and accurate, legal information, is crucial for asylum seekers and refugees 
to be able to enforce their rights. A series of provisions in the recast APD, and the 2013 Reception 
Conditions Directive, establish an obligation for Member States to provide information to applicants, 
‘[t]aking into account their particular circumstances’, to ‘[e]nable [them] to better understand the 
procedure […]’.69 It is indicated that Member States ‘[s]hould have the possibility to use the most 
appropriate means to provide such information, such as through non-governmental organisations […]’.70 
Accordingly, both collective actors and UNHCR should be able to have access to asylum seekers.71 
These provisions resonate with the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the 
case of MSS v Belgium & Greece, which held that asylum seekers on the whole are ‘a particularly 
underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection’.72 Although the 
‘vulnerable-group’ approach entails risks,73 it has the advantage of explicitly recognising the specific 
situation in which asylum seekers find themselves. Due to their traumatic experience of flight, the fact 
that they are unfamiliar with the language and legislative frameworks of the country of asylum, and their 
lack of economic means - where the latter is applicable - they need additional safeguards to be able to 
                                                     
facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of movement for workers ,and relevant 
contributions in this collective publication for analysis, OJ L 128/8, Article 3(2).   
68  See, for example, the recent report of the Greek Ombudsman on operationalising the hotspot approach to migration 
management in Greece, including, analysis on: access to the asylum procedure; legality of detention; and transparency of 
the procedural aspects of returns to Turkey: Συνήγορος του Πολίτη, Η πρόκληση των μεταναστευτικών ροών και της 
Προστασίας των Προσφύγων, 2017 
<https://www.synigoros.gr/resources/docs/greek_ombudsman_migrants_refugees_2017-el.pdf>. 
69  See Recast APD, Recital 22. See also 2013 Reception Conditions Directive, Article 5(1) stating that that in the framework 
of reception: ‘[M]ember States shall ensure that applicants are provided with information on organisations or groups of 
persons that provide specific legal assistance and organisations that might be able to help or inform them concerning the 
available reception conditions, including health care’.  
70  See Recast APD, Recital 22. This is reinforced in Recast APD, Article 21(1).  
71  See Recast APD, Article 12(1)(c) providing that applicants ‘[s]hall not be denied the opportunity to communicate with 
UNHCR or with any other organisation providing legal advice or other counselling’; Recast APD, Recital 25 establishing 
that Member States ‘[s]hould normally provide an applicant at least with: […] the opportunity to communicate with a 
representative of the UNHCR and with organisations providing advice or counselling to applicants for international 
protection […]’; and recast APD, Article 29(1)(a) making it obligatory for Member States to allow UNHCR to: ‘have 
access to applicants, including those in detention, at the border and in the transit zones’. Finally, Recital 21 of the 2013 
Reception Conditions Directive indicates that: ‘[i]n order to ensure compliance with the procedural guarantees consisting 
in the opportunity to contact organisations or groups of persons that provide legal assistance, information should be 
provided on such organisations and groups of persons’.  
72  MSS v Belgium and Greece, Appl no 30696/09 (ECtHR 21 January 2011), para. 251. 
73  For a critical assessment of the vulnerable-group concept in the ECtHR’s legal reasoning see L Peroni, A Timmer, 
‘Vulnerable groups: The promise of an emerging concept in European Human Rights Convention law’ (2013) 11 (4) ICON 
1056. Peroni and Timmer identify that the Court’s reasoning risks reinforcing the vulnerability of certain groups by 
essentialising, stigmatising, victimising, and paternalising them.  
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have effective access to justice. These needs are enhanced for detained asylum seekers,74 those present 
at border or transit zones,75 and those assigned in reception centres.76 Hence, the asylum instruments 
contain additional specifications to ensure access for collective actors and UNHCR in these locations. 
The asylum acquis also contemplates the possibility for collective actors to provide free legal assistance 
to, and representation of, individual applicants in appeals procedures.77 Establishing free legal assistance 
and representation schemes during first instance procedures remains a possibility, but not an obligation 
for Member States. Nevertheless, applicants have a right to legal assistance and representation at all 
stages of the procedure at their own cost,78 and Member States have a possibility - but not an obligation 
- to allow non-governmental organisations to provide these services.79 Finally, collective actors could 
be appointed as representatives of unaccompanied minors, provided that they perform their duties in 
accordance with the principle of the best interests of the child, and that they have the necessary 
expertise.80   
Another important function foreseen for both UNHCR, and collective actors, is their participation in the 
establishment of country of origin information (COI). COI are intrinsically linked with the credibility 
assessment of the merits of individual claims,81 as well as with the establishment of the finding that a 
third country is safe, a function that gains increasing importance with the externalisation impetus.82 
Therefore, among the procedural standards established is the use of:  
precise and up-to-date information is obtained from various sources, such as EASO and UNHCR and 
relevant international human rights organisations, as to the general situation prevailing in the countries 
of origin of applicants and, where necessary, in countries through which they have transited […].83 
A final set of functions relate specifically to UNHCR, and somewhat reflect its supervisory role under 
the 1951 Refugee Convention. First, Member States are obliged to allow UNHCR to: ‘have access to 
information on individual applications for international protection, on the course of the procedure and 
on the decisions taken, provided that the applicant agrees thereto’.84 This function allows UNHCR to 
perform its so-called quality initiatives at national and EU levels. The agency has conducted, for 
example, sampling of national cases in the European context at first instance and at appeal. This exercise 
                                                     
74  See 2013 Reception Conditions Directive, Article 10(4) stipulating that Member States should ensure that ‘[f]amily 
members, legal advisers or counsellors and persons representing relevant non-governmental organisations recognised by 
the Member State concerned have the possibility to communicate with and visit applicants in conditions that respect 
privacy’. See also recast APD, Article 29(1)(a). 
75  See Recast APD, Article 8(2) providing that: ‘Member States shall ensure that organisations and persons providing advice 
and counselling to applicants have effective access to applicants present at border crossing points, including transit zones, 
at external borders’. See also recast APD, Article 29(1)(a).  
76  See relevant guarantees in 2013 Reception Conditions Directive, Article 18(2)(b)-(c).  
77  See Recast APD, Article 20, Article 21(1). 
78  See Recast APD, Article 22(1).  
79  See Recast APD, Article 22(2).  
80  See Recast APD, Article 25(1)(a) and Article 2(n). See also 2013 Reception Conditions Directive, Articles 2(n), 24 and 
25(3), as well as 2013 Dublin Regulation, Articles 2(k) and 6(4).  
81  See Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status 
for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, OJ L 337/9 
(hereafter: 2011 Recast Qualification Directive) , Article 4(3), which makes the use of COI mandatory in asylum decision-
making.   
82  See analysis above in section: ‘Proceduralisation in the EU Asylum Policy: Three Legislative Waves’.   
83  See Recast APD, Article 10(3)(b). Further relevant obligations are established, or elaborated in, Recast APD, Recitals 39 
and 48, as well as Articles 37(3) and 45(2).  
84  See Recast APD, Article 29(1)(b).  
Enforcing refugee rights under EU procedural law:the role of collective actors and UNHCR 
European University Institute 109 
has allowed it to identify and highlight weaknesses in national decision-making systems, as well as 
develop on that basis practical tools to assist national practitioners.85 
A second function specifically concerning the UN agency is the obligation for Member States to allow 
it to: ‘present its views, in the exercise of its supervisory responsibilities under Article 35 of the Geneva 
Convention, to any competent authorities regarding individual applications for international protection 
at any stage of the procedure’.86 This function would allow the agency to intervene - if it so chooses - in 
an individual case in a formal manner. This provision has far-reaching effects as national procedural 
arrangements need to be altered, if necessary, to allow for UNHCR to intervene, at both the 
administrative, and the judicial, stages of the assessment of the claim. The obligation is absolute, and it 
is not tempered by the mention of any ‘criteria laid down in national law’. Interestingly, collective actors 
could indirectly benefit from both functions, since the recast APD foresees that these provisions apply 
also ‘to an organisation which is working in the territory of the Member State concerned on behalf of 
UNHCR pursuant to an agreement with that Member State’.87 
Strategic litigation before the CJEU: shedding light on hidden forms of support     
Harmonisation in the policy area of asylum carries within it the potential for the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) to shape EU asylum, and by extension international refugee law, as well as to 
enforce refugees’ rights.88 Strict procedural rules on direct access somewhat circumscribe the CJEU’s 
potential to become an ‘asylum Court’.89 Therefore, most commonly, the CJEU’s effects are indirect, 
namely through the interpretation of the asylum acquis in the framework of preliminary rulings.90 
Strategic litigation91 of EU asylum law is centred around litigation before national courts, that could end 
up before the CJEU if a question is referred to it. Nevertheless, strategic litigation is in practice much 
broader than the actual litigation of cases. It consists of a continuum of activities, including pre-litigation 
assessment: weighing up the particular facts/circumstances and considering different strategies to bring 
about policy change; as well as post-litigation actions to ensure proper implementation of the decision 
in practice, or improving the strategy in case of a negative outcome.92 Regarding the former aspect, 
practitioners caution that identifying cases as strategic and non-strategic is not a precise science.93 
                                                     
85  For an example at national level see information and material of the UK ‘Quality Integration Project’: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/quality-initiative-and-integration.html>. For the outcomes of a similar initiative at EU-wide level 
see: UNHCR, Building In Quality-A Manual on Building a High Quality Asylum System: Further Developing Asylum 
Quality (FDQ) in the European Union (UNHCR 2011).  
86  See Recast APD, Article 29(1)(c).  
87  See Recast APD, Article 29(2).  
88  For a scholarly appraisal of the Court’s role see: S Botruche-Zarevac, ‘The Court of Justice of the EU and the Common 
European Asylum System: Entering the Third Phase of Harmonisation?’ (2009-2010) 12 CambridgeYearbook of European 
Legal Studies 53 and R Bank, The Potential and Limitations of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Shaping 
International Refugee Law (2015) 27 IJRL 213.  
89  See TFEU, Article 263.  
90  See TFEU, Article 267.  
91  There is no universally agreed definition of what constitutes ‘strategic litigation’. The term refers to the impact of the 
outcome of a case. Coomber has advanced that: ‘‘[s]trategic ‘litigation (or ‘impact’ or ‘test’ litigation) is a form of public 
interest litigation where a case is pursued on behalf of an applicant or group of applicants, with a view to achieving a law 
reform goal beyond the individual case’. See A Coomber, ‘Strategically Litigating Equality: Reflections on a Changing 
Jurisprudence’ (2012) 15 European Anti-Discrimination Law Review 11, 11. 
92  A M Bucataru, ‘Is strategic litigation a way of ensuring that the rights of unaccompanied minors are fully considered in law, 
policy and practice?’ (European Database on Asylum Law Blog, 15 February 2017) 
http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/journal/strategic-litigation-way-ensuring-rights-unaccompanied-minors-are-fully-
considered-law.  
93  Weiss argues that strategic cases ‘seem explainable and predictable only in retrospect’, see A Weiss, ‘What is Startegic 
Litigation’ (European Roma Rights Centre Blog, 1 June 2015) <http://www.errc.org/blog/what-is-strategic-litigation/62>, 
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Among the factors to consider are: the particular facts of the case, the timing, constraints on the lawyers 
involved, constraints on the organisation (funding issues, other role played by the organisation at 
national or European level) etc.   
Despite the absence of a ‘defence clause’ in procedural legislation on asylum, collective actors are 
involved in strategic litigation on behalf of asylum applicants. The only such case in the area of asylum 
to have reached the CJEU is the case of Cimade and Gisti.94 It concerned the French practice to deprive 
asylum seekers, subject to transfer to another Member State under EU’s responsibility allocation rules, 
from reception conditions. The judgment resulted from a reference for a preliminary ruling from the 
French Conseil d’État. The Court held that there is ‘[…] only one category of asylum seekers’95 and that 
‘[…] an application for asylum is made before the process of determining the Member State responsible 
begins’.96 Following this pronouncement, the legislator amended the Reception Conditions Directive to 
clarify its scope, and to fully align it with the CJEU case law.97 This case represents the tip of the iceberg, 
since further direct litigation on behalf of applicants that could have broader policy impact is taking 
place at national level.98 
Apart from litigating on behalf of applicants, both collective actors and UNHCR, intervene in support 
of their position, meaning through formal third party interventions before national courts (amicus 
curiae).99 Where UNHCR, or collective actors, have intervened formally as third parties at the national 
level, then they can be granted permission to intervene before the CJEU. A characteristic example was 
the N.S. and M.E. case,100 concerning returns to Greece in application of EU’s responsibility allocation 
Regulation. The CJEU’s judgment signalled the end of ‘blind’ mutual trust between Member States in 
asylum, and had a far-reaching effect, with Member States suspending transfers to Greece. UNHCR, 
and several collective actors, namely: Amnesty International, the AIRE Centre (Advice on Individual 
Rights in Europe), the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) were given leave to intervene. 
Finally, even when it does not formally intervene in a case, UNHCR could choose to issue public 
statements on the interpretation of EU asylum law on the issues under examination before the CJEU. It 
has done so, for example, in cases relating to exclusion from refugee status,101 and the status of 
                                                     
while Walsh elaborates that ‘[w]hile it is possible to an extent to attempt to identify cases as strategic and non-strategic, 
the spectrum of variables involved is broad and by no means stationary – i.e. there is no set formula, just factors to consider 
and some are more predictable than others’, see J Walsh, ‘Strategic Litigation at a European Level’ (European Database 
on Asylum Law Blog, 14 February 2017) <http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/journal/strategic-litigation-european-
level>. 
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See for more information respectively: <http://www.lacimade.org>; <http://www.gisti.org/spip.php?page=sommaire>. 
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Palestinian asylum seekers.102 In its respective judgments, the CJEU aligned itself partly, but not fully, 
with the UNHCR positions as advanced in its public statements.103  
Still, the bulk of collective actors’ involvement in what concerns cases that finally reach the CJEU is 
through more ‘hidden’ forms of support, such as: drafting arguments, providing legal advice and 
research support to the lawyers who represent asylum seekers and refugees, as well as enabling 
networking between relevant actors. A specialist non-profit organisation that engages in an array of 
actions around strategic litigation: litigating cases directly (before the ECtHR), intervening as third party 
before proceedings, and supporting lawyers who litigate cases before national and European courts, is 
the AIRE Centre.104 Another organisation with intense activity on strategic litigation in asylum is the 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles’ (ECRE), the largest European umbrella network of refugee-
assisting civil society organisations. Apart from third party interventions, ECRE links relevant national 
practitioners through training and networking activities of the ELENA Network,105 assists practitioners 
through providing informal support on building legal argumentation, and seeks to identify cases at 
national level that could serve as the basis for a preliminary reference to the CJEU.106  
UNHCR, apart from its formal interventions, engages in the above more ‘hidden’ support activities, for 
example, through training for practitioners, or networking, such as the ‘Annual Roundtable on Strategic 
Litigation’, which it has organised for the past four years in the framework of its annual consultations 
with civil society. There are some factors pertaining specifically to UNHCR before deciding upon a 
formal or more informal type of intervention. Formal types of intervention bear the risk of it 
undermining its own supervisory authority when the CJEU rejects its arguments, the resulting decision 
then being binding within the EU.107 Furthermore, given the UN agency’s increased operational role, a 
decision to formally intervene needs to be weighed against the necessity to collaborate with Member 
States holistically, including for the continuing provision of services to asylum seekers and refugees.   
Conclusions  
Proceduralisation in asylum has materialised in three legislative waves. The first resulted in the creation 
of a basic set of procedural guarantees, alongside a plethora of exceptional procedures. The second 
resulted in modest improvements in terms of harmonisation, and adherence to fundamental rights, but 
saw exceptional procedural arrangements either retained or introduced. The third, forthcoming wave, 
aims at further harmonisation that would, however, be heavily focused on the underlying goal of 
externalising protection to third countries. On the ground, the quality of asylum decision-making varies 
greatly, among others, in terms of divergences in recognition rates, access to free legal assistance, and 
duration of the examination of individual claims.  
Procedural harmonisation sought to enhance the role of collective actors and UNHCR to better safeguard 
asylum seekers’ and refugees’ access to justice. While a ‘defence clause’ is absent, the legislation 
envisages information-provision to applicants, legal aid, and feeding into the establishment of country 
of origin information as their primary involvement. Additional functions are reserved for UNHCR, such 
as the obligation for Member States to allow it to formally intervene - if it so chooses - in individual 
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cases. These functions however, fall short of establishing a genuine supervisory role for the UN agency. 
In practice, collective actors engage in strategic litigation on behalf of refugees, and both they, and 
UNHCR, have formally intervened in cases that have reached the CJEU. They also engage in ‘hidden’ 
forms of support: legal advice to lawyers, liaison, and training.  
With a new procedural landscape emerging, including joint processing conducted by national authorities 
together with EU agency-coordinated missions,108 and the externalisation impetus, the need to access 
accurate legal information; representation; and defence, becomes more pressing than ever for the 
effective enforcement of refugee rights in the EU. 
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Anti-discrimination law as a laboratory for EU governance of fundamental rights  
at the domestic level: collective actors as bridging devices 
 
Elise Muir* 
 
The oldest set of procedural rules for the enforcement of EU fundamental rights can be found in EU 
equality legislation. It may be recalled that the anti-discrimination Directives from 2000 that introduced 
most of these rules (e.g.. on the creation of equality bodies or access to court for private collective actors) 
could be interpreted as ‘the counterweight of closing borders to immigration from third countries’ as 
well as a response to the rise to power in Austria of a philo-nazi and anti-semitic party.1 The Directives 
were intended to provide genuine protection against xenophobia and extremism, and were deemed to be 
‘the best car in town’ as Oliveira puts it; they provided more detailed and effective protection than earlier 
equality law instruments.2 
The governance of EU equality law thus benefits from the dynamics and strengths of an advanced form 
of supranational integration while promoting a selected fundamental right domestically. Almost two 
decades after the adoption of the first legislative instruments and policy initiatives designed to engage 
in this sectoral form of fundamental right policy, EU equality law can be examined as a laboratory for 
the governance of fundamental rights in an integrated legal order. What is the role of EU law in 
promoting a fundamental right at domestic level? How does the system operate in practice? It would be 
beyond the scope of this contribution to deal exhaustively with these ambitious questions,3 but it is 
possible to sketch out some preliminary directions for further research.  
Despite criticisms of the fact that EU anti-discrimination law as designed in the post-Amsterdam era 
remains overly centered on individual litigation,4 collective actors, defined in a broad sense and 
understood to cover both private (e.g. civil society organizations) and public actors (independent 
organizations such as equality bodies), have been given an important role. These collective actors 
created, structured or supported by EU law are intended to act as bridges between the EU and domestic 
legal orders as well as between a conventional, vertical approach to human rights focused on 
enforcement and a more reflexive process concerned with mutual learning. They thus constitute a useful 
starting point for enquiry. 
In this collection of papers, the effects of procedural provisions inserted in EU anti-discrimination 
legislation to facilitate access to court for collectives actors acting in support or on behalf of victims 
were explored. An investigation was carried out to examine the interplay between: (i) ‘collective actors’ 
as just defined, (ii) the actual litigation of EU equality law before domestic courts as it unfolds before 
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the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Court’) by way of preliminary references, and (iii) rules 
on access to domestic courts as influenced by EU legislation. This last set of rules may indeed shape 
legal opportunity structures for preliminary references. It was therefore used as a test-case to look at the 
interplay between domestic and EU spheres in matters of enforcement of the fundamental right to equal 
treatment.5 In essence, we sought to answer two – distinct yet related – central research questions: do 
EU law provisions on collective actors’ access to court indeed facilitate access to courts in practice? 
And, second, do collective actors make specific use of EU law arguments and the preliminary ruling 
procedure? 
The study proceeded owing to a rigorous, qualitative and contextual analysis of the procedural history 
of cases (i) having reached the Court by way of preliminary ruling, (ii) in matters covered by EU anti-
discrimination legislation, and (iii) involving a collective actor (either bringing the case on its own 
initiative or supporting the claimant as encouraged by the relevant procedural provisions identified 
above). It emerges from an overview of the Court’s case law based on these three criteria6 that a number 
of countries stand out either because of the great number of referrals (such as Belgium, Denmark and 
Bulgaria) or because of the low number of referrals (France and Germany). Experts in the legal regime 
applicable in these countries, as well as in the Italian regime which illustrates the ‘hidden’ role that 
collective actors may play in creating the circumstances for litigation without being formally involved, 
were thus invited to reflect on the research questions identified above. The intention was to seek to 
identify patterns in the domestication – or lack thereof – of EU procedural law on collective actors for 
the enforcement of the fundamental right to equal treatment. This could then serve to map out a broader 
research agenda on what may be the strengths and weaknesses of the new forms of governance created 
at the European level to promote and enhance the effectiveness of the principle of equal treatment in the 
domestic sphere.  
Before outlining some of the findings, one ought to make a series of disclaimers. This research exercise 
is not methodologically perfect or exhaustive. Instead, it is modestly exploratory. The importance of 
many factors other than the standing of collective actors - such as the scope of key legal concepts, fees 
or burden of proof - in accessing courts as well as that of avenues other than litigation to combat 
discrimination is fully acknowledged.7 Furthermore, a significant dimension of the role of collective 
actors in litigation is actually invisible8 in the context of a study primarily focused on reliance on the 
preliminary ruling procedure: for instance, when collective actors only intervene through funding this 
will not be visible in the Court proceedings. Also, collective actors may be involved in domestic 
proceedings not leading to a reference to the Court.9 Finally, it shall be stressed that for the purpose of 
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this exercise there is no attempt at assessing whether a preliminary ruling by the Court has had a positive 
or a negative outcome. Instead, the very use of the preliminary ruling procedure is deemed to be of 
interest as it shows reliance on the multi-layered institutional set up provided by EU law. 
Although the starting point for the study was narrow in contrast with the broad range of governance 
tools existing in the governance of EU equality law, the chosen angle has allowed for particularly 
interesting qualitative case studies. The contributions took the predefined angle as a starting point but 
then engaged in a deep reflection on the dynamics underlying processes of change at the domestic level 
as well as resistances to such change. What clearly comes out of this study, despite its initial grounding 
in a conventional approach to fundamental rights through its focus on litigation, is the importance of EU 
anti-discrimination law in shaping infrastructure that stimulates societal debate on equality in domestic 
spheres. Collective actors and equality bodies in particular, as empowered by EU law and adjusted to 
the specificities of each national context, act as vectors conveying new legal concepts domestically and 
in turn seeking to influence the definition of such concepts at the European level.  
The practices developed in the six countries under examination have characteristics which we will 
briefly develop below. To start with, the domestic approach to the enforcement of the fundamental right 
to equal treatment as it results from EU anti-discrimination law is profoundly dependent on the reception 
of the relevant legal concepts at domestic level (1). As a consequence, enforcement mechanisms 
provided by EU law will hardly be used in a legal culture which is hostile to the core dynamics of the 
new field of law. This is a particularly important lesson for EU intervention on matters of fundamental 
rights protection as domestic resistances to ‘imported’ rights may actually be very strong as the study 
confirms. For that very reason, collective actors shaped by EU law – if and when they are able to 
emancipate themselves from the internal dynamics of a given country – constitute crucial infrastructures 
for change at the domestic level (2). The study illustrates the wide range of strategies that such collective 
actors develop to counter internal resistances to change. 
The effectiveness of the transformative project initiated by EU anti-discrimination law is enhanced by 
the several complementing governance tools supported through EU intervention (3). Several elements 
of the case studies indeed confirm the added value of the hybrid approach developing at EU level10 if 
well targeted. Building on this holistic approach, EU anti-discrimination law and the relevant 
governance framework has spillover effects beyond the actual scope of the anti-discrimination 
Directives (4). Such effects are mediated through policy as well as legal avenues that are worth keeping 
in mind for further research in the field. Furthermore, several examples under analysis illustrate that 
legal mobilization at the domestic level have resulted in attempts to steer EU law developments (5). 
Several case studies indeed reveal a particularly strategic use of the preliminary ruling procedure. 
The construction of a framework for the governance of equality law at EU level has therefore resulted 
in the creation and consolidation of infrastructure at domestic level through a broad range of regulatory 
mechanisms. Although these mechanisms are adapted to the specificities of anti-discrimination, such a 
holistic approach is not unique to EU equality law. There is ample literature on new governance of EU 
policies.11 Increasing attention is also being devoted to bourgeoning initiatives and rules enshrined in 
EU legislation that are intended to support the enforcement of specific EU policies at domestic level.12 
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Within this diversity though, the ‘transformative’ mandate of selected areas of EU law shapes the modes 
of governance chosen at European level. Policies intended to have a direct impact on interpersonal 
relationships and intended to modify societal habits indeed warrant a particularly wide range of tools. 
While this is certainly the case of EU equality law and policy, these features are not exclusively for that 
policy area. EU data protection law, for instance, is also in many ways intended to regulate horizontal 
relationships. In this context, it shall not come as a surprise that much attention is paid to engaging 
NGOs or other legal entities with a qualified interest in triggering change in these fields where interests 
to be protected are fairly abstract or the victims disenfranchised and dispersed.13 The latest regulation 
on data protection actually features a whole chapter on ‘Remedies, liabilities and penalties’14 with 
important innovations for collective actors, as critically examined by Lynskey in this collection of 
papers. 
Lessons can thus be learnt from the last 10-15 years of transposing and using (or not using) the 
procedural rules inserted into domestic legal orders by EU equality legislation as well as from examining 
more recent legislative developments and practices in other fields. This is particularly important as rules 
on access to court are developing quickly. Distinct yet comparable procedural provisions that emphasise 
the role of collective actors in supporting alleged victims in litigation have been inserted in other 
branches of EU law closely intertwined with fundamental rights protection. For example, a Directive on 
the enforcement of posted workers’ rights contains an article entitled ‘Defence of rights, facilitation of 
complaints, back-payments’.15 Another on the enforcement of the right of mobile EU workers and their 
families also includes a provision on ‘Defense of rights’.16 One developing area of EU law that is 
particularly sensitive is EU asylum law. Here victims of breaches of the law are often particularly 
vulnerable or isolated and the role of collective actors is important, as illustrated by Tsourdi. Let us then 
examine the various lessons emerging from the national case studies on EU equality law before 
reflecting on their relevance for other fields of law such as data protection and migration (6). 
Interdependency between the reception of EU legal concepts and their enforcement at domestic level 
Oliveira suggests making a rough distinction between three groups of countries in which the measures 
requested for the implementation of the provisions of the anti-discrimination Directives on access to 
court for private collective actors has had a varying impact on existing legislation.17 In a first group of 
countries, the Directives are deemed to have had a ‘considerable impact’ on national law because the 
rules on the standing of associations other than trade unions (who often already had legal standing in 
the employment context), such as human rights associations, did not exist prior to the implementation 
of the Directives (such as Belgium, Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Poland, and 
Portugal). In a second group, the Directives are deemed to have had ‘some impact on national law’ but 
they did not introduce radical change since national law already provided some rights for associations 
and did not strengthen these rights considerably (for example France, Germany, Hungary, and Spain). 
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In a third but limited group, Oliveira argues that the Directives did not make much of a difference since 
the legislation on the matter was well developed before implementation of the Directives (in the 
Netherlands and the UK). 
On the basis of this classification, Oliveira observes that the impact of the procedural provisions of the 
Directives on access to justice for private collective actors has in general been stronger in southern 
Member States and in new Member States as from 2004.18 He points out that the influence of EU law 
has often been greater in countries that did not provide for the right for private collective actors to be 
involved in litigation before implementation of the Directives and which introduced new provisions that 
actually go beyond the requirements of the Directive. This is largely corroborated by Farkas.19 She 
stresses that many Member States from Central and Eastern Europe implemented the anti-discrimination 
Directives beyond EU law requirements, for instance looking at the powers of equality bodies and the 
rules on standing of collective actors. This was subsequently followed by intense legal mobilization as 
her case study on Bulgaria illustrates. In her view, this ‘enthusiasm’ was driven by the joint exercise of 
having to incorporate the EU acquis during accession and adjusting to the Council of Europe framework 
and international human rights standards. 
Besides this overview of measures implementing selected aspects of the procedural provisions of the 
anti-discrimination Directives, the study coordinated with Kilpatrick and de Witte engaged in an 
evaluation of the actual use by domestic actors of the procedures thereby made available to them. Most 
interesting are the findings in the case studies on France and Germany. These countries have been 
classified by Oliveira as being countries where EU procedural rules have had ‘some impact on national 
law’ in terms of the measures adopted to implement the EU requirements; the actual use of the relevant 
provisions at domestic level has been very limited. The French, the German as well as – although to a 
lesser extent – the Danish country studies, illustrate that the substance of fundamental rights protection 
as defined at the EU level may trigger strong and supported resistance at the domestic level resulting in 
obstacles to the effectiveness of the policy in the Member State. 
According to Latraverse, the European anti-discrimination legal framework is perceived by French 
political and legal actors ‘as the superfluous importation in the French legal system of an Anglo-Saxon 
political and legal approach which conflicts with the inner logic of French civil law, the theory of 
Equality and paramount legal principles such as the universal application of the rule and the refusal to 
recognize minorities, that anchor the French conception of public good.’20 Similar observations emerge 
from the Danish case study. Atanasova and Miller point at the deeply rooted vision of EU law as a 
'regrettable foreign import[s], inconsistent with the country’s consensus-based policy making style and 
culture of equality’.21 They further report that, according to a widely spread perception, Denmark would 
not have passed new anti-discrimination legislation had it not come under pressure to meet its 
obligations under EU law. In Germany, the well-known reluctance to implement the anti-discrimination 
Directives from 2000 resulted from a combination of factors. German economic actors predicted ‘a flood 
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of litigation by rejected job applicants and/or abuse of the possibilities to litigate’.22 An important body 
of academic writing expressed fears that anti-discrimination legislation would unduly restrict the 
(constitutional) principle of private autonomy and contractual freedom.23 Furthermore, there was a 
concern that such legislation would lead to high damages awards as in the Anglo-Saxon nations.24 
The depth of these resistances ought not be underestimated. In the French context, although the 
implementation of the EU Directives has not actually been minimalist, a variety of actors are reported 
by the Director of the Secretariat General of the French Equality Body, Latraverse, to hinder the 
effectiveness of anti-discrimination law on principled grounds. According to her, ‘[e]ver since 2000, 
the European pressure on legal action as the mean[s] chosen to impose a specific approach to the 
analysis and agenda on the fight against discrimination is perceived by most political forces as a domain 
where France must fight European politics’.25 Many jurists, judges, political actors and trade unions 
consider discrimination law to be an instrument that allows one to use the courts to circumvent French 
democratic institutions.26 In practice, lawyers and judges avoid anti-discrimination law and prefer to 
frame their discussion outside of its scope. And even when these actors do make use of equality law, 
they actually limit their reasoning to an application of the traditional French legal theory of `Equality´.27 
Trade unions, important actors in the fight against discrimination in the work place, largely refuse to be 
involved in anti-discrimination litigation.28 The same unions have also lobbied to preserve their 
exclusive right to initiate class actions in relation to the work place. As a consequence, these anti-
discrimination law sceptics have almost fully prevented any other interested organisations from 
representing claimants in class actions relating to discrimination in employment.29 As for NGOs, they 
do not litigate much on the basis of anti-discrimination law. For instance, anti-racist NGOs are present 
mostly before criminal courts while NGOs that are active in defending the rights of migrants as well as 
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those of Roma are used to relying on the equal treatment principle enshrined in the ECHR rather than 
on the basis of anti-discrimination law.30 
Similarly, on the German side, measures implementing the EU Directives were framed so narrowly, as 
a result of the reluctances introduced above, that they triggered doubts as to whether this was a correct 
implementation of the EU anti-discrimination Directives.31 Such a restrictive legal framework, also 
affecting the rules on standing for collective actors, has limited the role that collective actors have played 
in using or directly influencing the interpretation of EU law via preliminary reference procedures 
according to Möschel.32 
In contrast, in Denmark, the investigation carried out by Atanasova and Miller allows for the assertion 
that the procedural requirements in Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78 transformed Danish anti-
discrimination law, leading to a greater number of cases and a greater involvement of the Danish 
Institute for Human Rights (DIHR). Reticence there has thus to some extent been overcome but there is 
little evidence that the role of collective actors in that respect has changed after the implementation of 
the anti-discrimination Directives.33 Trade Unions have long been and still remain the key players in 
litigation, in contrast with NGOs or the equality bodies. Such unions have actually developed an 
‘uncharacteristic’ enthusiasm about litigating and pushing for preliminary references involving 
Directive 2000/78.34 
Infrastructure for change: the central role of collective actors at the domestic level 
Precisely because EU anti-discrimination law may be perceived as a foreign tool at the domestic level, 
it is interesting to recall where relevant legal provisions have their roots. There is very little doubt that 
engaged jurists from civil society have had a significant impact on introducing change in fundamental 
rights governance at the EU as well as the domestic level in some Member States, pushing for very new 
mechanisms – therefore not strongly anchored in domestic systems – in both contexts. 
Oliveira recalls that the origins of the rules on standing for private collective actors are to be found in a 
proposal from 1993 by a network of NGOs and independent experts (the `Starting Line Group´) 
subsequently supported by the European Parliament.35 The proposal to establish equality bodies able to 
assist victims of discrimination could also be traced back to that document. This is thus part of the 
important role of civil society movements from the 1990s in lobbying in the run up to the Amsterdam 
Treaty and then adoption of key anti-discrimination Directives. At the domestic level, Farkas notes that, 
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although Central and Eastern European Member States were not involved in the adoption of the EU 
Directives, many were among the first to transpose them prior to accession, and domestic law actually 
went beyond EU law requirements.36 In that regard, members of NGOs engaged with the Council of 
Europe and EU integration processes played a central role. 
While these examples illustrate the role of civil society actors in ‘pushing from outside’37 to shape EU 
law and its implementation at domestic level, the study coordinated with Kilpatrick and de Witte shows 
that the creation of infrastructure at the domestic level under the umbrella of EU law is also 
unquestionably capable of promoting the emergence of a human rights culture from within - that is both 
within EU law and at the domestic level. The importation of new concepts, through sophisticated 
structures at domestic level, is indeed capable of generating a process of progressive change even where 
the domestic terrain is particularly hostile. EU equality bodies at the domestic level have played a 
particularly important role in that regard in certain Member States. 
Equality bodies created by virtue of EU law are playing a central role in enforcing the Racial Equality 
Directive. Such bodies are quite strongly present in relevant procedures before the Court.38 In the 
Bulgarian context, Farkas noted that the implementation of the Directive has been an essential 
precondition for legal mobilization as the problems of racial discrimination related to access to 
electricity at issue in Belov and CHEZ had existed since 1998, but did not become the subject of legal 
challenges until the Directive came into force.39 Even beyond the scope of the Racial Equality Directive, 
in certain equality cases reaching the Court litigation was made possible almost exclusively owing to 
mechanisms significantly shaped by EU law. In cases emerging from Belgium, such as Feryn, Rosselle 
or Achbita, the involvement of equality bodies was a pre-condition to litigation either because no clear 
victim had been identified or because actual victims would have not had sufficient financial means to 
carry out the proceedings.40 
Besides these remarkable though limited examples of public interest litigation, equality bodies also 
perform crucial background work and act as catalysts for legal change within domestic legal systems. 
Latraverse stresses that the French equality body has targeted its strategy specifically towards 
developing a new legal culture.41 To that effect, the equality body educates judges via amicus curiae and 
supports the importation of new concepts specific to anti-discrimination law, such as the partial shift of 
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the burden of proof (as well as the necessary evidence and concept of ‘the right to have access to 
evidence’42) and the concept of indirect discrimination. 
Complementary tools of EU Fundamental Rights governance? ‘Hybridization’43 in action 
As this French example illustrates, a fundamental rights policy ought to be based on a multiplicity of 
factors. To start with, the case studies provided multiple examples of the complementarities between 
several categories of collective actors encouraged by EU law to engage in litigation. Together with 
Kolf44, we reported that Belgian NGOs do not litigate much in the field of anti-discrimination although 
their standing to do so has been enlarged through the implementation of the relevant EU Directives. 
However, these NGOs actually refer cases to the more resourced equality bodies who themselves engage 
in litigation. Similarly, Latraverse explains that the Hay case, which led to a preliminary ruling, was 
initially brought by a claimant who was himself a union representative and president of an NGO 
supporting gay rights, and that the HALDE had presented observations in the course of judicial 
proceedings at domestic level.45 And again, the Bulgarian preliminary ruling request in CHEZ is reported 
to have started with an individual complainant but formed part of a test case strategy anchored in 
collective actions and involving equality body and civil courts.46 
The co-existence of public (that is, equality bodies) and private (NGOs in this context) collective actors 
therefore allows for diversity in the type of entities and powers available to counter discriminatory 
practices.47 In that sense, EU intervention may support different types of collective actors so as to have 
an impact on the diversity of factors at play in the construction of litigation. Conversely, certain litigation 
factors, such as the existence of high profile jurists supporting specific forms of litigation, are largely 
outside the realm of regulatory intervention. Möschel for instance notes that German anti-discrimination 
NGOs tend to refer cases to specialized lawyers such as Klaus Bertelsmann who himself litigates and is 
behind a number of preliminary references from German courts on anti-discrimination matters.48 
The second important feature of infrastructure created under EU law to introduce change at the domestic 
level is the complex interplay between various forms of governance adjusted to each national context. 
The tool box for the governance of anti-discrimination thus reaches far beyond the limited realm of 
litigation. The diversity and complementariness of governance mechanisms used to engineer legal and 
policy change is well illustrated by the French country study. As well as supporting individual litigation, 
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the equality body influences the academic curriculum of universities and deploys training programmes 
for key stakeholders.49 Atanasova and Miller also report that Danish employees’ representatives have 
been very active in raising awareness about the new workers’ rights and how to exercise them in the 
aftermath of the implementation of Directive 2000/78.50 
Although the interplay between this broad range of mechanisms largely takes place at domestic level, 
EU law is capable of influencing - if not shaping - some of the features of this governance framework. 
The study coordinated with Kilpatrick and de Witte provides examples of how the EU governance tool 
box operates in practice. Bulgarian and Italian case studies illustrate the importance of EU funding to 
support the anchoring of a given legal culture.51 Virginia Passalacqua in particular stresses that the four 
Italian associations that intervened in the Kamberaj proceedings that led to a preliminary ruling had 
been partners in an EU-funded project promoting non-discrimination. The project involved providing 
legal advice to victims of discrimination as well as raising awareness about non-discrimination. The 
author of the Italian case study adds that these four associations played a ‘quasi-institutional role’: they 
organized meetings with other organizations to address specific problems related to housing benefits for 
third-country nationals and collectively decided to challenge the approach of the province through pilot 
cases. 
Such complementarities between various governance tools are particularly useful where there are power 
asymmetries between stakeholders, for instance where the national equality body is very weak, as is the 
case in Italy or where NGOs lack resources or expertise. One interesting point however is whether these 
various governance tools may also compete or hinder each other. In Denmark for instance, one could 
question whether the omnipresence of unions in the handling of discrimination complaints does not 
create a risk of having a lack of monitoring of discrimination practices outside the field of employment. 
Along similar lines, it may be considered whether the quasi-judicial function of certain equality bodies 
may have a detrimental effect on their other more policy and ex-ante focused functions.52 In the context 
of EU asylum law, Tsourdi also expresses the concern that public entities, such as the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which combine monitoring with 
operational functions, may be inclined to choose soft governance tools when exercising the first function 
in order not to undermine their collaboration with Member States for the purpose of assisting and 
providing services to refugees.53  
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Spillover effects of EU fundamental rights governance beyond the scope of the anti-discrimination 
Directives 
The influence of EU anti-discrimination policy comes not only from the combination of several 
governance tools within the framework designed at EU level but also from the use of some of these 
instruments outside of the framework. Several mechanisms can serve as bridging devices. Some of them 
are fairly diffuse and inherent to law and policy making. EU law trends may indeed be relied upon to 
legitimate developments beyond EU law requirements. For instance, the Belgian Constitutional Court 
relied on EU procedural rules on access to justice to uphold Belgian rules on standing for collective 
actors, some of which pre-dated or went beyond the EU law requirements.54 The anti-discrimination 
Directives were used to point out the specific nature of litigation in this field and thus to support an 
enhanced standing for collective actors.55 EU law developments may also be used for the purpose of 
‘strategic campaigning’. Key stakeholders can enhance the impact of a given development at EU level 
through mobilisation at domestic level. By way of example, an information campaign and reliance on 
the media, in the aftermath of the Kamberaj ruling of the Court, allowed NGOs to pressure an Italian 
province to pass a reform which went well beyond what the Court’s ruling required.56 
Other bridging mechanisms have a more precise and classic legal nature - they are enshrined in general 
principles of law. One of them is the principle of equal treatment: national authorities may extend the 
use of legal tools adopted in the course of the implementation of EU law obligations (possibly going 
beyond such requirements) to non-EU law areas of a comparable nature.57 In the recent ruling by the 
Italian Supreme Court in Nabil, the generous rules on standing for collective actors in claims based on 
race or ethnic origin adopted for implementation of the Racial Equality Directive were deemed to apply 
to claims of nationality discrimination as well, despite the silence of the relevant domestic provisions. 
As reported by Passalacqua,58 the Supreme Court asserted that nationality and race/ethnic discrimination 
are equally prohibited by the Italian law, and therefore they should be equally regulated.59 Conversely, 
the principle of equal treatment may be used to back up downwards spillover effects. For instance, in 
Germany, the minimalist implementation of the procedural provisions of the anti-discrimination 
Directives has resulted in a reform of the general statute establishing the procedures before labour law 
courts that lowered protection.60 The possibility for organizations to bring claims in the name of a victim 
before labour courts is no longer possible as this option had been rejected in the context of the drafting 
of the General Equal Treatment Act.  
Another principle that can be used to as a bridging device to expand the effects of EU law beyond their 
initial scope is the right to an effective remedy and/or a fair trial. This principle exists in domestic legal 
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orders and interacts with Article 47 CFEU as well as Articles 6 and 13 ECHR.61 As legislative provisions 
of EU law encourage procedural change at domestic level, this may progressively feed into a reflexive 
process lifting upwards the common understanding of the fundamental right to effective judicial 
protection. Examples of domestic courts consolidating their standards of protection of the right to a fair 
trial by reference to an evolving legal framework influenced by EU law already exist. The Italian 
Supreme Court´s Nabil ruling also referred to that fundamental right in order to broaden the scope of 
generous rules on standing for collective actors to grounds of discrimination not initially covered by 
national rules implementing the anti-discrimination Directives.62 
Such an upgrading of the fundamental right to an effective remedy and/or a fair trial inspired from 
legislative developments could also in turn have consequences on the content of the right at the European 
Union level. Reflections have already been shaped along those lines on the basis of procedural 
developments in fields other than EU equality law. It has been argued that certain provisions of 
Directives addressing remedies in a broad range of situations covered by EU public procurement law 
could ‘end up acting as a blueprint of what is required from the Member States under the principle of 
effective judicial protection in areas which are not covered by the Directives’.63 One may question 
whether the reasoning of the Court on the burden of proof in matters of pay in gender equality cases, 
further extended to the Article 19 TFEU grounds through legislative intervention, could be deemed to 
apply to isolated equal treatment clauses found in EU employment and migration law. In the early case 
law indeed, the Court had shifted the burden of proof out of concern that applicants may be ‘deprived 
of any effective means of enforcing the principle of equal pay’.64 A reading of isolated equal treatment 
clauses in the light of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection65 could thus result in spillover 
effects of procedural progress in mainstream anti-discrimination law. The Court here would be engaging 
in a subtle exercise of stretching certain mechanisms by reference to the fundamental right to effective 
judicial protection and respecting the specificities of the legislation adopted on various legal bases at 
EU level.66 
Interplay between the domestic sphere and EU law concepts 
Besides these spillover effects at national level, the study showed that the dynamics created by the anti-
discrimination Directives through the support they lend to collective actors domestically can feed back 
into the development of core EU legal concepts. EU law, which can be invoked before domestic courts 
and takes primacy over domestic law, provides a tool to circumvent domestic resistance towards change. 
In this context, the preliminary ruling procedure is sometimes used as a strategic tool to push for a 
progressive vision of a given right to be imposed on domestic authorities by EU law. 
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The study coordinated with Kilpatrick and de Witte provides multiple illustrations in practice of this 
logic of circumvention of resistance to change. Danish trade unions have been reaching out to the Court 
to enhance the extent of the prohibition of disability discrimination. Atanasova and Miller explain that 
the Court´s HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge) ruling largely came about as a result of a 
particularly narrow reading of the notion of disability by Danish courts.67 Danish employee 
representatives made a conscious choice to push for a reference to the Court in the hope of a more 
generous interpretation of the notion. More generally, Danish stakeholders working in the equality field 
at the national level perceive the Court as more likely to issue positive decisions in the equality field 
compared to national courts.68 It is perhaps worth noting here that the logic of circumvention may not 
always (immediately) work, either because rulings of the Court do not match expectations or because 
the domestic court resists adopting the suggested new approach.69 It will be added here that although in 
certain settings, such as in CHEZ, lower courts make use of the preliminary ruling procedure to 
circumvent higher domestic courts, this is not always the case. Some of these preliminary rulings, such 
as that in Achbita, have actually emerged from the highest domestic courts themselves.  
Apart from the general potential that EU law offers for strategic litigation, it is important to stress that 
governance infrastructures created or enhanced under the influence of EU law have been catalysts to 
make greater use of this circumvention logic. For instance, the Belgian equality bodies, significantly 
shaped by EU law, have purportedly decided to use the preliminary ruling procedure in an attempt to 
circumvent domestic resistance to change. The dynamics behind the Feryn and Achbita cases clearly 
illustrate this point.70 The referral by the equality body in Belov, initiated in Bulgaria where no such 
body existed before the implementation of the EU Race Equality Directive, illustrates attempts to 
override decisions of the Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court.71 Similar choices to use EU law 
arguments as well as the preliminary ruling procedure in order to address domestic problems are found 
in the background of the case identified by Italian associations funded by EU programmes in Kameraj.72 
In addition to opting for EU law and pushing for use of the preliminary ruling procedure, domestic 
collective actors also shape the way EU substantive equality may develop as a consequence of a Court 
ruling. Belgian equality bodies for instance have been making wise and strategic use of EU law 
arguments as well as the preliminary ruling procedure itself.73 There is no procedure for parties or 
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collective actors to have a direct influence on the wording of preliminary questions in Belgium. Yet, in 
collaboration with Kolf, we traced back the history of the preliminary rulings in Feryn, Rosselle and 
Achbita and could see evidence of the decisive impact of Belgian equality bodies on the use of EU law 
arguments in these cases going as far as before the Court. In all three cases the equality bodies had a 
very strong influence on the very drafting of the preliminary questions brought before the Court. In that 
sense, infrastructure empowered by EU anti-discrimination law to promote equal treatment at the 
domestic level has ended up also promoting the right at the EU level. 
Conclusions and relevance for other fundamental right policies 
EU law provisions on collective actors therefore did unquestionably facilitate or broaden access to courts 
in certain countries, such as Belgium and Bulgaria; and when collective actors seek access to court, they 
do make specific use of EU law arguments and the preliminary ruling procedure. Yet, the overall picture 
is highly complex and nuanced. Domestic resistance to legal concepts imported from a supranational 
level under the label of fundamental rights are real and have far-reaching implications for the efficiency 
of such EU policies.  
In fact, the genuine added value of EU intervention in fundamental rights matters may lie in planting 
the seeds for fruitful reflexive processes at the domestic level through the creation of infrastructure, such 
as equality bodies, with a wide range of powers. The various contributions to the study coordinated with 
Kilpatrick and de Witte provide a vivid reminder that emphasis should not only be placed on the strength 
of the powers of actors but also on their diversity and softly textured nature, so as to allow for 
appropriation by the domestic sphere. Importantly, for such processes to be successful, infrastructure 
for EU fundamental rights governance at the domestic level ought to be able to operate despite potential 
hostility: they thus ought to be independent.74  
As EU intervention increasingly includes procedural rules on access to justice in sectoral legislation and 
diversifies governance tools in matters touching upon fundamental rights, it may be that EU decision-
makers in the years to come will be more inclined to transpose and adjust some of the existing 
mechanisms to other fields of law. Cross-sectoral analysis of procedural rules, governance tools and 
their actual operation at the domestic level may act as a catalyst for cross-fertilization.75 Horizontal soft-
law initiatives such as the 2013 Commission Recommendation on Collective Redress certainly seems 
to be a step in that direction.76 In the study coordinated with Kilpatrick and de Witte our focus has been 
on two remarkably dynamic, and equally fundamental-rights-sensitive, areas of EU law: data protection 
and asylum law.  
Until recently, in none of these two fields were Member States under an obligation to make it possible 
for private collective actors such as NGOs to play a formal role in litigation. In the context of asylum 
law, EU legislation (still) only refers to a possibility for the Member States to enable such entities to 
provide legal assistance and representation. In contrast, the 2016 reform of EU data protection law has 
recently introduced change: provisions partly mirroring the rules in EU anti-discrimination Directives 
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have been inserted in the relevant legislative framework.77 It will be interesting to observe in the years 
to come whether and how private collective actors actively engage in the governance of EU data 
protection law at domestic level and whether these developments spillover in particularly dynamic fields 
such as EU asylum law. 78  
Lynskey´s study of EU data protection law further observes the centrality ‘on paper at least’ of public 
collective actors or ‘domestic fundamental rights watchdogs’. Here, the expression refers to data 
protection authorities or ‘DPAs’ in the current governance system for data protection in the EU.79 In her 
view, though, such centrality on paper has not resulted in a major role for DPAs in litigating contentious 
issues of EU data protection law reaching as far as the Court. As for EU asylum legislation, it does not 
require the designation or creation of specialised entities such as equality bodies or DPAs at domestic 
level but, as we shall see below, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) performs at least some of their functions.  
Interesting features of both data protection and asylum law are the existence of specialised and strong 
supra-national governance structures. For instance, after the 2016 reform, a new EU body – the European 
Data Protection Board - will replace the current Article 29 Data Protection Working Party in order to 
ensure the consistent application of the relevant legislative framework across the Member States.80 
Another example is the European Data Protection Supervisor – in charge of monitoring the processing 
of personal data by EU institutions and bodies. It has power to intervene in infringement proceedings as 
well as actions for annulment before the Court (although not in preliminary reference procedures).81  
In the context of EU asylum law, a special role is allocated to the UNHCR, created as a subsidiary organ 
of the UN General Assembly in 1950, and now given an important role by the 1951 Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees. Among other functions, under EU law,82 the UNHCR must be given access to 
asylum seekers and these persons must also be able to communicate with the UNHCR in order to make 
legal advice available; access to individual applications for international protection and their follow up 
allows for the analysis of samples of domestic procedures making it possible to identify weaknesses; 
and, the UN agency must be allowed by the Member States to formally intervene in individual cases 
either before administrative authorities or the judiciary to present its views. 
The importance given by EU legislation to both sets of supra-national entities in data protection and 
asylum law distinguishes them from what exists in the field of EU anti-discrimination. There, the most 
advanced structures beyond the domestic sphere are EQUINET and the European Gender Institute but 
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these entities are much less powerful than those just mentioned. The strong anchorage of data protection 
law in internal market law may go a long way in explaining the degree of sophistication of these EU 
level organs in contrast with other fundamental rights policies such as equality law. While the 
importance given to the UNHCR illustrates how closely EU and international asylum law are 
intermingled. 
Quite naturally, both Lynskey and Tsourdi stress that collective actors have been involved in litigation 
even in the absence of specific rules to that effect in EU legislation. It is worth noting that in Digital 
Rights Ireland,83 which pre-dates the rules on standing for private collective actors in EU data protection 
law, the Irish court adopted a remarkably creative approach to the standing of such organizations. The 
Court referred inter alia to effective judicial protection under both national law and EU law – also 
important in the Italian Nabil case mentioned above - in order to allow this actio popularis on behalf of 
the privacy and data protection rights of all individuals.84 This confirms that the fundamental right to 
effective judicial protection may play a pivotal role in future jurisprudential developments; its 
interaction with provisions of EU legislation designed to enhance the effectiveness of EU fundamental 
rights policies shall provide for fruitful analysis in the years to come. Lynskey also observes that, 
curiously, no preliminary references have been received from larger Member States such the UK and 
Poland. It would be interesting to examine whether some of the entrenched resistances to imported legal 
concepts that characterize the French and German approach to anti-discrimination law could also explain 
the silence of these countries from EU level litigation in data protection law. 
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